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The European Union has agreed on implementing the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) 
principle in all policy sectors that are likely to have a direct impact on developing countries. This is in 
order to take account of and support the EU development cooperation objectives and the achievement of 
the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals.  
 
The common EU migration policy and the newly introduced EU Blue Card directive present an example 
of the implementation of the principle in practice: the directive is not only designed to respond to the 
occurring EU labour demand by attracting highly skilled third-country professionals, but is also intended 
to contribute to the development objectives of the migrant-sending developing countries, primarily 
through the tool of circular migration and the consequent skills transfers.  
 
My objective in this study is to assess such twofold role of the EU Blue Card and to explore the idea that 
migration could be harnessed for the benefit of development in conformity with the notion that the two 
form a positive nexus. Seeing that the EU Blue Card fails to differentiate the most vulnerable countries 
and sectors from those that are in a better position to take advantage of the global migration flows, the 
developmental consequences of the directive must be accounted for even in the most severe settings. 
Accordingly, my intention is to question whether circular migration, as claimed, could address the 
problem of brain drain in the Malawian health sector, which has witnessed an excessive outflow of its 
professionals to the UK during the past decade. 
 
In order to assess the applicability, likelihood and relevance of circular migration and consequent skills 
transfers for development in the Malawian context, a field study of a total of 23 interviews with local 
health professionals was carried out in autumn 2010. The selected approach not only allows me to 
introduce a developing country perspective to the on-going discussion at the EU level, but also enables 
me to assess the development dimension of the EU Blue Card and the intended PCD principle through a 
local lens. Thus these interviews and local viewpoints are at the very heart of this study.  
 
Based on my findings from the field, the propensity of the EU Blue Card to result in circular migration 
and to address the persisting South-North migratory flows as well as the relevance of skills transfers can 
be called to question. This is as due to the bias in its twofold role the directive overlooks the importance 
of the sending country circumstances, which are known to determine any developmental outcomes of 
migration, and assumes that circular migration alone could bring about immediate benefits. Without initial 
emphasis on local conditions, however, positive outcomes for vulnerable countries such as Malawi are 
ever more distant. Indeed it seems as if the EU internal interests in migration policy forbid the fulfilment 
of the PCD principle and diminish the attempt to harness migration for development to bare rhetoric. 
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Euroopan unioni on sitoutunut noudattamaan kehityspoliittisen johdonmukaisuuden periaatetta kaikilla 
politiikan aloilla, joiden katsotaan vaikuttavan kehitysmaiden kehitykseen. Periaatteen mukaisesti näiden 
eri politiikan alojen tulisi työssään ottaa huomioon sekä tukea kehitysyhteistyön tavoitteita ja yhteisesti 
sovittuja YK:n vuosituhattavoitteita.  
 
EU:n yhteinen maahanmuuttopolitiikka ja toukokuussa 2009 hyväksytty Blue Card -direktiivi toimivat 
hyvänä esimerkkinä periaatteen toimeenpanosta käytännössä. Direktiivin tarkoituksena on houkutella ja 
rekrytoida korkeasti koulutettua työvoimaa unionin alueelle ja siten vastata nykyiseen ja tulevaan 
työvoimapulaan. Samanaikaisesti Blue Cardin uskotaan tukevan myös maahanmuuttajien lähtömaita 
kiertomuuton ja aivokierron avulla.   
 
Tutkielmani tarkoituksena on arvioida näitä EU Blue Cardille asetettuja tavoitteita ja tarkastella direktiiviin 
sisältyvää ajatusta muuttoliikkeen valjastamisesta kehityksen hyväksi. Ottaen huomioon, ettei heikoimpia 
ja haavoittuvimpia maita ja sektoreita ole selvästi rajattu direktiivin ja sen kannustaman kansainvälisen 
rekrytoinnin ulkopuolelle, on sen vaikutuksia syytä tutkia myös kaikista köyhimmissä maissa. 
Pyrkimyksenäni on siten tutkia Blue Cardin ja sen tukeman kiertomuuton tarjoamia mahdollisuuksia 
Malawissa, jossa lääkärien ja sairaanhoitajien maastamuutto ja aivovuoto Isoon-Britanniaan on ollut 
laajamittaista ja on johtanut maan terveydenhuoltosektorin nykyiseen vakavaan työvoimapulaan.  
 
Kiertomuuton todennäköisyyden, soveltuvuuden ja hyödyllisyyden arvioimiseksi toteutin syksyllä 2010 
Malawissa kenttätutkimuksen, joka koostui kaiken kaikkiaan 23 haastattelusta. Nämä paikallisten 
lääkärien ja sairaanhoitajien näkemykset tarjoavat tuoreen näkökulman eurooppalaiseen keskusteluun 
muuttoliikkeen ja kehityksen yhteyksistä. Lisäksi kenttätutkimus avaa mahdollisuuden tutkia 
kehityspoliittisen johdonmukaisuuden periaatteen toteutumista EU Blue Card -direktiivissä 
kehitysmaiden omasta perspektiivistä.  
 
Tutkimukseni pohjalta kiertomuuton ilmenemisen todennäköisyys ja sen oletettu hyödyllisyys voidaan 
kyseenalaistaa. Jotta kiertomuutosta olisi hyötyä myös kaikista köyhimmille maille, kuten Malawille, tulisi 
Blue Card -direktiivissä kiinnittää huomiota ennen kaikkea lähtömaiden paikallisiin olosuhteisiin, joiden 
tiedetään pitkälti määrittävän muuttoliikkeen kehitysvaikutuksia. Tämä ei kuitenkaan ole mahdollista, 
koska direktiivin pääasiallinen tavoite on vastata unionin sisäisiin intresseihin. Tästä johtuen 
kehityspoliittisen johdonmukaisuuden periaate ei toteudu vaan rajoittuu pelkkään retoriikkaan, jonka 
mukaan yksinomaan kiertomuutto riittäisi takaamaan muuttoliikkeen tuen kehitykselle.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
‘The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies 
that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies 
support development objectives’ (European Consensus on Development 2005). 
 
Within the 2005 European Consensus on Development the European Union (EU) 
adopted the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) approach as one of the guiding 
principles of its policy formulation. The basic idea of PCD is that all EU policies which 
are likely to have a direct impact on developing countries should be aware of these 
possible effects. The aim is to avoid the situation where ‘one hand does not know what 
the other is doing’ (CONCORD 2009). This means either making other policies 
supportive of development objectives or at the minimum guaranteeing that they do no 
harm. 
 
The European Consensus listed twelve specific policy areas, where policy coherence 
should be especially considered in order to facilitate eradication of poverty and the 
achievement of the internationally adopted Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 
2015. Migration policy stands for one of these key policy sectors amongst sectors such 
as security, environment and energy.1 Attaining policy coherence regarding migration 
policy presents itself as particularly interesting challenge within the PCD framework. 
This is because the EU intentions towards migration policy are twofold: on the one hand 
migration  policy  is  formulated  for  the  benefit  of  the  internal  security  and  employment  
interests of the Union, and on the other hand it is required to take account of 
development objectives within the migrant-sending countries.  
 
This twofold role of the common European Union migration policy is embodied in the 
recent EU initiative to recruit highly skilled third-country nationals – the EU Blue Card 
directive. The directive is to be adapted in the member state immigration systems by 
July 2011.  By introducing the Blue Card, the Union not only wishes to reduce illegal 
migration and to respond to its own labour needs, but also hopes to encourage 
development-friendly circular migration. Circular migration has been perceived as a 
tool to address the current problem of human capital flight from developing countries to 
                                               
1 The rest are agriculture, trade, fisheries, social dimension of globalization, research and innovation, 
information society, transport, and climate change (European Consensus on Development 2005).  
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developed ones, known as brain drain – and convert these persisting one-way South-
North migration patterns to more sustainable and mutually beneficial human capital 
flows on a global scale.  
 
The idea of development-friendly circular migration embedded in the EU Blue Card 
represents prevalent migration-development optimism, according to which migration 
and development form a positive nexus. According to Oxford Current English 
Dictionary (1990) nexus is ‘a connected group or series’. A positive nexus can be 
defined to occur when subjects forming the nexus, act as complementary to one another. 
This positive nexus between migration and development is however not self-evident as 
any initiative devised to recruit highly skilled personnel from developing countries risks 
further intensifying the prevalent South-North migration patterns instead of converting 
the flows, if circular migration fails to materialize. This is also true with the EU Blue 
Card. Indeed the African Union (AU) and several non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have warned of the potential negative impacts of present selective immigration 
practices, especially on countries where human capital is already scarce (see for 
example Maru 2008 and Fair Politics 2008a).  
 
Emigration of health professionals from Malawi to the UK at the turn of the century 
illustrates such negative consequences that may follow when developed countries lure 
highly skilled personnel from developing ones. Instead of providing a resolution to the 
already stressed conditions at home, many Malawian health workers covered up for the 
staff shortages within the British health sector at the time. Although the British 
immigration and employment policy never intended to exacerbate the already stressed 
conditions in Malawi, in the absence of effective safeguards, excessive emigration and 
brain drain resulted.  
 
The out-migration of Malawian health professionals has been somewhat soothed for 
now  with  successful  state  and  donor  intervention,  but  the  vast  human  resources  crisis  
still remains. One of the reasons for present crisis is that of marginal return migration. 
Indeed, of the four hundred Malawian health professionals, who emigrated between 
2000 and 2005 alone, only few have returned to Malawi (European Community 2007). 
The persisting and acute lack of highly skilled professionals in Malawi makes the health 
sector highly vulnerable for initiatives that are likely to encourage further out-migration 
of  its  doctors  and  nurses,  and  poses  a  serious  threat  to  the  realization  of  the  MDGs –  
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three of which relate directly to the provision of adequate health care; child health, 
maternal health and combat against HIV/AIDS.  
 
In order to ensure coherence along with these common development objectives and to 
avoid negative consequences similar to that of Malawi, the EU Blue Card attempts to 
facilitate circular migration in order to safeguard the interests within the migrant-
sending  countries  as  well.  Supplementary  to  circular  migration,  the  EU  Blue  Card  
encourages ethical recruitment to avoid deepening the problem of brain drain. Hence the 
directive has been equipped with two specific tools that are considered essential for the 
realization of the Policy Coherence for Development principle. 
 
 
1.1  Research topic and questions  
 
In  this  thesis  I  will  study  the  twofold  role  of  the  EU  migration  policy  and  question  
whether or not the current migration policy framework of the Union can succeed in 
realizing the PCD principle. Is it possible for the EU Blue Card to support the common 
development objectives, while responding primarily to the internal EU security and 
employment  interests?  Will  the  Blue  Card  initiative  be  able  to  support  the  pro-
development circular migration instead of further contributing to the brain drain 
dilemma of developing countries?  
 
The purpose of my study is to transfer this line of questioning from the heavy EU 
apparatus to a more approachable individual developing country context, and to 
determine, if the tools and mechanisms embedded in the Blue Card are relevant from a 
developing country perspective. I have chosen health sector in Malawi as my particular 
focus. Provided that all highly skilled personnel in developing countries are eligible to 
apply for an EU Blue Card, the concern over the out-migration of Malawian nurses and 
doctors is legitimate. Malawi thus presents itself as a valid framework for this research. 
 
I have chosen to approach the overall research questions from a local point of view, as 
local developing country perspectives has been by far ignored in the EU policy 
formulation. Furthermore the local perspective enables the assessment of the 
development  dimension  of  the  EU  Blue  Card.  For  this  purpose,  I  carried  out  a  field  
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research of over twenty interviews in Malawi in autumn 2010.2 My intention in these 
field interviews was to map the potential of the EU Blue Card to harness migration for 
the interest of development, as seen from a local Malawian point of view. What are the 
needs and interests present within the Malawian health sector and will circular 
migration provide relevant means to match these needs?  
 
The challenge has been to discover if the migration-development nexus maintains its 
positive nuance when observed from a different angle. As the EU has perceived circular 
migration as a way forward to realize the positive nexus, my purpose has been to 
evaluate the sustainability of such argument. As history of humankind shows, people 
have always migrated within and beyond national borders, and will most likely continue 
to  do  so.  The  form  that  migration  flows  take  –  where  they  start  and  end  and  whether  
they circulate – depends first and foremost on the circumstances underlying the decision 
to migrate. These circumstances can be studied in order to discover individual motives 
behind migration. In other words, the circumstances define the form of the actual 
migration, and the form is what distinguishes negative brain drain from positive brain 
circulation. 
 
In Malawi my intention was to understand these circumstances through the personal 
experiences of the local medical professionals rather than relying on the vague 
generalizations of the developing country conditions and the reasons why migration 
occurs. Personal hopes and aspirations presented by the Malawian health workers have 
not only facilitated my understanding of why some have decided to leave and others to 
stay,  but  also  why so  many have  failed  to  return  and  circular  migration  has  not  so  far  
occurred. 
 
The EU Blue Card will be assessed in the light of my findings. I will conclude whether 
or not the local realities and interests in relation to migration are taken into account 
within  the  directive.  In  other  words  I  will  question,  whether  or  not  the  EU Blue  Card  
matches the current needs and interests present in Malawi. Based on this assessment, I 
will discuss the assumed capacity of the EU Blue Card to accomplish its twofold role, 
not only in securing the internal interests of the European Union, but also in benefitting 
the migrant-sending countries. That is, does circular migration provide a viable and 
relevant solution for the problem of brain drain? Within the limits of this study, 
                                               
2 A total of 20 persons were interviewed – three of whom twice.  
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provided that circular migration is found relevant and likely, the EU Blue Card can be 
expected to contribute to development, and hence follow and realize the Policy 
Coherence for Development principle. 
 
 
1.2  The boundaries and limitations of the study 
 
Seeing that the EU Blue Card is yet to be adopted to the member states’ immigration 
systems, it is too early to assess the outcomes of the directive as such. Therefore I will 
use the experiences of somewhat similar British migration policy and the emigration of 
Malawian health professionals to the UK during the past decade as reflection points for 
my  discussion.  It  must  be  stressed  that  the  Blue  Card  and  the  British  policy  are  not  
directly equivalent, but share similar characteristics which makes the link applicable 
within the limits of this study.  
 
I have selected health sector and emigration of doctors and nurses as my occupational 
focus  of  all  highly  skilled  labour  migration.  The  reasons  for  my  selection  are  the  
obvious connection between health sector and social development, and the fact that 
even if staff shortages of health professionals in developing countries are acknowledged 
in the Blue Card, experiences from the British case indicate that even selective ethical 
recruitment will not efficiently prevent migration within this line of work. Furthermore, 
migration  of  health  professionals  is  interesting  in  relation  to  circular  migration,  seeing  
that unlike for many other occupations such as IT personnel, the opportunities for 
doctors and nurses to transfer skills are to a great extent tied to physical return as 
acknowledged in Bach (2006). For this reason the accomplishment of circular migration 
becomes particularly important. 
 
I  have  chosen  Malawi  and  the  Malawian  health  sector  as  my case  for  several  reasons.  
First of all, I had ready personal contacts within the country. Without these contacts my 
access to the field could have been denied or at least would have required great efforts – 
even to an endless extent. I had alternative contacts in the neighbouring countries of 
Tanzania and Zambia as well, but these did not prove reliable enough. Second, the 
situation of the health sector can be considered as rather extreme. It is often quoted fact, 
that there are more Malawian doctors in Manchester than in the whole of Malawi (for 
example in Broadhead & Muula 2002). There are approximately only two hundred 
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doctors for the population of 14 million (Malawi Ministry of Health 2007, AHWO 
2009). Hence Malawi stands out as an exception even amongst its Southern African 
neighbours, where highly skilled health workforce is scarce. 
 
The choice of such strong case country can be maintained for two reasons. First, as the 
EU Blue Card is open for all third-country nationals, it is available also for Malawians. 
And as will be shown later, even with ethical recruitment, the directive currently fails to 
differentiate vulnerable countries from the more stable ones. This is why it is important 
to  point  out  also  the  worst-case  scenario  of  the  Blue  Card.  Second,  as  the  Malawian  
health sector is in critical condition, it also provides an opportunity to consider, whether 
the tools of the EU Blue Card actually can promote development and bring about 
improvement over the present situation by means of circular migration.  
 
The  extremity  of  my  case  country  is  not  however  purely  a  benefit  for  my  study.  Any  
findings regarding Malawi have to be thoroughly assessed before making any 
generalizations. Similarly focusing on health sector may exaggerate the risks concerning 
migration of highly skilled workforce encouraged by the EU Blue Card. Few 
professions after all are so closely linked with social development and the well-being of 
populations.  
 
What  is  more,  it  must  be  stressed  that  my  focus  here  is  only  on  the  common  EU  
migration policy designed to encourage highly skilled labour migration. In addition to 
the EU Blue Card the Union has, however, adopted or introduced initiatives for other 
migrant categories as well, such as for students, researchers, seasonal workers, intra-
corporate transferees and remunerated trainees (European Commission Home Affairs, 
online source). The impact that migration is likely to have on the development of the 
migrant-sending countries naturally depends on the overall sum of all these migration 
flows. Hence it is important to note, that within the limits of this study my objective is 
to  evaluate  the  policy  coherence  between  the  Blue  Card  directive  and  the  EU  
development objectives alone, instead of trying to grasp the common migration policy 
as a whole. Similarly, I will refrain from addressing the issue of individual migrant 
rights, as my focus will be solely on developmental and societal impacts. That is to say 
that my intention is not to argue against anyone’s right to migrate or the right to reside 
in the EU. The boundaries and limitations in relation to the field research and analysis 
will be discussed below in chapter 5.  
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1.3 Previous literature 
 
International migration and its impacts on development is a well-discussed topic within 
the academia. Among the first theories of international migration were those of 
Ravenstein (1885 in Lee 1966 p. 47), Petersen (1958) and Lee (1966), in which 
definitions, laws and typologies of migration were initially introduced. It is these early 
studies that also formed the basis for current discussion and literature, which nowadays 
embraces a wide array of societal issues, ranging from broad economic effects to 
cultural influences. Such societal transformations caused by international migration are 
for example at the heart of studies concerning transnationalism and migrant diasporas 
(see for example Vertovec 2007, 2009 and Davies 2007). Especially the ways in which 
migration  intertwines  with  development  has  attracted  a  growing  attention.  Some  
influential and essential examples, also regarding my own study, include for instance 
Massey et al. (1998); Massey (1999); Stark (2004); Tanner (2005); de Haas (2005, 
2010); de Haan (2006); Bakewell (2007); Portes (2009) and Beine et al. (2009).  
 
Within such research, the idea of a migration-development nexus is strongly present as 
it is often pointed out that circular migration and return of migrants can act as an engine 
for development through financial, human and social capital that migrants are likely to 
bring back home. Such ideas together with the notion of a nexus have been explicated 
for example in the well-known and often quoted Nyberg-Sørensen et al. (2002a, 2002b). 
Yet another study concerning migration-development nexus worth mentioning is that of 
Böhning (2009), who has examined the relationship of migrant status and rights in the 
receiving society to that of the developmental outcomes in the sending country. 
Böhning’s contribution is particularly topical, given the current re-formulation of the 
EU migration policy.  
 
Closely related to the nexus-literature is that of literature concerning the fundamental 
driving forces behind international migratory movements – namely research addressing 
the root causes of migration (see for example Neumayer 2005 out of the many authors, 
who have addressed the issue). Such research reveals well how global inequalities and 
lack of development influence decisions to migrate and explain the persistence of 
South-North migratory flows. These matters cannot be neglected when assessing the 
developmental outcomes of migration within the nexus-literature, because the latter 
depends  on  the  former.  In  addition  to  more  general  assessments  of  root  causes  of  
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migration, also more specific reasons behind global health worker movements have 
been addressed. For the purposes of my own study, of particular interest are for example 
the articles by Bach (2003; 2006); Martineau et al. (2004); Eastwood et al. (2005); 
Muula (2005, 2006), Muula et al. (2006); Dovlo (2005); Vujicic & Zurn (2006) and 
Connell et al. (2007), as these have focused not only on health sector conditions, but 
also on the problem of brain drain in Sub-Saharan Africa. My own field work in Malawi 
resembles such studies, yet my intention is to connect my findings to the nexus-
literature as well as to the broader European discussion on migration and development – 
a link that has been so far missing.  
 
As opposed to the above, the connection between migration and development in the EU 
context  has  not  been  widely  addressed.  The  few  authors,  who  have  explored  such  
relationship, include Castles (2004); Lavenex & Kunx (2008) and Adepoju et al. (2010). 
In addition to these academic contributions, also Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has carried out research concerning the 
interlinkages between the two policy sectors (see for example Katseli et al. 2006). On a 
larger scale, the ways in which different policy sectors interact has come under scrutiny 
through the concept of policy coherence. Some key writings and theories regarding 
policy coherence and development can be found in Forster & Stokke (eds. 1999a) and 
Carbone (2008) – works, which I will turn to later on in the study.  
 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
Above I have briefly introduced the topic of my study rooted in the idea that migration 
policy can be conducive to development objectives. My purpose is to place this line of 
thought present within the European Union migration policy formulation to a concrete 
developing country context and test the viability of such optimism. I have presented 
Malawian health sector as my primary focus.  
 
Since Malawi presents the definitive focus of my research, in chapter 2 I will begin by 
presenting the local context and discussing the current developmental challenges that 
have to a certain extent resulted from the emigration of Malawian health professionals 
to the UK. I will show how the British employment policy resulted in controversial 
conditions and brain drain in Malawi, requiring an emergency response from both the 
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Malawian and British governments. Such negative outcomes of migration policy are 
currently feared to result from the EU Blue Card as well.   
 
Consequently in chapter 3, I will discuss the twofold role and the very content of the EU 
Blue Card and present the concrete tools by which the EU aims to avoid such negative 
consequences that migration policy may have on developing countries. The EU aim is 
to  transform  the  global  migration  trends  for  the  benefit  of  all  by  means  of  ethical  
recruitment and circular migration that are to turn brain drain into a brain gain. These 
tools are crafted to serve both the internal EU security and employment interests as well 
as to fulfil the Policy Coherence for Development principle.  
 
In chapter 4 I will proceed by placing my research context and topic – Malawi and the 
EU Blue Card – in the academic field and present my theoretical framework. The 
current debate over the developmental implications of the EU Blue Card fits well in the 
previous research over migration-development nexus, in which optimist and pessimist 
schools of thought can be identified. It is also this juxtaposition upon which my 
theoretical framework can be constructed. Seeing that previous literature on migration 
and development is extensive and diverse, I have decided to focus on three key concepts 
of triple-win, brain drain and migrant syndromes that fit not only the current European 
discussion, but also the Malawian experience. I will furthermore discuss the concept of 
policy coherence in more detail and present some previous work on the topic.    
 
After rooting my study in previous research, I will commence with my personal 
contribution to the topics of EU policy coherence and the migration-development nexus. 
Before presenting my findings and following conclusions, in chapter 5 I will discuss my 
fieldwork. I will explain my methodology as well as consider the obstacles and 
boundaries that I faced both in Malawi and afterwards during the research analysis. In 
order  to  comply  with  my  chosen  approach,  in  chapter  6  I  will  describe  the  prevailing  
circumstances in Malawi trough the words of the local health professionals. My 
intention is to assess whether or not the local needs and interests match with the EU 
approach to harness migration for the benefit of development as adopted in the EU Blue 
Card.   
 
After discussing the Malawian reality and laying the groundwork, in chapter 7 I will 
return  to  my  research  questions  of  the  twofold  role  of  the  EU  migration  policy  and  
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determine whether tools of circular migration and ethical recruitment will prove enough 
to address the problem of brain drain and to realize the PCD principle. I will do this by 
looking at the issue through a new lens provided by my findings from Malawi. 
 
 
2. Brain Drain of Health Professionals: from Malawi to the UK 
 
‘The NHS will not actively recruit from developing countries in order not to undermine 
their efforts to provide local healthcare’ (UK Department of Health 2000).  
 
The UK National Health Service (NHS) implemented a new policy plan for investment 
and reform in 2000, in which international recruitment was identified as a way to tackle 
human resources for health shortages within the UK. Despite the above statement 
concerning the recruitment of overseas professionals, overall around 68,000 nurses and 
17,000 new NHS doctors came from abroad between 2001 and 2006. Even though 
majority of non-European recruits originated from India and the Philippines, emigration 
of health workers from Africa occurred in addition (Young et al. 2008). 
Correspondingly immigration of the highly skilled personnel to the UK was encouraged 
primarily by the means of the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP) and the 
Work Permit scheme of the Home Office at the time (Dobson et al. 2007, EMN 2007).3  
 
Increased opportunities of immigration and employment encouraged also Malawian 
health workers to move to the UK at the turn of the century, contributing to excessive 
human resource crisis in a country already suffering from staff shortages of skilled 
health care personnel. While the absolute numbers of Malawian health professionals 
within the UK seem insignificant according to the European benchmark, these 
emigrants have accounted for a considerable proportion of the total health workforce 
available in Malawi. The saying ‘there are more Malawian doctors in Manchester than 
there are in Malawi’ has appeared continuously in the newspaper reports during the past 
decade (as for example in the Economist 26.11.2004, online source), and illustrates well 
the extent of emigration from the Malawian point of view.   
                                               
3  The introduction of the points-based system in February 2008 reduced 80 different routes to 
employment and education in the UK to just five tiers, which are being rolled out up to spring 2009. The 
first tier concerns highly skilled individuals (NHS Employers 2008, online source) 
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2.1 Consequences and response to the health sector crisis 
 
Currently, there are less than 200 local medical doctors working within the public health 
sector in a country of some 14 million people, although since the establishment of the 
Malawi College of Medicine (COM) in 1991, some 300 doctors have graduated 
(Malawi College of Medicine, online source). Out-migration continues to downplay the 
number of graduates, as according to the Malawi Ministry of Health (2007) estimates, 
some 12-19 medical doctors have emigrated each year since 2002 – either to work or 
study. So far return migration has not been significant. Likewise out-migration of nurses 
proposes a challenge, as for example in 2005 emigration of nurses accounted for 88 
professionals – 80 of whom migrated to the UK (ibid.). During the peak of the crisis, 
out-migration exceeded the training rate of some sixty degree nurses per year (Record & 
Mohiddin 2006).  
 
In addition to out-migration, high attrition levels due to death, illness, retirement, 
resignation, dismissal, or redundancy – have contributed to the crisis. In 2005 the 
attrition level of public sector health workers accounted for nearly five hundred, half of 
which accounted for death. Over 20 percent accounted for resignations and it is indeed 
unclear how many of these could be accounted for out-migration as well, as it has been 
noted, that high attrition levels due to early retirement and resignation in particular, 
might indeed disguise the actual number of emigrants (Malawi Ministry of Health 2007). 
Regardless of the challenges proposed by data inaccuracies, WHO (2010a) estimates 
that in total there are only three health workers per 10 000 inhabitants in Malawi, 
whereas the recommendation is a minimum of 23. The doctor/patient ratio is estimated 
at only 0, 16 per 10 000 people. The Ministry of Health report supports these estimates 
and notes that these ratios are below those of the neighboring countries (Malawi 
Ministry of Health 2007).  
 
These  shortages  of  health  professionals  pose  a  serious  threat  to  a  country  with  life  
expectancy rate of 53 years (Human Development Report 2009, WHO 2010b). In 
particular communicable diseases increase the pressure experienced within the health 
sector. For example prevalence of HIV among adults aged 15-49 years is nearly twelve 
percent in Malawi whereas the regional average is almost five percent. Additionally to 
HIV/AIDS – malaria and tuberculosis account for the most common communicable 
diseases and causes of death in Malawi. Also poor child and maternal health strain the 
16 
 
scarce human resources; under-five mortality rate is one hundred per a thousand live 
births, and maternal mortality ratio is 1100 per 100 000 live birth – which tops the 
regional average of 900/100 000 (WHO 2010b). 
 
To reduce child mortality, improve maternal health and to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and other diseases comprise three of the eight United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). On the whole the accomplishment of these particular goals is risked on 
account  of  the  human resource  shortages,  as  for  instance  antiretroviral  (ARV) therapy  
coverage among people with advanced HIV infection was only 35 percent in 2007, 
below the regional average of 44 percent. Only 54 percent of all births were attended by 
skilled health personnel in Malawi during 2000-2008 (WHO 2010b). House of 
Commons (Lunn et al. 2008) indeed reported that not least because of migration to the 
UK, MDGs like maternal mortality are unlikely to be met in Malawi by 2015.  
 
As a result of scarce human resources for health, Malawi adapted the Essential Health 
Package (EHP) in 2002. The idea was to prioritize resources for essential health care 
alone and guarantee these services for all. In order to secure delivery of basic health 
care, specialized medicine was left with less attention (Malawi Ministry of Health 2004). 
Also the UK department for International Development (DFID) has stepped in as a 
response to the human resources crisis in Malawi.  
 
Critical shortage of medical and human resources were identified as the primary 
obstacles in achieving the EHP objectives. Hence the six-year emergency human 
resources for health programme (EHRP)4 was implemented in collaboration with the 
DFID and the Global Fund as the key partners, with an objective to train, recruit, deploy 
and  retain  health  professionals  in  Malawi  (Malawi  Ministry  of  Health  2007).  Out  of  a  
number of tools to tackle the human resource shortages, retention policy as a response 
to out-migration has perhaps received the most attention in migration-development 
literature (see for example Dovlo 2003, Skeldon 2008). Retention policy introduced a 
bond for health workers to work within the public sector in exchange for subsidized 
generic studies. The duration of the bond is usually from two to five years.5 In addition 
                                               
4 A six-year emergency pre-service training plan initiated in 2002 preceded the introduction of EHRP, 
with an objective to ensure full enrollment in facilities providing health education. The aim was to train 
850 health workers each year for six years.  
5 Retention policy signifies a bond to work either within government facilities or CHAM. The duration of 
the bond varies, as different periods were obliged at different times of the crisis.  
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to retention policy, wage increments, a system of locum and budget housing have been 
introduced in order to encourage health workers to remain in Malawi.  
 
According to DFID (2010) report, the number of physicians increased from 43 in 2004 
to 265 in 2009. Correspondingly the number of nurses (all cadres) increased from 3456 
to 4812 within the same period.6 These achievements were by large enabled by the 
retention policy and increased educational intake. Also the introduction of auxiliary 
nursing cadres in addition to that of degree nurses facilitated improvement; the idea 
behind auxiliary cadres has been to provide a quick response to the crisis by producing a 
large  number  of  nurses  within  a  short  period  of  time.  Auxiliary  nurses  are  not  
internationally qualified, and hence also employment opportunities abroad are 
somewhat limited.7 
 
Despite these efforts, human resources for health have not yet been stabilized, as 
proportional out-migration remains high (Malawi Ministry of Health 2007). Migration 
is considered as a viable option, primarily because of the limited intake and 
opportunities for further studies. Of the 255 College of Medicine students graduated by 
2005, only 58 percent remained in Malawi in 2007, whereas 38 percent resided abroad, 
half of whom were studying (Malawi Ministry of Health 2007). Return was uncertain. 
Seeing that in 2008 only 24 medical specialists were registered to practice in Malawi 
(AHWO 2009), return migration could have a remarkable impact for the development 
of the health sector. However as of now, international volunteers have stepped in to 
cover the lack of specialized professionals.  
 
The six-year emergency human resources for health programme came to an end in 2010, 
signifying drastic reductions in funds available for subsidized education. As will be 
discussed in my research analysis, ending of the EHRP has resulted in vast uncertainty 
and insecurity among the Malawian health professionals, given that the consequences 
remain to be seen.  
  
                                               
6 It is likely that not all have remained in Malawi keeping in mind the WHO estimate of 3/10 000 health 
workers. Nurses are trained within three main institutions in Malawi, University of Malawi Kamuzu 
College of Nursing (KCN), Malawi College of Health Sciences and CHAM colleges. Faculty of Health 
Sciences has been established also in Mzuzu (Univeristy). 
7 At the peak of the crisis in 2002 the education of auxiliary nurses (diploma enrolled nurses referred to as 
technicians) took only two years, the third year was completed later on. Today education lasts for three 
years, compared to four years in the university.  
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2.2 The failure of ethical recruitment 
 
Additionally to development programs initiated in Malawi, responses to the crisis were 
implemented in the migrant-receiving end as well. The UK Department of Health 
adopted a Code of Conduct for International Recruitment in 2001, in order to ensure 
ethical recruitment from developing countries already experiencing human resource 
crisis within the health sector (Department of Health 2001). However as stated in 
British Medical Journal (Carlisle 2004) between 2002 and 2003, one in four new nurse 
registrants originated from a developing country listed as critical and not to be targeted 
by  the  NHS  for  active  recruitment.  In  fact  according  to  the  European  Community  
Country Strategy Paper for Malawi, the number of emigrants in 2000-2005 totaled four 
hundred – all of which were listed as medical personnel, and categorized as permanent 
emigrants. UK presented the primary destination country (European Community 2007).  
 
In 2004 the Code of Conduct was revised to include recruitment of temporary and 
locum health workers through private employment agencies in addition to NHS 
recruitment. Likewise the Code of Practice was as well extended to include the private 
sector by the means of voluntary agreement (Department of Health 2004). However, the 
2004 revision of the Code has not managed to guarantee ethical recruitment up to date. 
According to Buchan et al. (2009), the attempt of the Code is not actually to prevent 
overseas recruitment from critical sectors and vulnerable countries, but only to stop 
active recruitment. Recruitment is not considered as active, if  the  applicant  makes  the  
initial  contact  for  employment.  Likewise,  the  Code  fails  to  take  account  of  applicants  
already residing within the UK, as for instance students and those initially recruited by a 
private sector health care employer not bound by the Code, are eligible for employment.  
 
In the absence of systematic monitoring mechanisms of active recruitment, it becomes 
impossible to separate the number of international health workers, who were actively 
recruited from those who were not (ibid.).  Although an assessment of the effect  of the 
Code of Practice shows a significant reduction in overseas recruitment after 2006, 
Buchan et al. (ibid.) argue, that this decline can be traced to multiple reasons other than 
ethical recruitment protocols. Among all, declining demand for health workers in the 
UK, greater number of local medical graduates, implementation of more strict 
registration and entry requirements, and NHS budget constraints are acknowledged to 
have contributed to the reduction in overseas recruitment.  
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Despite reduction in recruitment, brain drain from developing countries has continued 
and thus DFID has acknowledged the role of migration policy for development among 
other policy sectors. Improved migration management, such as circular migration is 
believed to provide a solution for the problem of brain drain: 
 
‘DFID recognizes that policy coherence is of central importance to global 
development. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals depends less on 
international aid than on national policies on trade and agriculture, migration and 
employment, finance, environment, science and technology, security and defense’ 
(House of Commons International Development Committee 2004 p.21) 
 
 
In 2009 the European Union adapted a directive on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment 
(Council of the European Union 2009a) – known as the EU Blue Card. In its attempt to 
attract highly qualified personnel to the Community area in order to cover for the 
emerging staff shortages, the EU Blue Card can be perceived similar to the Highly 
Skilled Migrant Programme and the Work Permit scheme of the UK at the turn of the 
century.  
 
Seeing that global health workforce shortages continue to encourage migratory 
movements, in particular from developing countries to developed ones – it is likely that 
the EU Blue Card will provide yet another channel for this movement to occur. Whereas 
the advocates of the directive believe that the EU Blue Card has potential to contribute 
to development within the migrant-sending countries through circular migration, 
opponents claim that the directive is implemented at the expense of developing 
countries  human  resources  and  risks  to  increase  brain  drain.  Below  I  will  present  the  
fundamentals of the Blue Card directive, and the opposing views of its developmental 
implications. 
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A billboard message in Malawi stating the importance of nurses  
and the problem of staff shortages. 8 
 
                                               
8 The original picture http://www.flickr.com/photos/hodgkinson/page2/ 
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3. The Twofold Role of the EU Blue Card 
 
In May 2009 the European Union adapted a Council Directive on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment – an initiative put forward by the European Commission Directorate-
General (DG) for Justice, Freedom and Security responsible for the common 
immigration and asylum policy of the Union (Council of the European Union 2009a). 9 
The  primary  objectives  of  the  so  called  EU  Blue  Card  were  identified  as  to  enhance  
internal security as well as to boost the competitiveness of the European Union 
economy.  Economic  labour  migration  has  been  perceived  to  provide  a  solution  to  the  
foreseen consequences of demographic ageing in Europe (European Commission 
2007a).  In  addition  to  these  economic  interests  set  out  for  the  EU  Blue  Card,  the  
common European Union migration policy is obliged to account for the objectives of 
development cooperation in accordance to the Policy Coherence for Development 
principle agreed on in the 2005 European Consensus on Development.  
 
Although migration policy was identified as a common EU issue already in the 1992 
Treaty of Maastricht, little was done before the 1999 Tampere Programme, where four 
elements  were  identified  as  a  framework  for  a  Common  EU  Asylum  and  Migration  
Policy.  These  elements  were  defined  as  1)  partnership  with  countries  of  origin,  2)  
establishment of a common European asylum system, 3) fair treatment of third-country 
nationals, and 4) management of migration flows. This comprehensive EU approach to 
migration issues and harmonization of the member state migration procedures was seen 
essential for improved migration management, and the establishment of an area of 
freedom, security and justice within the European Union (Council of the European 
Union 1999 & 2004, European Commission 2000). 10  The past decade has indeed 
witnessed a variety of consequent policy achievements, as common procedures have 
been implemented for instance for the admission of students and researchers, and for 
defining the terms of family reunification and EU long-term resident status. Equally 
common grounds for integration and illegal migration have been laid out (European 
Commission Home Affairs 2010, online source).  
                                               
 
9 Directorate-General  for  Home  Affairs  was  created  on  July  1,  2010  from  the  division  of  DG  Justice,  
Freedom and Security into two Directorates-Generals. 
10 The legal basis for an area of freedom security and justice within the EU were laid out in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997, and confirmed in relation to migration in Tampere 1999, and Hague 2004 (Council 
of the European Union 2004). 
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The EU Blue Card to be adopted in the member states’ immigration policy by July 2011 
presents one of the more recent developments towards a common EU Migration 
Policy.11 The directive is derived from the 2005 Policy Plan on Legal Migration, where 
common rules for the admission and stay of desired economic migrants within the 
European Union were established and legislative initiatives for entry and residence of 
four separate categories of economic migrants were listed as 1) highly skilled workers, 2) 
seasonal workers, 3) intra-corporate transferees and 4) remunerated trainees (European 
Commission 2005a). These categories for improved management of economic 
migration  were  formed  after  a  failure  to  agree  on  a  2001  proposal  for  a  Council  
Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities (European 
Commission 2001). As evident, within this proposal clear categories of labour migration 
were not identified. Of the four categories defined in 2005, the EU Blue Card for highly 
skilled workers has been the first to be approved and implemented.  
 
In addition to the domestic demands regarding the common EU migration policy laid 
out  in  the  1999  Tampere  Programme  as  well  as  in  the  2005  Policy  Plan  on  Legal  
Migration, yet another agenda was to guide migration policy formulation. Within the 
2005 European Consensus on Development, all three key European institutions 
(Commission, Council and Parliament) agreed to take account of development 
objectives and support development cooperation according to the Policy Coherence for 
Development principle. Doubts have been casted over the ability of the Community to 
answer to this twofold role of the EU Blue Card to facilitate both internal economic and 
security  interests  of  the  Community  and  external  development  objectives  of  the  
migrant-sending countries.  
 
Below I will provide an insight to the ways in which the EU Blue Card has been 
claimed to  fulfill  the  two without  compromising  the  other  –  namely  serve  the  security  
and economic interest of the European Union without compromising development 
objectives within the migrant-sending developing countries. Last I will view some of 
the present critique, seeing that consequences of the EU Blue Card comparable to that 
of Malawi and the UK are feared.  
                                               
11  It is necessary to note that many EU member states already employ corresponding directives and 
procedures regarding highly skilled third-country nationals, hence the scope of future changes in 
migration policies vary from one member state to another.   
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3.1 EU Blue Card as a tool for economic competitiveness 
 
As noted the internal objectives of the EU Blue Card can be recognized in both security 
and employment policies. Whereas the interests of Community security policy towards 
the EU Blue Card are to tackle illegal migration and gray economy as well as to 
contribute to the establishment of an EU area of freedom, security and justice, the 
Community employment policy sees migration as a way to answer for the arising labour 
demand within the Union (Council of the European Union 2000 & 2004). These two 
policy sectors go hand in hand, seeing that both aim to create legal avenues for 
economic migration to improve migration management. Hence the two are not 
considered separately within this study, but together form the first dimension of the 
twofold role of the EU Blue Card.  
 
The internal objectives of the EU Blue Card have been set out in accordance to the 
Lisbon European Council in March 2000 – referred to as the Lisbon Strategy – where 
Community objectives of becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better  jobs  and  greater  social  cohesion  were  laid  out  (Council  of  the  European  Union  
2000, Council of the European Union 2009a). Ageing population within Europe is 
foreseen  to  contribute  to  staff  shortages  in  the  future  and  is  feared  to  downplay  EU  
economic and employment objectives. Overseas recruitment has been perceived to 
relieve these occurring staff shortages – an idea comparable to that of the NHS Plan in 
the UK in 2000.  
 
In the EU Blue Card impact assessment, it is estimated that the size of the working-age 
population within the EU will decrease by 48 million by 2050. At the moment only 1.72 
percent of highly skilled workers in the European Union are from third countries, 
whereas the same figure is 9.9 percent in Australia, 7.3 percent in Canada and 3.2 
percent in the United States (European Commission 2007a).  In order to influence these 
flows and attract highly skilled migrants to Europe instead, the EU Blue Card is 
designed to provide an easy and fast channel for highly skilled immigrants to enter the 
EU labour markets, comparable to the immigration procedures of other developed 
countries.   
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Compared to other developed countries’ immigration policies, heterogeneity and non-
uniformity of the EU member state immigration systems has proposed the main obstacle 
for attracting highly skilled immigrants into the EU in the past. The EU Blue Card 
intends to change this by harmonizing and simplifying the vast array of these 
immigration  policies  in  accordance  to  the  framework  for  a  common  EU  migration  
policy laid out in the 1999 Tampere Programme. Common procedures for entry and 
residence throughout all EU member states will facilitate accelerated admission 
procedures and employment of the migrant workers within the Community and thus 
increase  the  attractiveness  of  the  EU as  a  destination  (Council  of  the  European  Union  
2009a). 
 
In addition to accelerated admission procedures, improved migrant rights and status 
frame  the  attractiveness  of  the  EU  Blue  Card;  visa  holders  are  allocated  with  an  
extensive set of rights such as improved and equal access to labour market, equal 
treatment with nationals of member states, social security, immediate family 
reunification as well as rights and derogations considering the attainment of EC long-
term resident status. For instance, it is declared that the EU Blue Card holders and their 
families  should  be  able  to  move  freely  throughout  the  EU  member  states,  as  well  as  
travel to their countries of origins without compromising their migrant status within the 
EU (ibid.). 
 
In addition to increasing the attractiveness of the EU, an improved set of migrant rights 
is also perceived to facilitate a quicker response to the fluctuating labour demand within 
the member state labour markets. Temporality of the Blue Card visa is designed to 
reflect the concurrent and changing demand within the Community as at the outset the 
EU  Blue  Card  is  valid  only  for  a  period  of  one  to  four  years,  yet  visa  extensions  are  
possible, if further employment is found. Further employment can be searched in any 
member  state  after  18  months  of  legal  residence  in  the  initial  one.  In  all,  the  member  
states will determine the number of third-country nationals they admit, and may regulate 
the EU Blue Card admissions according to their own economic and demographic 
needs.12 Within the volume of admissions also those migrants already residing in a 
member state can be included, such as students and scientific researchers wishing to 
                                               
12 As well as in accordance to the Community Preference principle that gives preference to workers who 
are nationals of the Members States over workers who are nationals of third countries as regards access to 
the EU labour market (Council of the European Union 1994). 
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work within the Community after their respective visas have expired (Council of the 
European Union 2009a). 
 
Improvements to the migrant status (of the highly skilled employees) represent 
considerable steps in refreshing the EU approach to migration as a whole. Additionally 
to the perception that improved administrative status of the migrants will increase the 
attractiveness of the EU labour markets and will answer to the existing internal labour 
demand, it is viewed that these enhancements will facilitate circular migration as the 
means to address the problem of brain drain. This developmental dimension of the EU 
Blue Card will be discussed in the following section. 
 
3.2 Policy Coherence for Development incorporated 
 
‘The primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation is the 
eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of 
the Millennium Development Goals’ (European Consensus on Development 2005). 
 
The legal basis of the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) principle were laid out 
in the Treaty of Maastricht signed already in 1992,13 yet the principle rose as a key 
priority of the Union in the 2005 Consensus, when twelve specific policy areas were 
identified to have a direct impact on development – migration policy as one of them.14 
These non-aid policy areas were to support the achievement of Millennium 
Development  Goals,  seeing  that  development  aid  alone  could  not  reach  the  agreed  
objectives by 2015 (European Consensus on Development 2005, Carbone 2008). Within 
the 2005 European Consensus on Development PCD principle was defined along the 
following lines: 
 
‘The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all 
policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that 
these policies support development objectives’ (European Consensus on 
Development 2005). 
                                               
13 The PCD principle was set out originally in the articles 130u & 130v of the Treaty of Maastricht and 
can be currently found under the article 208 of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
14 Twelve areas of PCD were identified as Trade, Environment, Climate change, Security, Agriculture, 
Fisheries, Social dimension of globalization, employment and decent work, Migration, Research and 
innovation, Information society, Transport and Energy (European Consensus on Development 2005).  
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Consequent to this definition, the European Commission with the lead of DG 
Development has sought to integrate PCD principle in its daily work and has for 
example produced two PCD reports with the purpose to monitor the progress made 
within the twelve defined PCD policy areas (European Commission 2007b & 2009a). 
The European Commission has also recently revised the concept of the PCD by 
introducing it as a Whole-of-the-Union approach (European Commission 2009b) and 
narrowed-down  the  focus  from  twelve  policy  areas  to  five  more  specific  frameworks,  
with migration still holding its place as one of the key sectors. 15 
 
The significance of migration policy for development was in fact acknowledged already 
in the 2002 Commission communication on integrating migration issues in the 
European Union’s relations with third countries – that is well before the recent 
emphasis on PCD. The communication emphasized the importance of participation with 
the third-countries in order to acknowledge the root causes and potential consequences 
of international migration as means of improved migration management for the benefit 
of both, migrant-sending and receiving countries: 
 
‘It is a fact that industrialized countries, including the European Union, benefit 
considerably from migration and will continue to need inward migration in the 
future, both in high-skilled and low-skilled sectors. However, the expected 
continuation, or even acceleration, of international migration flows will have 
major consequences for both the European Union and the third countries, 
including developing countries, from which these migrants originate. To 
successfully address these consequences, it will be necessary to strengthen policies 
that focus on the root causes of international migration while – at the same time – 
working towards a further strengthening of the migration management capacity of 
both the European Union and the countries of origin’ (European Commission 
2002). 
 
Along with the necessity to harmonize the member state migration and asylum policies 
in order to facilitate improved migration management within the European Union, also 
collaboration with migrant-sending regions accordingly to the 1999 Tampere 
Programme was perceived essential for the benefit of both. Not only was it recognized 
                                               
15  The five specific frameworks identified were: trade and finance, agriculture and food security, 
migration, climate change, and security and development. 
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that development policy could support migration policy and management, but also that 
migration policy could equally contribute to development objectives.  
 
This reorientation of migration-development thinking marked an exciting shift from 
previous course of harnessing development for the purposes of migration into the 
current euphoria of the positive nexus between the two. It was no longer believed that 
development could only support improved migration management and alleviate the 
adverse consequences of migration to developing countries, but that the two policy 
sectors were mutually reinforcing and that migration could also act as an engine for 
development. The 2005 Commission communication on Migration and development: 
some concrete orientations introduced a framework along which the reciprocal 
relationship could materialize. Four particular orientations were identified: 1) 
facilitation of financial remittances by faster, safer and cheaper procedures within the 
EU  member  states,  2)  acknowledgement  of  the  role  of  migrant  diasporas  in  home  
country development, 3) transfer of skills through circular migration and facilitation of 
voluntary return and 4) mitigation of the adverse effects of brain drain by the means of 
ethical recruitment and institutional partnerships. In all, the four concrete orientations 
were identified as means to achieve the positive nexus between migration and 
development and consequently as means ‘to ensure a concrete contribution of migration 
policy to the objective of policy coherence for development’ (European Commission 
2005b).  
 
The succeeding EU Blue Card proposed in 2007 (European Commission 2007c) was to 
follow these established orientations in order to achieve the PCD principle and fulfill 
the  development  dimension  of  its  twofold  role.  Within  the  limits  of  this  study,  in  
particular the third and fourth orientations of circular migration and ethical recruitment 
are of focus here, seeing that they form the two specific PCD tools embedded in the EU 
Blue Card and are presented as means to avoid similar consequences to that of Malawi 
and the UK. It is these two tools that will be discussed in more depth in the following 
sub-sections, and will afterwards be considered in the Malawian context within the 
research analysis.  
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 3.2.1 Ethical recruitment 
 
‘Member states should refrain from pursuing active recruitment in developing 
countries in sectors suffering from a lack of personnel. Ethical recruitment policies 
and principles applicable to public and private sector employers should be 
developed in key sectors, for example the health sector… and the education 
sector…’ (Paragraph 22 in Council of the European Union 2009a). 
 
A  need  for  an  EU  Code  of  Conduct  for  ethical  recruitment  in  certain  key  sectors  
essential  for  development  was  noted  in  the  paragraph  22  of  the  EU  Blue  Card,  in  
conformity with the four concrete measures identified in 2005. The necessity of ethical 
recruitment has also been acknowledged in the subsequent European programme for 
action to tackle the critical shortage of health workers in developing countries 2007-
2013 (European Commission 2008). 16  Additionally to these notions, the 2007-2013 
programme for action also stated that ethical recruitment alone would not be sufficient, 
and additional measures to reduce the outflow of health professionals from developing 
countries would be needed in order to address the adverse effects of brain drain 
(European Commission 2006a). The deficiency of ethical recruitment protocols to 
prevent brain drain alone was evident in the Malawi-UK experience as well, as I have 
discussed above.  
 
Because of the evident limitations of ethical recruitment policies due to the lack of legal 
competence and monitoring, and the failure of the EU to produce its own Code of 
Conduct and ready protocols, I have decided to focus primarily on the other PCD tool 
embedded in the EU Blue Card – namely circular migration. This focus can be justified 
not only because of the EU failure to produce protocols that would address the problem 
of brain drain, but also because the very idea of enforced ethical recruitment is 
impossible to start with, given that selective restrictions can be viewed as discriminatory 
and compromising both basic human rights and equal treatment. However, it must be 
noted that if the EU against all odds would produce functioning and successful ethical 
recruitment protocols, the Code of Conduct could have a considerable role in the fight 
against brain drain.  
 
                                               
16 This European programme for action is based on the EU Strategy for Action on the Crisis in Human 
Resources for Health in developing countries [COM (2005) 642]. 
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Most  importantly,  seeing  that  I  have  chosen  to  approach  my research  question  from a  
Malawian perspective and to investigate the ways in which EU induced migration 
policy could be beneficial for development in a country, where brain drain has already 
taken place, it is more practical to focus principally on the second PCD tool of circular 
migration. This is because the occurrence of circular migration depends on the local 
conditions, attitudes and perspectives – individual decisions to migrate – whereas 
ethical recruitment presents only factual barriers for Malawians. 
 3.2.2 Circular migration 
 
‘…. [Ethical recruitment policies and principles] should be strengthened by the 
development and application of mechanisms, guidelines and other tools to 
facilitate, as appropriate, circular and temporary migration, as well as other 
measures that would minimize negative and maximize positive impacts of highly 
skilled immigration on developing countries in order to turn ‘brain drain’ into 
‘brain gain’ (Paragraph 22 in Council of the European Union 2009a). 
 
The Impact Assessment of the Commission Proposal for the Blue Card directive 
acknowledges that one of the probable negative impacts of the directive targeted at 
highly skilled professionals could be that of brain drain in the developing countries 
suffering from lack of human resources in certain sectors and occupations. Accordingly 
to the concrete orientations defined in 2005, transfer of skills through circular migration 
has been perceived to mitigate these adverse effects of brain drain and even contribute 
to brain gain. However, as noted structures and mechanisms to promote circular 
migration between migrant-sending and receiving countries are missing:  
 
‘With the few exceptions, no member state seems to have procedures promoting 
circular and return migration of third-country highly skilled workers. Such 
schemes could help to maximize benefits for all interested parties, i.e. responding 
to labour needs in Member States, while contributing, through eventual return, to 
the development of their countries of origin’ (European Commission 2007a). 
 
Although the significance of circular migration for development is acknowledged 
within the EU Blue Card directive, concrete mechanisms to ensure circular mobility, 
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temporary migration and voluntary return, are missing. However, steps towards this end 
have been taken for example in the Commission communication in 2007 on circular 
migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries,17 
where also a common definition for circular migration has been provided: 
 
‘A form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of  legal 
mobility back and forth between two countries’ (European Commission 2007d).  
 
Within this common definition two main forms of circular migration are identified; 
circular migration originating from the third-countries towards the EU, and circular 
migration of those permanently residing within the EU towards their countries of 
origins (ibid.): 
 
? circular migration of persons residing in a third-country – such as third-country 
nationals who, after having completed their studies, wish to be employed in the 
EU to acquire professional experience which is difficult to obtain at home, 
before returning. 
 
? circular migration of third-country nationals settled in the EU – such as doctors, 
professors and other professionals willing to support their country of origin by 
conducting part of their professional activity there; 
 
Seeing that return migration is of particular importance within the first definition, the 
risk of brain drain was acknowledged within the Impact Assessment (ibid.): 
 
‘If not properly designed and managed, migration intended to be circular can 
easily become permanent’. 
 
The objectives of circular migration resemble the twofold objectives set for the EU Blue 
Card, as circular migration is believed not only to respond to the labour market needs in 
the EU, but also to contribute to the development of migrant-sending countries.  
                                               
17 The communication provides operational substance to the EU's Global Approach to Migration adapted 
in 2005, under which several policy areas were brought together – namely migration, development, 
employment and external policies together with justice, freedom and security policy (European 
Commission 2006b).  
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As discussed, in order to encourage circular mobility and return migration, the EU Blue 
Card  allows  absence  from  the  territory  of  the  Community  without  interrupting  the  
migrant’s period of legal and continuous residence necessary to be eligible for a long-
term residence status.18 This is to say, that temporal return to countries of origin is 
supported by the Blue Card directive without compromising the chance of attaining 
permanent residence within the EU. As opposed to illegal migrants or weak migrant 
rights, the secured legal status of a Blue Card holder allows travel between the country 
of origin and the EU. However, for later purposes it is important to point out, that in its 
attempt to encourage circular migration, temporality and return – the EU Blue Card 
paradoxically facilitates the acquisition of a permanent status within the EU.  
 
Nonetheless, additionally to flexible migrant rights a number of options have been 
envisioned in order to ensure return migration over permanent stay. Proposals, such as 
facilitating the professional reintegration of returning migrants in their home countries, 
and  written  commitments  by  migrants  to  return  voluntarily  to  their  countries  of  origin  
amid a promise of readmission to the EU – have been introduced. Also, facilitation of 
attractive local professional opportunities in the migrant-sending countries as 
alternatives to emigration has been viewed significant in ensuring circular migration 
over permanent stay. It is this influence that local circumstances may have on the 
likelihood of circular migration to occur that I have also chosen to address in my field 
study and research analysis in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
However, so far the only tool put forward by the EU to attempt circular migration is that 
of Mobility Partnership Programmes based on bilateral agreements between an EU 
member state and individual third-countries in question (European Commission 
2007d).19 Mobility Partnerships have been planned as tools for the achievement of the 
PCD principle (Council of the European Union 2009b & 2010), but are yet to be 
implemented  more  comprehensively  as  so  far  only  a  few pilot  programmes  have  been  
initialed. The need to extend these programmes has been recognized in the recent Policy 
Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010-2013 in order to strengthen the 
implementation of the migration-development agenda within the common EU migration 
                                               
18 As defined in the Council Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals, who are long-term 
residents. At present the Directive stipulates that, as a rule, long-term resident status will be withdrawn in 
the event of an absence of more than 12 consecutive months from the territory of the Community 
(Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of long term residents). 
19 Also for instance IOM has implemented a program – Migration for Development Africa (MIDA) – in 
order to encourage circular migration for the benefit of development (IOM, online source).  
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policy, as for example within the EU Blue Card (European Commission 2010).20 Seeing 
that Mobility Partnerships are mechanisms based on the very idea that circular 
migration and improved migration management facilitate a positive nexus, in this study 
I have chosen to focus on the very assumption that circular migration is achievable and 
would as such be beneficial and relevant for the purposes of development. That is to say, 
that rather than limiting my study to specific mechanisms and to the question of how 
circular migration can be achieved, my purpose is to examine whether circular 
migration can provide a significant tool for development.  
 
3.3 Calculating the costs of migration 
 
Despite the complementary orientations commenced by the European Commission, the 
impact of the Blue Card directive on development of the migrant-sending countries 
remains contested; whereas the proponents of the directive argue for a positive impact 
on development such as brain circulation, the opponents fear permanent brain drain of 
highly skilled professionals from developing countries to Europe. In other words, it has 
been questioned whether or not the Blue Card directive follows the 2005 European 
Consensus on Development and the accompanied Policy Coherence for Development 
principle and whether or not the initiated tools of ethical recruitment and circular 
migration to guarantee the delivery of the PCD principle are sufficient enough. 
 
A representative of the African Union claims that the EU Blue Card indeed 
compromises  several  of  the  MDGs  and  thus  also  the  European  Union's  own  
development objectives by encouraging out-migration of third-country highly skilled 
workers without providing legally binding concrete mechanisms to monitor ethical 
recruitment, return migration and consequent brain circulation (Maru 2008). The 
succeeding supporting communications and guidelines for ethical recruitment and 
circular migration equally fail to establish legal competence, given that the measures put 
forward remain bare recommendations for member state areas of responsibility. Such 
arguments are understandable for example in the light of the Malawian experience.  
 
Several negative consequences of selective migration policies on developing countries 
were  in  fact  discussed  before  the  EU Blue  Card  proposal  in  the  2006 Joint Africa-EU 
                                               
20 Bilateral agreements have been discussed in more detail for example in Betts & Cerna (2011). 
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Declaration on Migration and Development signed in Tripoli, where the African Union 
expressed its concern particularly over brain drain towards Europe – seen as a serious 
threat to development (Tripoli Declaration 2006).21  Nine key areas for cooperation 
between the two Unions were identified in this Tripoli Declaration – human resources 
and brain drain as one of them.22 Among all, the harmful impact of selective migration 
policies was emphasized:  
 
 ‘…selective migration approaches in developed countries could constitute an 
additional threat to African social and economic development’ (ibid.).  
 
Consequently, concern over the loss of investments made by African governments in 
education and human resource development was expressed, as selective immigration 
policies  within  the  EU  could  downplay  these  efforts.  Therefore  also  ‘the necessity to 
encourage skilled workers to remain in Africa in order to contribute to the attainment of 
the Millennium Development Goals’ was underlined (ibid.). These conclusions of the 
2006 Tripoli Declaration were confirmed in the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership on 
Migration, Mobility and Employment as one of the eight priority action areas identified 
in the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (Council of the European Union 2007). 
 
However, subsequent to the Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon 2008, where the EU Blue 
Card objectives and impacts were presented, the African Union expressed its renewed 
concerns over brain drain: 
 
‘While it is commendable that Blue Card holders be granted equal basic socio-
economic rights, health and safety at the workplace, education, vocational training, 
recognition of qualifications, social security, export of pensions once they are paid, 
access to goods and services on an equal footing with its own nationals, 
nonetheless this does not improve negative effects of brain drain on Africa…the 
main concern on the Blue Card Scheme still remains its impact on brain drain and 
the achievement of Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction 
Strategies’ (paragraphs 27 & 29 in African Union 2008).  
                                               
21 The 2006 Tripoli Declaration is based on the Migration Policy Framework for Africa, Gambia 2006 
and the African Common Position on Migration and Development, Algeria 2006. 
22  The 2006 Tripoli Declaration lists nine key areas for cooperation; migration and development; 
migration management challenges; peace and security; human resources and brain drain; concern for 
human rights and the well-being of the individual; sharing best practices; regular migration opportunities; 
illegal or irregular migration; and protection of refugees.  
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This concern of the African Union is at the very heart of my study as my intention is to 
test the applicability of the provided PCD tools in addressing the problem of brain drain 
in  Malawi,  and  assess  the  EU  claim  that  migration  and  development  could  form  a  
positive nexus.  
 
The inability of implementing binding obligations for ethical recruitment and circular 
migration to secure developing countries’ interests in the Blue Card directive, in 
particular when EU member states face labour shortages in critical  sectors such as the 
field of medicine and education, has been criticized by European non-governmental 
organizations as well. Fair Politics (2008a)23 concludes that by implementing the EU 
Blue Card, the EU risks increasing brain drain in developing countries and ‘counteracts 
its own development efforts’ – namely those efforts implemented in order to enhance the 
achievement of the MDGs. The incoherencies apparent between migration and 
development policy are summarized as follows;  
 
‘The EU’s migration policy is designed to attract highly skilled workers into the 
EU, while at the same time one of its development policy objectives is to encourage 
them to stay in their own countries. The inescapable conclusion is that these are 
incoherent, conflicting policy goals’ (Fair Politics 2008b).   
 
Three particular incoherencies similar to those concerns expressed in the 2006 Tripoli 
Declaration are emphasized on account of the Blue Card directive: 
 
? The EU Blue Card lacks legal status and an efficient framework for 
implementing and monitoring ethical recruitment. 
 
? The EU Blue Card does not provide mechanisms for temporary migration to 
translate into reality to ensure circular migration over permanent stay.  
 
? The EU Blue Card does not provide means of compensation for the migrant-
sending countries for their loss of educational investments.  
                                               
23 An initiative of the Dutch Evert Vermeer Foundation (EVF), and the European umbrella 
organization  for  development  NGOs,  CONCORD.  Fair  Politics  was  known  before  as  the  EU  
Coherence project.  
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These arguments put forward by the Fair Politics cast doubts over the fulfillment of the 
twofold role of the EU Blue Card and the assumption that migration and development 
form a positive nexus.  
 
According to Fair Politics (2008a) estimates, currently over 25 percent of the highly 
skilled African workers reside in developed countries. The total costs of migration seem 
depressing, such as in the case of Malawi, where some four hundred health 
professionals emigrated over the period of 2000-2005. In comparison the amount of 
incoming remittances in Malawi in 2005 was 16,600 USD – which accounts for some 
42 USD send annually by each emigrant. This comprises only 0.001 percent of the 
country’s GDP (European Community 2007) and is clearly not enough to compensate 
for the lost investments put into education, nor for the work input of one health service 
employee. It seems evident that Malawi does not benefit from out-migration.  
 
Maru (2008) acknowledges similar situation in Kenya, Zambia and Ethiopia, where 
exodus of medical and health service professionals has increased during the past 
decades. He argues that the selectivity of the EU Blue Card risks discriminating 
migrants according to their skill and profession, and violates against the 2006 Tripoli 
Declaration,  where  the  need  to  focus  on  temporary  migration  of  low  and  semi-skilled  
Africans was emphasized. He notes how out-migration of highly skilled Africans not 
only results in loss of investments and development aid put into education, but may also 
result in increase in investments required, since foreign consultants and international 
volunteers must be hired to cover for the shortages. According to the House of 
Commons International Development Committee (2004 p.21) estimates, some 4 billion 
USD is spent annually in Africa on recruiting around a hundred thousand skilled 
immigrants to replace skilled locals working outside the region. At the time of the field 
research, Malawi was indeed negotiating with Cuba on the possibility to “import” 
medical doctors to cover for the local staff shortages (Malawi Mail 8-14.10.2010).  
 
It  is  for  the  above  reasons  that  the  EU  Blue  Card  is  perceived  to  pose  a  threat  
particularly for developing countries already experiencing brain drain of the highly 
skilled personnel (Philippart 2008). Without stronger safeguards, guarantees of return 
migration and adequate compensation for the countries of origin for the provision of 
skills to the EU labour markets, the directive is viewed to risk intensifying the existing 
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exodus of skilled workers and the already stressed conditions. It is obvious that the 
Malawian experience corresponds with these fears expressed by the African Union and 
European NGOs as brain drain has already materialized. Hence, my intention here is not 
to  question  and  verify  the  evident  fact  that  brain  drain  has  occurred  in  Malawi,  but  to  
ask whether the EU Blue Card risks intensifying these conditions or succeeds to provide 
a solution and a way to address such adverse effects.  
 
Again, because ethical recruitment protocols are evidently limited, my focus is first and 
foremost on circular migration. I will question whether or not circular migration and 
skills transfers believed to be beneficial for development can provide a remedy for the 
present situation in Malawi,  as this dictates whether the EU Blue Card will  realize the 
development dimension of its twofold role and follow the PCD principle. The key is to 
question whether the rights and mechanisms embedded in the EU Blue Card match with 
the local needs and individual interests and are enough to reverse the current brain drain.  
 
 
The potential of the EU Blue Card directive to contribute to development in the 
migrant-sending regions remains contested and unseen. Whereas critics fear brain drain 
of the highly skilled professionals and unbearable costs of migration, advocates argue 
that circular migration can be ensured by improved migrant status and rights, and 
therefore migrant-sending countries will become beneficiaries of the EU Blue Card as 
well. These opposing views can be investigated within a theoretical framework drawn 
from the existing literature. In the following chapter I will introduce the previous 
academic debate over migration and development, within which optimistic and 
pessimistic views, similar to above positions, can be identified.  
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4. Theoretical Framework 
 
The current debate over the developmental implications of the EU Blue Card fits well in 
the previous research over migration and development. Although it may appear so, the 
idea to harness migration for the benefit of development is not new, but has in fact 
surfaced frequently in the academic debate during the past decades. This debate can be 
divided roughly into two opposing schools of thought: migration-development optimism 
and pessimism – as has been presented for example in Portes (2009) and in de Haas 
(2010). 24  Optimistic views claim that migration can be conducive to development 
forming a positive nexus, while migration-development pessimists argue the contrary. 
Below,  I  will  present  arguments  from  both  sides,  as  the  EU  standpoint  represents  the  
first and the Malawian experiences speak for the latter.  
 
I  will  discuss  the  previous  literature  from  which  I  will  draw  the  key  concepts  for  my  
theoretical framework. The concepts of triple-win, and brain drain and migrant 
syndromes will facilitate my interpretation and final assessment of the EU Blue Card in 
chapter 7. Additionally to these three key concepts emerging from the migration-
development literature, I will also study the concept of policy coherence more closely. 
My intention is to establish a link between migration literature and the PCD approach 
embedded in the EU Blue Card. This link is necessary to carry out the research analysis 
and to answer the set research questions.  
 
 
4.1 Migration-development nexus: optimist and pessimist views 
 
The roots of migration-development optimist and pessimist schools of thought can be 
found  in  the  mainstream  development  and  social  paradigms  of  the  second  half  of  the  
20th century, and the debate over the costs and benefits of migration for the sending 
countries has up to day revolved primarily around financial remittances and social 
transfers. Whereas in the past these differing schools of thought were rather 
deterministic in nature, nowadays the views put forward generally acknowledge that the 
                                               
24 In addition for instance Zolberg (1989) acknowledges these two competing views over the benefits and 
costs of migration, although these do not constitute a central framework for his study.  
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impacts of migration on development vary and indeed depend on the circumstances 
under which migration takes place (Massey et al. 1998, de Haas 2010).25  
 
Although the two opposing schools of thought are no longer as deterministic as before, 
this division is still valid and useful for my analysis, as it facilitates outlining and 
understanding of the current discussion and differing standpoints. For the purposes of 
my analysis, I have hence highlighted the controversy between the two, yet it is 
important to bear in mind, that optimists and pessimists share a common ground to a 
certain extent, and acknowledge several factor that may influence the developmental 
outcomes.  
 
Principally the conclusions put forward by the opposing perspectives on migration and 
development depend on the context specificity of the studied migratory flow (Portes 
2009). The spectrum of previous literature on migration-development nexus is colorful, 
as the focus of research ranges from very general labour migration to specific highly 
skilled migrant groups. Naturally the outcomes reached vary accordingly. In turn, 
theories focusing solely on skilled labour migration have often failed to distinguish 
between different occupational categories; as for example emigration of health 
professionals  might  result  in  different  developmental  outcomes  than  that  of  the  IT  
personnel, given that unlike amongst the latter, skills transfers of medical personnel 
depend largely on return migration (Bach 2006). In all the human capital composition of 
different migratory flows influences the final developmental outcomes.  
 
Additionally to context specificity, conclusions reached depend on the circumstances 
under which migration occurs. For instance Adepoju et al. (2010) have noted how return 
migration (i.e. circular migration and skills transfers) is unlikely in situations where 
emigration presents an alternative and not a complement to sending country conditions. 
Despite the common enthusiasm, the optimists as well do acknowledge the influence 
that circumstances may have on migratory patterns. As Portes (2009) has noted, the 
developmental outcomes of migration indeed depend on the duration of the stay, namely 
reliant on whether migration is temporary or permanent – the first indicating return and 
circular migration, and the latter permanent loss of human capital.  
 
                                               
25 The authors referred here in relation to migration-development optimism and pessimism would not 
necessarily identify themselves within neither of the two categories.   
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My focus is on potential developmental outcomes of circular migration and social 
transfers, as these are the tools of the EU Blue Card. Thus I have given financial 
remittances only a limited role in this research. Focus on circular migration is all the 
more significant due to my objective to study the migration-development nexus within a 
specific highly skilled occupation. However, seeing that the EU Blue Card concerns all 
highly skilled personnel, the conclusions reached here in relation to health workers 
migration are not necessarily similar with regard to all highly skilled migratory flows. 
Indeed it is likely that outcomes foreseen and claimed by both optimistic and 
pessimistic views will transpire in relation to the EU Blue Card, depending on the 
specific occupational migratory flow and the country of origin under scrutiny. 
 
Below I have introduced views in favor and against a positive nexus. The dichotomy 
underlines the defining characteristics of both sets of arguments, although also a 
common ground is found. These characteristics provide useful reference points for my 
research analysis and a framework to test the developmental potential of circular 
migration in reality.  
 4.1.1 Triple-win and brain circulation 
 
The mainstream school of thought over migration and development today is that of new 
optimism that emerged during the 1990s. Although this optimist school of thought 
acknowledges the heterogeneous impact of migration on development depending on the 
conditions under which migration occurs, it principally claims that migration is 
conducive to development. The essential idea is that the returns of migration exceed any 
resulting  costs  by  means  of  financial  remittances  and  social  transfers.  Therefore  it  is  
perceived that not only the migrant-receiving countries and migrants themselves profit, 
but also the migrant-sending countries benefit. This is commonly referred to as a win-
win-win or as a triple-win situation within the migration and development literature (see 
for example Tanner 2005). Similar optimistic logic is apparent within the EU Blue Card 
where in conformity with the PCD principle, ethical recruitment and circular migration 
are considered to ensure the delivery of the benefits for the migrant-sending countries as 
well.  
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This sort of new optimism (sometimes referred to as pluralism) is based on the ideas of 
former migration-development optimist school of thought that emerged already during 
the 1950s-60s and is rooted in neo-classical and developmentalist theories of balanced 
growth and evolutionary views on development (de Haas 2010). Due to the known 
limits within these theories, today more contemporary schools of thought, such as new 
economics of labour migration (NELM), livelihood approaches and transnationalism 
have grown to represent migration-development optimism. Despite this shift in 
mainstream theory, the current focus remains essentially on the benefits brought about 
by financial remittances and return migration, similarly to the optimistic views put 
forward some sixty years ago (Massey et al. 1998, de Haas 2010).  
 
The idea of triple-win consists of both short-term and long-term benefits of migration. 
For example Olesen (2002) argues that while financial remittances benefit the sending 
countries  in  the  short-term,  long-term  benefits  will  transpire  through  return  migration  
and skills transfers. Olesen however notes that for return migration and brain gain to 
occur, incentives for return must be created. These incentives relate to those reasons 
why migration occurred in the first place and within the optimist school of thought are 
perceived to consist primarily of global wage differentials. Short-term and long-term 
benefits of migration are thought to boost economic growth and development. This 
boost in turn is thought to reduce further incentives for emigration and instead create 
incentives for return (ibid.). All this indicates for triple-win to occur.  
 
Parallel to these ideas, Stark (2004) and Stark & Fan (2007) have argued that in addition 
to financial and social transfers originating abroad, migration influences structural 
changes at home, as for example international employment opportunities may boost 
incentives to attain education. As a result, the stock of human capital in migrant-sending 
economies is thought to increase, provided that not all migrate. Again along with this 
line of thought, migration influences positive outcomes for development.  
 
Similar ideas of triple-win are discussed in de Haas (2005 p.1272), who argues that 
instead of brain drain, highly skilled migration is likely to result in brain gain, seeing 
that ‘a counter-flow of remittances, investments, trade relations, new knowledge, 
innovations, attitudes and information’ emerges. However, again the importance of the 
circumstances in the migrant-sending countries is acknowledged, as de Haas notes how 
for example unfavorable investment climate, the lack of political stability and legal 
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security may undermine any positive outcomes of migration. Additionally, he views 
retention policies implemented by many of the developing migrant-sending countries as 
unwelcoming and undermining any incentives for return migration to occur. These 
incentives for return are neither provided by migrant-receiving countries, who so far 
have failed to encourage circular flows (ibid.). As discussed in chapter 3, the EU Blue 
Card intends to fix this.  
 
On the whole the optimist school of thought believes that individual and collective gains 
of migration through financial and social transfers as well as structural changes will 
outweigh any potential costs that may result. With favorable circumstances in both 
migrant-sending and receiving countries the benefits will accrue to all parties, 
accordingly to the idea of the triple-win.  
 
It is these circumstances that I have addressed in my field study in Malawi as it has been 
my intention to examine the local needs and interests towards migration. Based on these 
local needs and interests, I have interpreted what kinds of migration patterns – 
temporary or permanent – are characteristic for Malawian health professionals and 
whether or not the EU Blue Card fits in this context. According to the optimist school of 
thought, the occurrences of triple-win and positive developmental outcomes depend on 
these very circumstances and patterns of migration. This is why studying the Malawian 
conditions enables assessing the realization of the PCD principle in the EU Blue Card.  
 4.1.2 Brain drain and migrant syndromes 
 
Contrary to optimistic views, migration-development pessimist school of thought 
concludes that migration is not conducive to development. In particular, studies 
concerning highly skilled migration argue that the total social costs of migration exceed 
any financial or social returns to the sending countries. In other words, it is not believed 
that the potential benefits of circular migration overcome the losses accrued due to 
temporarily or permanently lost workforce. These pessimistic ideas first emerged during 
the 1970s-80s as a response to the earlier migration-development optimism of the 1960s, 
and are based on the views put forward by the structuralist theory, Myrdal’s cumulative-
causation theory and neo-Marxists development theory. In particular centre-periphery 
and dependency models have influenced the present ideas of the form and pattern of 
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human capital flows from developing to the developed countries (Massey et al. 1998, de 
Haas 2010). Such pessimism can be understood in the light of the Malawian experience 
discussed in chapter 2. 
 
Instead of resulting in a triple-win situation suggested in the EU Blue Card, skilled 
labour migration is indeed feared to result in a brain drain syndrome, where developing 
countries lose not only manpower, but also costly investments in education through a 
positive selection of these skilled personnel by developed countries (Massey et al. 1998).  
It is this positive selection that was in fact executed by the NHS as discussed in chapter 
2, and resulted in both, massive losses of skilled manpower and educational investments 
in Malawi. According to Iredale (2001 p.16), positive selection for instance occurs, 
when migration is ‘government-induced’ or ‘industry-led’. The EU Blue Card provides 
grounds  for  both,  as  it  can  be  considered  a)  as  a  government  initiative  that  b)  allows  
employers to select the best qualified migrants according to the existing demand for 
skilled labour. 
  
Consistent with the discourse on brain drain syndrome, Iregui (2003) has elaborated on 
the  implications  of  positive  selection.  Challenging  to  the  idea  of  a  triple-win,  she  
concludes that if only skilled personnel migrate, the estimated costs of migration exceed 
any potential welfare gains to the sending countries. Such scenario occurs, when 
migrant-receiving countries implement selective immigration policies, as for example 
the EU Blue Card. According to Iregui costs of migration could be reduced, if both 
skilled and unskilled labour migration was encouraged. The current critique towards the 
EU Blue Card advocated by some European NGOs for instance, in general criticizes the 
failure of the Union to encourage both.26  
 
Generally speaking the optimist school of thought has perceived that financial 
remittances compensate for the adverse effects of positive selection. It is often indicated 
that financial remittances exceed the amount of Official Development Aid (ODA) (de 
Haas 2005, Lavenex & Kunz 2008 p.442, see also Taylor 1999).27 Kapur & McHale 
(2009 p.1102) however conclude, that although migration increases world income per 
                                               
26 In the light of these criticisms, it is necessary to bear in mind that although the EU Blue Card is 
intended for the purposes of highly skilled immigration, it consists a part of a larger policy plan on legal 
migration, within which three other categories were identified. Additionally Member States may continue 
to allow labour migration of other forms.  
27 ODA remains more significant in most sub-Saharan African countries given that remittance flows are 
primarily directed to Asia and Latin America (Human Development Report 2009). 
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person by almost one percent – and 2, 25 percent in developing countries – ‘even small 
brain drain related adverse growth effects could quickly swamp the direct gains to 
migrants, where rich-country immigration policies have a strong skill bias’. Contrary to 
optimistic  views,  they  argue  that  migration  policies  that  favor  highly  skilled  workers  
impoverish the migrant-sending countries from innovators and institution builders 
essential for economic development. This line of arguing illustrates well the very idea 
of brain drain syndrome. Similarly to Iregui, Kapur & McHale suggest that 
development potential of migration could be better harnessed by encouraging migration 
of the less skilled.  
 
Additionally to the costs of migration incurred by brain drain syndrome, i.e. the lost 
human capital and investments, migration-development pessimist school of thought 
argues that migration deteriorates conditions for those left behind and creates more 
incentives for further migration to emerge – instead of influencing an economic boost in 
the sending countries as suggested by the optimists. This downward trend has been 
referred to as a migrant syndrome (Reichert 1981 in de Haas 2010 p. 234-35). Although 
my focus was not on the implications of migration on the Malawian economy as a 
whole, the interviews I conducted suggested that migrant syndrome applied to the 
Malawian health sector. This was because previous emigration had exacerbated the 
already stressed work conditions, which again pushed for further migration. I will 
elaborate on these findings in chapter 6.   
 
The idea of migrant syndrome is opposed to the optimistic argument that migration 
would create incentives for education within migrant-sending countries due to the fact 
that skilled personnel tend to have better prospects for international employment. 
Faini’s (2003) findings do not support such positive influence of migration on human 
capital formation at home. Even if migration created incentives for education amongst 
those left behind, these incentives alone are not enough to boost human capital 
formation, since the educational opportunities are often limited. The lack of 
opportunities was evident also in Malawi. Indeed instead of migration creating 
incentives for education within the migrant-sending countries and adding to the existing 
human capital stock, the demand for education may create further incentives for 
migration (see for example Skeldon 2008). Incentives for education translating to 
incentives for migration illustrate well the problem of migrant syndrome.  
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Brain drain and migrant syndromes can be perceived as opposed to the ideas of triple-
win; whereas the first result in a vicious cycle, the latter brings about a virtuous cycle of 
migration and development. Bakewell (2007) criticizes the optimistic idea of a virtuous 
cycle,  as that  of triple-win – seeing that it  relies heavily on the assumption that return 
migration occurs. In the following analysis, my intention is to examine not only this 
assumption of return migration to occur also apparent in the EU Blue Card, but also the 
widespread assumption that skills transfers via return migration would automatically 
result  in  positive  developmental  outcomes.  In  fact  previous  discourse  has  failed  to  
question  this  last  notion  that  skills  transfers  are  relevant  for  developing  countries,  yet  
the issue of relevance emerged strongly within the interviews, and is thus also vital to 
address.  
 
 
Regardless of some generalizations made by optimist and pessimist schools of thought 
in  relation  to  labour  migration,  some  useful  concepts  can  be  drawn  from  these  
theoretical divisions and employed for the purposes of the research analysis. Within the 
analysis, the EU Blue Card can be viewed to present the optimistic beliefs as opposed to 
the Malawian experience that suggests more pessimistic outcomes. Whether or not the 
EU Blue Card succeeds in ensuring the temporality and circularity of migration, 
optimistic outcomes can be expected to address the pessimistic fears of brain drain, if 
social transfers are found relevant. The chosen focus on emigration of Malawian health 
professionals proposes an opportunity to study the ability of the EU Blue Card to 
address  the  problem of  brain  drain  and  migrant  syndromes  –  and  to  realize  the  Policy  
Coherence for Development principle. 
 
 
4.2 Policy Coherence for Development: dimensions and definitions 
 
In order to assess whether or not the EU Blue Card follows and realizes the Policy 
Coherence for Development principle, it is necessary to discuss the concept as such. In 
addition to the definition provided in the European Consensus in 2005 that all EU 
policies which are likely to have an impact on developing countries should take account 
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of and support development objectives, also other definitions have been given. For 
instance the OECD defines PCD as follows: 
 
‘Policy coherence for development means taking account of the needs and interests 
of developing countries in the evolution of the global economy’ (OECD 2003).   
 
In addition to, or perhaps precisely because of the work done by the European 
Commission, the idea of policy coherence has attracted attention also within academia. 
For instance Hoebink (1999 p.324) has acknowledged coherence as something “free 
from self-contradiction” (using a dictionary definition) and hence defines policy 
coherence as ‘the non-occurrence of effects of policy that are contrary to the intended 
results or aims of policy’. Along with this definition, Hoebink interprets policy 
coherence in two separate ways; either to signify one particular field of policy and the 
actions and objectives within this field, or actions in one field of policy, and objectives 
in another field (ibid.). These two dimensions of policy coherence have been later 
coined respectively as internal and horizontal coherence (see for example Carbone 
2008)28, both of which are fundamental for this study and are discussed below. 
 
The notion of internal coherence is useful as it allows treating outcomes as separate 
from the original intentions and objectives within  one  certain  policy  sector,  such  as  
migration policy. Indeed, Forster & Stokke (1999b) have brought up this essential 
feature of internal coherence by acknowledging that ‘strategies and mechanisms should 
be attuned to the objectives’ and that ‘the outcome should correspond with intentions 
and objectives’ as well (ibid, original emphasis). In this study, this means that first, the 
strategies of the EU Blue Card to contribute to development, namely circular migration 
and ethical recruitment, should be attuned to the intention and objective of attaining the 
MDGs, and second, that the final actual outcomes of these strategies should match this 
very intention and objective. In other words, it is not enough that the strategies are 
supposed to contribute to the objective, but that the final outcome should be in line with 
the intended outcome. 
 
                                               
28 Hoebink (1999) introduced the term ‘horizontal coherence’ in its current meaning, but used ‘internal 
coherence’ to describe coherence of internal EU policies, such as migration and fisheries policies, as 
opposed to external policies. 
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The latter interpretation, that of horizontal coherence, is of particular interest in this 
study, seeing that my purpose is to investigate policy coherence through the actions of 
migration policy and the impact of these actions on development policy objectives. In 
addition to Hoebink’s definition of horizontal coherence as the impact of actions in one 
field to the objectives in another, Forster & Stokke (1999b p.20) acknowledge how also 
the objectives within the multiple policy fields ‘should be attuned to each other, or as a 
minimum not be conflicting’. Given that the objectives of the EU migration policy can 
be identified within other policy fields, namely employment, security and development, 
the EU Blue Card does not hold objectives of its own. Thus in the case of the EU Blue 
Card, Hoebink’s definition of horizontal coherence is equivalent with that of above 
internal coherence, and it is better to focus on the definition provided by Forster & 
Stokke. 
  
This definition is significant seeing that within the EU Blue Card at least three separate 
policy objectives can be identified; 1) economic and employment policy objectives 
within the EU, 2) objective to establish an area of freedom security and justice within 
the EU, and 3) development objectives within the migrant-sending countries. Whereas 
the two initial objectives are rather straightforward, the execution of the third objective 
has required some additional measures to be incorporated into the Blue Card directive; 
in order to attune with the development policy objectives as well, circular migration 
between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries is encouraged, and in order to 
avoid adverse effects of the EU Blue Card on development objectives namely through 
brain drain, ethical recruitment protocols are recommended. As discussed in chapter 3, 
circular migration policies and ethical recruitment protocols have indeed been perceived 
by the European Commission as the means to execute the PCD principle in practice.  
 
 
My theoretical framework consists on one hand of the optimist and pessimist notions of 
migration and development – where the concepts of circular migration and triple-win, as 
well as brain drain and migrant syndromes are fundamental – and on other hand of the 
different attributes attached to policy coherence. These concepts play different roles in 
my study. Whereas the concepts drawn from the migration-development literature 
facilitate the assessment of the real-world outcomes of the EU Blue Card and whether or 
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not these outcomes support development objectives from the Malawian point of view, 
the concepts derived from the coherence literature allow me to explain the reasons why 
coherence or incoherence in relation to the EU Blue Card may occur.  
 
This theoretical framework will be employed particularly in chapter 7, where I will 
bring my findings from the field back to the context of the EU. At the outset, as 
established, the Malawian experience with the UK represents pessimist interpretation of 
migration  and  development,  and  the  EU  approach  corresponds  with  that  of  triple-win  
and a positive nexus. By means of approaching the EU Blue Card and the question of 
PCD through a pessimist Malawian perspective, I am able to assess the viability and 
relevance  of  the  tool  of  circular  migration  to  address  the  problems  of  brain  drain  and  
migrant syndromes. If proven viable and relevant, the EU Blue Card will achieve its 
objective  of  a  triple-win  and  fulfill  the  acquired  PCD  principle.  Again  it  must  be  
emphasized that even if circular migration materialized, accomplishment of a triple-win 
would  not  be  self-evident  in  case  skills  transfers  were  not  found  relevant  for  
development objectives.      
 
Again, whereas the accomplishment of the PCD in the Malawian context can be 
explained through the concepts of circular migration, triple-win, brain drain and migrant 
syndromes, the occurrence of  coherence  or  incoherence  within  the  EU context  can  be  
elaborated through the different dimensions of the concept of policy coherence. To fully 
understand PCD and the EU Blue Card in the context of Malawi and to address the set 
research questions, both sets of concepts are fundamental. 
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5. Research Methodology & Reflections  
 
In order to address the definitive research questions – as whether or not the EU Blue 
Card can be conducive to development within the migrant-sending countries while 
responding primarily to the internal interests of the EU, and whether or not the EU Blue 
Card succeeds in promoting circular migration instead of adding to the problem of brain 
drain, accordingly to the aim of the PCD principle – my intention is to place and assess 
the directive in the Malawian context.  
 
As stated, by placing the EU Blue Card within the context of the Malawian health sector, 
a specific country-check of the implications, viability and relevance of the directive in a 
developing country and a particular sector, can be presented. Before presenting my 
findings from the field in chapter 6, I will discuss my research methodology: first I will 
introduce the employed method of semi-structured interviews; second I will discuss 
some challenges that occurred in the field; and last overview the phases of my research 
analysis that relates principally to the theoretical framework presented above.  
 
 
5.1 Semi-structured focused interviews  
 
In  the  Malawian  context  I  will  be  able  to  address  the  way  in  which  the  local  health  
workers view the interlinkages between migration and development as regards to their 
every day work, and whether or not according to these views the EU Blue Card could 
present a relevant and viable means to support the health sector development in the 
future. I saw semi-structured focused interviews as best-suited method to serve my 
chosen approach to emphasize the local perspectives, as it allows the researcher to 
encourage the viewpoints of the respondents. To underline individual opinions, values 
and interpretations is at the core of the method of semi-structured interviews as 
compared to more structured dialogue (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2001).  
 
The idea behind semi-structured focused interviews is to conduct an interview through 
certain selected themes. Structured and exact questions are few, if any, as the questions 
and dialogue emerge from the given replies and thus reduce the risk of letting my own 
prejudices guide the discussion. In other words, the role of the researcher is only to 
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manage the dialogue within and between the selected themes. The order of the themes 
and  the  form  of  the  questions  may  evolve  along  with  the  discussion.  In  this  way  the  
method allows for flexibility and respondents may stress the matters which they 
personally see significant. For this reason also new unforeseen factors may arise from 
the discussion, as anticipated and hoped. Although semi-structured focused interviews 
allow flexibility, the selected themes must be the same throughout all interviews to 
guarantee congruence and comparability between the interviews (ibid.).  
 
Prior  to  the  field  research  in  Malawi,  I  had  selected  three  themes  within  which  I  had  
planned a few questions for guidance. These themes were constructed based on my 
research dilemma and questions, rooted in previous literature and debate. Since I was 
not able to practice the interviews with my focus group before I entered the field, I had 
to allow some adaptation to the themes during the first interviews. It is also worthwhile 
to note that the three themes overlap, and were discussed interchangeably in all of the 
interviews: 
 
The purpose of the first theme was to address the reasons why my respondents had 
chosen to stay in Malawi; mostly bonding policy, education opportunities, and future 
plans arose from the discussions. Here my objective was to understand the personal 
choices and wishes of my respondents. Although my focus was on the reasons why my 
respondents had remained in Malawi, grievances and challenges present at work arose 
continuously from the discussions.  
 
Correspondingly, the aim of my second theme was to understand some more practical 
and work related issues, and the conditions and circumstances under which individuals’ 
decisions took place. Instead of focusing on the individual, this theme evolved around 
the  general  work  in  the  hospitals  in  question,  as  well  as  other  hospitals  where  my  
respondents had worked before. Within this theme I was able to investigate the current 
state and needs of the health sector – some ten years after the crisis fist emerged.  
 
Within the third theme, my intention was to address the implications of migration more 
vigorously. My attempt was to understand the consequences of the human resource 
crisis  and  the  actual  role  of  emigration  within  it.  Discussion  evolved  around  
improvements and developments that had occurred during the past ten years, equally to 
the reasons, why these improvements were undertaken in the first place. Within this 
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third theme, I also investigated the possibilities permitted by circular migration, as for 
instance work with international volunteers and Malawian returnees was addressed.  
 
In all, the purpose of the selected themes was to ensure that information relevant for my 
research purposes and objectives was acquired from the field.  Through my improved 
knowledge  of  the  local  perspectives  and  the  current  state  of  the  health  sector,  I  could  
understand the idea of migration-development nexus more comprehensively – as what 
seems  to  form  a  positive  nexus  from  a  European  point  of  view,  might  appear  the  
opposite from a developing country perspective. Principally, the three themes along 
which I managed the interviews called attention to certain inconsistencies in the idea 
that circular migration and skills transfers would self-evidently and as such encourage 
development. As hoped, the field research proved worthwhile in assessing circular 
migration as a tool to fulfill  the development dimension of the twofold role of the EU 
Blue Card and to realize the PCD principle.  
 
 
5.2 Reflections from the field 
 
My initial aim was to complete some fifteen to twenty interviews, yet in the end I had 
conducted a total of 23 interviews and had enriched my field research by several 
informal encounters and observations during the long waits in the hospitals. Before 
entering the field I had defined nurses and doctors as my primary focus group – 
including all related cadres such as auxiliary nurses and clinical officers, since all these 
health professionals are eligible for the EU Blue Card.29 Since Malawian doctors in 
particular are few and difficult to reach due to their busy schedules, I prepared to 
interview any other personnel working in the Malawian health sector, such as 
international volunteers (United Nations Volunteers, Volunteer Service Overseas as 
well as other NGO based volunteers), European medical exchange students, health 
related NGO workers, trade union representatives and teaching personnel.    
  
The first limitation to my chosen method occurred when I was invited to conduct some 
of my interviews in the hospital, although I had planned not to carry out research during 
the working hours, should patient care be compromised. An invitation was hard to resist, 
                                               
29 The pre-defined focus group includes diploma enrolled and diploma registered nurses, degree nurses, 
medical assistants, clinical officers and medical doctors.  
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and hence under these circumstances I chose to limit the duration of my interviews to 
some 30 minutes, as an alternative to the original plan of an hour or more. This 
naturally compromised the interview technique employed, as half an hour did not prove 
enough to cover three separate themes through fairly free dialogue. My reaction to this 
drawback  was  to  introduce  some  additional  questions  in  order  to  ensure  that  all  three  
themes could be covered in the given time. Additional questions however risked 
influencing  the  matters  discussed  according  to  my  own  expectations  rather  than  
allowing  the  discussion  to  evolve  on  the  respondents’  terms.  Because  of  this  apparent  
risk, I decided to re-interview three of the respondents in order to evaluate my role as an 
interviewer and to cross-check that the given replies were not led on.  
 
Of the 23 interviews, all but seven were conducted during working hours. I was assured 
not only by the respondents, but also by the persons in charge, that patient care was not 
compromised. However, where staff shortages were evidently severe and patients many, 
I feared I was receiving a special treatment out of local kindness and hence encouraged 
the respondents to call a halt in case they were needed elsewhere. For a light relief, I 
soon noticed that the staff indeed told me, when the time was surely not good, and I had 
to wait. I never imagined finding myself in a situation, where I would be happy to sit 
around  and  wait  in  the  hospital  for  hours  to  see  a  nurse  or  a  doctor,  yet  under  these  
circumstances a wait was certainly appreciated. Even when there was an opening for me 
to step in, due to the ever-changing situation consultations and administrative tasks were 
carried out on several occasions in the midst of the interviews. In all, however, 
respondents volunteered gladly and often I was allowed more time than a half an hour. 
Also  towards  the  end  of  the  field  research,  when  my  understanding  of  the  current  
situation had improved, I was able to use the time given more efficiently.  
 
The respondents were chosen primarily by two methods. The first interviews in each of 
the hospitals were organized with the assistance of my prior contacts in the field and 
after receiving research permission from the head of the hospital. After this, people 
whom I had already interviewed or the person in charge referred me forward to persons, 
who were not engaged in work at  the moment and had time to sit  down with me. The 
hospital staff proved also very helpful in referring me to personnel with different 
backgrounds and experience, and often it was thought that it was important for me to 
speak with these certain people. Additionally, a few interviews were with health 
workers I simply met by coincidence.  
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In all of the interviews I applied the ethical principle of informed consent, according to 
which interviewees should both comprehend and agree voluntarily to the nature of the 
research  and  their  role  within  it  (Israle  & Hay 2006 p.  61).  Also  permission  to  record  
was requested where needed and confidentiality was assured. No trouble occurred 
concerning these issues and indeed most of the time Malawian respondents in particular 
were excited of the mp3 recorder. Instead of creating tension, the fact that I was 
recording encouraged eagerness to respond even to an extent where the respondents 
wanted to hold the microphone themselves. At times this eagerness did not pay off, as 
on some occasions fists holding on to the microphone blocked the sound and made the 
transcription work evermore challenging.  
 
In all,  the twenty respondents (of whom three were interviewed twice) consisted of 13 
nurses, one clinical officer, two local medical doctors, one medical doctor from another 
African country, and three international medical volunteers. Of the 13 nurses four were 
degree registered nurses with university level education, three were internationally 
qualified diploma registered nurses30 and six were diploma enrolled nurses, so called 
technicians, who in turn are not internationally qualified. The cadre of diploma enrolled 
nurses was introduced as a response to the crisis in early 2000s. Although technicians 
are not internationally qualified as nurses, the cadre compares for instance to European 
care assistants and could find employment for example in old-people’s homes. 
Therefore, all respondents with an exception of international volunteers represented the 
very focus group of the EU Blue Card. 
 
Additionally to occupational qualifications, respondents represented a wide array of 
backgrounds. Two local health workers had educational experience from outside the 
region, yet I saw only one as a returnee given that the other had stayed abroad for only 
three months. On top of this international experience amongst the interviewees, two 
more had experience from another African country. Seeing that in general senior staff in 
Malawi is lacking, I was lucky to reach six experienced professionals – some of whom 
were able to share experiences from several decades. Additionally to above, I saw the 
time of the education somewhat significant as this determined whether or not the 
respondent was currently working under a bond – or had already finished the bonding 
                                               
30  These three nurses were among the first ones to graduate among this newly introduced cadre in 
December 2010. 
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period. Bonding period was first introduced at the heart of the crisis in exchange for 
subsidized education with the aim to ensure that the newly graduates would remain in 
the country. All nurses, who had graduated after the year 2002 were working or had 
worked under the bond, whereas the more senior personnel had escaped such 
arrangements.  Out  of  all  the  respondents,  ten  were  female  and  ten  were  male.  On  the  
whole, the respondents represented four different hospitals in three different towns in 
central Malawi: two of the hospitals were public sector district hospitals, one was a 
CHAM  hospital  and  one  was  a  private  hospital.  The  hospitals  too  were  selected  in  
accordance to the few contacts I had in the field, without whom access to the field 
would have been uncertain.31  
 
In addition to reduced time also another factor proved equally challenging with the 
chosen method of semi-structured focused interviews. The general expectation of a 
respondent volunteering for an interview seems to be that of a structured interview and 
thus as an interviewer I was expected to ask pre-determined questions. Whereas 
talkative respondents posed no problem to the use of this particular interviewing 
technique, respondents providing short replies proved demanding, given that according 
to the method my role was to base my next question on the given replies. Therefore, not 
only depending on the time at hand, but also depending on the respondent, I had to 
introduce  more  or  less  structure  to  the  interviews.  At  best  semi-structured  focused  
interviews  ensure  the  objectivity  of  the  research,  seeing  that  specific  issues  under  the  
selected themes are initiated by the respondent him/herself. However with more 
structure and set questions, the risk of leading on the interview in accordance to my own 
expectations and ideas increased. This was the case especially at first, when the 
limitations to the method caught me by surprise.  
 
Mainly due to the time limitations and the structure that I was forced to introduce, at 
first  it  seemed  that  I  had  reached  a  saturation  point  quite  quickly  and  did  not  receive  
much new information. After such trouble, I saw it best to retreat to Likoma Island of 
the Lake Malawi, famous of its peace, quiet and happy people 32  as  well  as  of  its  
numerous black mambas and crocodiles. This provided a perfect environment to stay 
put – away from the lake and the bush – sit tight, review and rethink the work 
                                               
31 See Appendix I for more information concerning the interviewees.  
32 Peace and quiet was guaranteed apart from the occasional visits of a drunken member of the vivid expat 
community. These visits however added to the happy of the people.  
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completed  so  far.  Also  much  of  the  early  transcription  work  was  conducted  here.  
Listening  myself  on  the  tape  –  as  much  as  I  hated  it  –  prepared  me  well  for  the  
following interviews, where my performance became much more bearable.  
 
After the break and a change of location (a new hospital in a new district), I was able to 
discuss my three themes in more depth and overcome the saturation point among other 
shortcomings that I had experienced at first. In the new location I also reached a wider 
array of respondents, which also helped me to escape certain reactions and expectations 
that I had developed to some most general questions and replies. This was also a reason, 
why  in  the  end  I  chose  to  interview  some  of  the  very  first  respondents  once  more  in  
order to cross-check my initial style with the more adapted technique as well as to 
evaluate my own position as a researcher. The second interviews indeed proved to be 
worthwhile, mostly because the respondents were no longer shy and uncertain, but 
talkative from the very beginning. Not least because of this reason, with more time than 
the seven weeks I had in the field, it would have been a good idea to re-interview a 
greater number of the respondents. Gladly I noticed that no remarkable changes 
occurred in the replies given by the three respondents during the second interviews. 
Nonetheless, I realized that during the initial confusion I had sidestepped some 
interesting points made by the interviewees, which luckily points had emerged in other 
interviews. Also transcription work revealed the limitations I had faced, as it became 
evident that there simply had not been enough time to discuss all arising issues in depth 
as I was forced to move on with the selected topics. The total of the 23 interviews 
however seemed to complement each other as an issue bypassed in one was discussed in 
another.  
 
 
5.3 Research analysis  
 
The research analysis has been carried out accordingly to the theoretical framework 
based on previous research on migration and development and policy coherence as 
presented above. The juxtapositions recognizable within the migration-development 
nexus of the EU Blue Card and PCD debate, such as permanent and temporary 
migration, brain drain and brain gain, and irrelevance and relevance of circular 
migration – have guided the following analysis and interpretation of the findings from 
the field.  
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Again, limitations to this theoretical framework of migration-development optimism 
and  pessimism must  be  noted,  seeing  that  migration  of  health  professionals  presents  a  
rather specific case, and cannot be generalized to challenge the previous theories of 
optimistic outcomes in particular. However, by studying such a specific case in the light 
of the selected framework, I have intended to give a fair chance to both pessimist and 
optimist  schools  of  thought,  and  to  study  whether  or  not  the  adverse  effects  of  brain  
drain in Malawi could be addressed by circular migration. Having said this, it must be 
acknowledged, that my initial hypothesis is based on the EU Blue Card criticism, and 
naturally rests on the previous studies carried out in relation to emigration of health 
professionals from sub-Saharan Africa. In particular previous literature by Bach (2003, 
2006), Palmer (2006), Gerein et al. (2006), Connell et al. (2007), Vujicic et al. (2004) 
and Muula (2005, 2006)33 has influenced my own perspectives and understanding over 
the matter. Whereas much similarity can be found in the succeeding analysis, also some 
exceptional findings as well as differing accentuations to these studies are presented.   
 
My process of analysis begun already in the field in the form of a field diary, yet coding 
of a number of concepts under the most fundamental categories was possible only after 
the completion of the transcription work. Seeing that the method of semi-structured 
focused interviews had not worked as wished in practice, the planned objectivity of the 
research through a minimal role of the interviewer had also been compromised as at 
times I clearly introduced questions in accordance to my own expectations, instead of 
employing the on-going dialogue as a foundation for further questions. Despite my 
mistakes, the role of the respondents should not be undermined, as at times they indeed 
presented quite opposing views to what I had anticipated and thus fixed the error I had 
caused.  
 
In order to study the dialogue and at least point out and exclude some of the most 
obvious faults, I processed the data through coding and categorizing accordingly to the 
method of content analysis (Holsti 1969, Hirsjärvi & Hurme 1988, Miles & Huberman 
1994). According to Holsti (1969 p.4) objectivity of the research and the position of the 
researcher must be acknowledged during the selection of the categories and coding of 
                                               
33 Muula is a Malawian health professional himself, and has published a number of articles on Malawian 
health sector development and human resource crisis. By means of his research and several co-writings 
(Muula & Broadhead 2001; Broadhead & Muula 2002; Muula & Maseko 2006; and Muula, Panulo & 
Maseko 2006) I was able to familiarize myself with the essentials of the Malawian health sector prior my 
own field research.  
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the data in order to minimize the ‘possibility that the findings reflect the analyst’s 
subjective predispositions rather than the content of the documents under analysis’. 
Therefore, in order to avoid biased conclusions, I implemented coding carefully 
according to those issues raised by the informants; my attempt was to identify key 
determinants introduced and emphasized by the respondents during the interviews, 
although at times these differed from my own preconceptions. In all, a total of 25 topics 
were identified during the transcription work and analysis and are presented explicitly in 
appendix II.34 I proceeded by organizing the topics in three interrelated categories, that 
again were based on the interlinkages spontaneously created by the respondents. 
Interpretation of the findings in chapters 6 and 7 is intended to serve the selected 
approach to emphasize and remain loyal to the local perspectives. Only after the 
completion of the coding, the identified categories were reflected against the theoretical 
framework and previous literature of migration and development as well as the concept 
of policy coherence.  
 
Within the research analysis a variety of examples given by the respondents are referred 
to,  as  the  selected  approach  to  the  EU  Blue  Card-PCD  dilemma  has  been  that  of  
introducing the local viewpoint to the debate. According to good research conduct, 
anonymity has been guaranteed for the respondents. I have also chosen not to identify 
the towns and hospitals in question, since health professionals in Malawi are few and 
could be easily identified. For these reasons, I have listed the interviews in a random 
order, and will refer to the respondents simply by a number [no.], where necessary. On 
occasions  the  professional  status  of  the  health  worker  has  been  revealed.  It  is  also  
worthwhile to note that although not all interviews [1-23] are directly referred to in the 
text; all replies have contributed to the following analysis and thus have been taken into 
account. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind that as a social scientist I was not able to assess 
the quality and standard of patient care and local medical education. Any references to 
medical  science  within  the  analysis  rest  on  those  perspectives  presented  by  the  
respondents. However, I sought guidance and a point of comparison to the European 
standards already in the field in particular in the interviews with international volunteers. 
Furthermore, during the process of analysis I have consulted medical professionals in 
Finland, where clarifications were seen necessary. In relation to the debate of potential 
                                               
34 See Appendix II for a complete list of the topics.  
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benefits brought about by brain circulation, a medical view should be included. For this 
it is crucial to involve medical specialists to identify critical areas in medical care, 
which could be improved and targeted by migration of health professionals. 
 
 
6. Migration-Development Nexus in the Malawian Health Sector 
 
The 23 interviews, all of which I conducted in September and October 2010, are at the 
core of this study. These discussions with local nurses and doctors, as well as 
international volunteers, proved valuable and fruitful in opening a desired view for me 
to observe the research topic – EU Blue Card – from an alternative perspective. In this 
chapter I will present my findings from the field in rather thorough and extensive 
manner to remain loyal to my approach and to the contribution of my interviewees. 
Furthermore, this chapter forms the basis for the final interpretation and analysis of the 
set research questions in chapter 7, where I will bring the study back to the EU and PCD 
context.  
 
Among all, the following questions emerged from the interviews and framed my 
analysis: 
 
1. What are the reasons behind emigration and why return migration and brain 
circulation have so far failed to occur to address the problem of permanent 
migration and brain drain? 
2. Which factors determine the circumstances favorable for out-migration, return 
migration or for one to stay in Malawi? 
3. Do the improved migrant rights embedded in the EU Blue Card match with the 
needs and interests of individual Malawian health professionals?  
4. Whether or not circular migration is even perceived relevant and conducive to 
development objectives by the local health workers? 
 
I have presented my findings in three separate sections. In section 6.1 I will begin by 
illustrating the local circumstances and situation through the voice of my respondents. 
To discuss the circumstances is crucial for two reasons. First, to understand the local 
circumstances is to understand the reasons for one to migrate. These reasons in turn 
determine what it is that locals wish to gain from migration and what kind of migratory 
58 
 
flows are characteristic for Malawi. Second, as recognized in the previous literature 
discussed in chapter 4, to study the circumstances is significant because any 
developmental outcomes are likely to depend on these local conditions and the 
migratory flows likely to occur in this specific context. Whereas in section 6.1 I will 
simply describe the circumstances, in the following sections I will elaborate on the two 
aforementioned points as in section 6.2 I will discuss the local choices concerning the 
decisions  to  leave,  to  stay  or  to  stay  away,  as  well  as  analyze  what  kind  of  migratory  
flows are originating in Malawi and whether these flows are temporary or permanent. In 
turn in section 6.3 I will present an originally unexpected element in my findings, as I 
will discuss the relevance of one of the main PCD tools embedded in the EU Blue Card 
–  that  of  brain  circulation  –  from the  point  of  view of  Malawian  health  professionals.  
Together these three sections provide fundamental grounds for chapter 7, where the 
potential of the EU Blue Card to respond to the local needs and to address the problem 
of brain drain through circular migration is assessed.  
 
 
6.1 Circumstances behind migration 
 
I will begin my research analysis by identifying and discussing a number of reasons for 
migration to occur and persist, and by illustrating why it continues to offer a viable, 
rational and at times the only alternative for the local health workers today. The reasons 
for migration were not explicitly addressed as such within the interviews, yet incentives 
for migration were evident in the respondents’ views over the prevailing circumstances 
and the current state of the health sector development in Malawi. In this section I will 
illustrate these views through three different yet interlinked categories of 1) work 
overload, 2) frustration and feeling of helplessness and 3) opportunities for further 
education. These three categories appeared as evident common denominators within the 
research analysis – and thus it is under these groupings that also a number of additional 
topics could be addressed and naturally presented.  
 
Not only is my purpose to identify an array of topics that form the local circumstances, 
but also to underline the commonly neglected fact that rather than one reason alone, it is 
the overall impact of all incentives that enforce out-migration. This is to argue that out-
migration should not be viewed as a result of a single factor (the one that may manifest 
most clearly), but as a consequence of multiple underlying incentives that form the 
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prevailing  circumstances  on  the  whole.  As  said,  to  discuss  the  local  circumstances  as  
well as the grievances, hopes and aspirations currently present in the Malawian health 
sector is crucial, seeing that such conditions on one hand explain the migratory flows 
characteristic for Malawi, and on the other determine the developmental potential of 
such flows – topics which I will turn to later on. 
 6.1.1 Underlying reasons for work overload   
 
Here research findings are presented in relation to the first analytical grouping of work 
overload. Work overload emerged as one of the main topics discussed, and presents 
itself as somewhat obvious explanation for poor working conditions and for potential 
out-migration. However, work overload may only manifest as the main motive for one 
to migrate, as there are multiple other underlying causes that may contribute to the 
situation  to  culminate.  In  other  words,  an  array  of  factors  as  a  sum  contributes  to  the  
emergence of a work overload situation and the consequent decision to migrate. My 
purpose  here  is  to  discuss  the  multiplicity  of  these  reasons  and  to  demonstrate  the  
interlinkages between these motives in order to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
circumstances on the whole.  
 
Before elaborating on each of the individual factor separately and presenting the 
circumstances as described in the interviews, I will present a summary of my key 
findings in Table I. I have chosen to illustrate these findings in a linear fashion 
accordingly  to  the  examples  and  emphases  raised  during  the  interviews,  as  well  as  in  
order to seek clarity. However, it is necessary to note that the multiple factors identified 
below are in fact interrelated and extend beyond the presented causalities. Furthermore, 
although my purpose here is to investigate various reasons as well as the circumstances 
on the whole, that could contribute to work overload and result in out-migration, it is 
important to bear in mind, that out-migration presents only one option among a few 
alternatives: equally to emigration, a work overload situation could lead to a decision to 
seek employment elsewhere; to a decision to change occupation altogether; or to a 
decision  to  continue  as  always,  as  will  be  discussed  later  on  when reasons  to  stay  are  
investigated in section 6.2. However, what is significant for now is that the multiple 
factors that contribute to the emergence of a work overload situation provide grounds 
for a decision to be made.   
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Work 
overload  
? 
out-migration 
 
 
 
Table I – Some of the elements identified by the respondents within the interviews that 
as a sum result in a work overload situation.  
 
 
Whereas it is common-sense that staff shortages result in work overload and stress 
experienced by the health workers, staff shortages alone do not explain a work overload 
situation, as there are other equally significant factors that may contribute to the 
circumstances to occur. To identify these reasons is to identify the severity and 
extensity of the human resource crisis, and the multiple factors that should be 
acknowledged in order to reduce the stress, improve the working conditions and thus 
reduce the likelihood of further emigration. In other words, not only should staffing 
levels be improved in order to tackle the crisis, but additional measures should be taken 
into  account.  In  the  following  I  will  elaborate  on  these  underlying  causes  of  the  crisis  
resulting to the present circumstances (as identified by the respondents).  
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Against expectations, out-migration was not seen as the primary reason for staff 
shortages and consequent work overload. Instead the primary reason identified by all 
respondents was that of low intake within the few Malawian schools providing health 
related diplomas and degrees. Out-migration was seen to simply downplay these already 
low levels. Respondents generally agreed that the number of emigrants would become 
insignificant (along with high attrition levels in general), if only intake levels and 
consequent number of graduates were more; if ten out of fifty newly graduates migrated, 
it would have a more depressing impact than if twenty out of a hundred would leave. 
One of the respondents illustrated the problem of emigration as follows; 
 
‘If we were producing more nurses – even if some of them go away, we wouldn't 
feel the pinch. But we are producing so little, so even if two go away we feel the 
pain. But let’s say we produced more nurses – even if a third of them go out – it is 
like a drop in the ocean’ [7]. 
 
Together with low educational capacity, it was generally noted how the doctor/patient 
and nurse/patient ratios have been insufficient to begin with. Seeing that Malawi has 
had its own medical college only for some twenty years – that is less than ten years 
prior to the crisis – these ratios provide no surprise. Even today, “catching-up” proposes 
a challenge, not only because of low educational intake, but also because (according to 
the local health workers) population growth continues to exceed the rate of newly 
graduating medical professionals.35  
 
Additionally to the reasons for a work overload situation originating from inadequate 
schooling capacity and depressing ratios to begin with, also reasons originating from 
medical resource shortages were cited to add to the amount of work. At times the lack 
of medical resources was perceived even more problematic than that of staff shortages, 
as it was commonly acknowledged that even if an adequate number of nurses were 
made available, little could be done if the equipment and medications remained missing. 
Besides general care and treatment, the lack of medical equipment and technology may 
also forbid thorough diagnosis. All of the interviewed physicians noted, that on 
occasions where diagnosis cannot be made in the districts, patients are referred to the 
                                               
35 The reasons why human resource crisis for health became visible at the turn of the century and not 
before can be debated – possible factors could entail population growth, HIV/AIDS pandemic, local 
political developments, and global migration trends. Or perhaps the crisis was simply not acknowledged 
until the British medical community awoke to the problem of brain drain in Malawi. 
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central  hospitals  in  Blantyre,  Lilongwe,  Zomba  or  Mzuzu.  As  a  result,  these  referrals 
increase the pressure experienced in the central hospitals. What is more, referrals are 
necessary not only for the reason of deficient medical resources in the districts, but also 
because most specialized physicians work in the central hospitals. This is to say that due 
to the lack of specialized skills in the districts; at times thorough diagnosis and 
systematic treatment propose a challenge parallel to that of resource shortages.  
 
Interestingly and in addition to above-mentioned staff, medical and skills shortages, also 
behavior and practices characteristic in Malawi, especially amongst the poorer 
population, may contribute to a work overload situation to occur: a medical volunteer [2] 
noted that due to a delayed arrival at the hospital opportunistic infections and 
complications may have matured and thus patients tend to be sicker and their condition 
more severe. As a result the work at the hospital becomes harder.36 Medical care is not 
sought in time due to high tolerance of disease among the local population and because 
of high costs involved in both traveling to and staying in the hospitals [7]. Because of 
the delayed arrival, the stay in the hospital may, however, be prolonged resulting in not 
only additional costs for the patient, but also in additional workload for the hospital staff. 
Prolonged stays at the hospitals may likewise be a result of inadequate hospital 
facilities, which may add to the commonly compromised health standards. In one of the 
interviews it was noted, how recently improved space and adequate amount of beds 
within a new facility had evidently reduced the risk of hospital-acquired infections. As 
a result patients would respond quicker to the medication and could be discharged 
earlier as before [3].37 Such adequate facilities are, however, usually missing. 
 
In  the  midst  of  these  somewhat  obvious  reasons  that  add  to  the  problem  of  work  
overload, also an unforeseen cause emerged during the field research. Perhaps for the 
reason of staff shortages to begin with, district head officers (DHO) together with other 
highly positioned medical doctors and nursing officers are responsible of multiple tasks. 
In general this indicates that in addition to patient care, the few physicians must 
                                               
36  The medical volunteer however notifies that ‘luckily’ most patients are rather young and suffer 
primarily from infectious diseases. With adequate resources of intravenous antibiotics and antifungal 
medication patients generally recover well. Also in some cases diagnosis can be easier, when disease has 
progressed  and shows more  symptoms and signs.  In  all  however,  it  is  stated  that  work  becomes  harder  
due to delayed arrivals [2].  
37 Conversely in one of the central hospitals only few hospital acquired diseases were reported. One of the 
supposed reasons for such phenomenon was the lack of nurses treating and touching each patient, and the 
necessity to delegate the tasks to the guardians [2]. Such explanations however remain to be studied.  
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undertake  many  administrative  tasks  as  well.  A  head  of  a  private  clinic  and  the  only  
medical doctor in the hospital illustrated his work tasks as follows; 
 
‘I run the hospital, I am responsible for budgeting of everything – including 
transport logistics, ambulance’s fuel, peoples salaries, and everything else. I am 
responsible for making sure that the drugs are bought, responsible for controlling 
and recruiting any vacancies so that we have people in the right place, I am 
responsible for making sure everyone gets trained continuously. So I am basically 
running as the managing director of that little clinic – and I am still the doctor and 
must see my patients…so in terms of work pressure, that is a huge challenge’ [10].  
 
The administrative positions in the public sector hospitals are described very similarly 
to above description of a private one: in the Malawian set-up district  head officer is  in 
fact considered as an administrative post [3]. Administrative responsibilities (critical to 
keep the hospitals in operation), nevertheless, propose a challenge, especially where 
supplementary physicians are few. An international volunteer described such challenged 
situation in a hospital of just three physicians (him included) as he exemplified how his 
local colleagues are ‘always attending meetings and seminars’ instead of prioritizing 
patient care [5]. He indicated that because of such administrative posts and the 
consequent failure of medical doctors to prioritize patient care, the workload of the 
others was increased. As a result, the time that nurses and clinicians could allocate for 
each patient was less and thus also the care provided became compromised. The 
volunteer further exemplified the situation as he described how he no longer had time 
for ward rounds, when needed – and thus the patients were brought into his office 
instead.  
 
Because of the multiple administrative responsibilities placed upon the few medical 
doctors, clinical officers are generally referred to as the ‘backbone of the Malawian 
health sector’. It is indeed clinical officers, who answer for most of the treatments 
implemented and decide of the necessary referrals and consultations (which may be 
many because qualifications of clinicians are less). However, seeing that medical 
doctors are often engaged elsewhere and staff is otherwise few, clinical officers too 
have to answer for numerous tasks. It is, for example, common for one to 
simultaneously supervise two wards and on top manage an anti-retroviral treatment 
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(ART) clinic [3 & 11]. As described, such multiple responsibilities propose a challenge 
regarding patient care; 
 
‘So it is like two, three, four things at once – you find that one thing will fail’ [3].  
 
Multiple tasks call for prioritizing and may lead to conscious negligence of certain 
duties. It was illustrated, for example, how in a case of a cesarean section, all other 
duties are to be abandoned and how the emergency is naturally prioritized. This is to say 
that no-one may be available to attend problems elsewhere. Such circumstances become 
emphasized when communication between the staff is inadequate. One of the nurses [3] 
exemplified such a failure in communication by telling of what had just happened that 
morning; neither of the two clinical officers responsible for the out-patients department 
had arrived at work, since one had unexpectedly worked the whole night, and the other 
was attending a training that day. As a result, instead of performing his own duties, the 
nurse  had  to  spend  the  whole  morning  trying  to  reach  someone  to  answer  for  the  
department. When communication fails, the nurses felt strongly that it was them, who 
had to compromise their own tasks in order to take upon additional responsibilities.  
 
Aforementioned factors, such as lack of educational facilities and low educational 
intake; extreme nurse/patient and doctor/patient ratios; medical resource as well as skills 
shortages; numerous referrals; delayed medical treatment; limited hospital facilities; 
multiple tasks and responsibilities and consequent problems to prioritize patient care; 
together with failed communication, illustrate the extent of the problem of work 
overload. These individual factors identified in the interviews resemble the findings 
presented in previous studies concerning the sub-Saharan African health sectors and 
emigration of health professionals, as for instance Muula & Maseko (2006) and Palmer 
(2006) have listed comparable challenges in their studies regarding Malawi. My 
purpose here, however, is to go beyond bare description of single challenges and to 
point out and emphasize the simultaneous impact of  an  array  of  factors  that  as  a  sum 
form  the  overall  circumstances  and  contribute  to  the  emergence  of  a  work  overload  
situation, stressed conditions and the consequent decision to migrate.  
 
This indicates that although work overload may manifest as the main motive for one to 
migrate, there are multiple additional underlying causes that contribute to the 
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circumstances to culminate – that is to say that in order to tackle the problem of work 
overload, the components of such conditions as well as the interlinkages between these 
components must be identified and understood.  
 
The overall circumstances (made up of several components) have been demonstrated 
above in Table I accordingly to those views presented by the respondents. Within this 
first scenario and analytical grouping of work overload, I have, however, only scratched 
the surface of the Malawian reality and circumstances, as based on the above findings 
ever more numerous factors and complex interlinkages could be identified. It is these 
that I will turn to in the following.  
 6.1.2 From work overload to personal frustration  
 
Work overload and consequent out-migration do not necessarily have to be the final 
manifestations of the causality chains illustrated above in Table I, as factors and 
causality  chains  even  after  this  can  be  traced.  Here  I  have  employed  the  second  
analytical grouping of personal frustration and the feeling of helplessness as a 
continuation to the previous one – again with the purpose to stress the all-encompassing 
character of the underlying reasons behind those causes that may manifest more clearly 
as reasons for migration. This is to say, that although again a number of separate factors 
could be identified, it is in fact the sum of these incentives that form the overall 
circumstances that may as a whole influence one’s decision to migrate. A summary of 
the below findings will follow in Table II.  
 
Evidently the reasons for frustration and feeling of helplessness are multiple. To begin 
with,  the  staff  shortages  enforce  both  nurses  and  doctors  to  rotate between  the  wards  
and departments accordingly to the emerging needs. Obligations in several different 
fields of medicine would prove a challenge anywhere and for anyone – nonetheless in 
Malawi a general medical doctor may have to answer for maternity, pediatrics and 
surgery at once without adequate specialized knowledge or medical resources in all of 
these particular fields [4, 11]. Likewise  a  nurse  may  be  required  to  fill  in  both  for  
pharmacy and surgery [9, 11]. Whereas this describes the daily situation for the GPs 
(and clinicians) within the districts, where staff is few, nurses commonly work only for 
one ward at a time and are reassigned only occasionally. Naturally health workers fail to 
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command expertise in such a wide array of fields and in part because of this, also fail to 
deliver adequate diagnosis and treatment (resource shortages must be acknowledged 
here in relation to skills shortages). In the absence of an adequate consultation network 
for the benefit of the district staff, constant failure to provide treatment easily translates 
to a feeling of personal failure, frustration with  the  work  at  hand  and  a  feeling of 
helplessness when the burden becomes too heavy.  
 
Although all respondents expressed similar feelings, the problem arose specifically 
among the less qualified cadre of nurses (that of diploma enrolled nurses referred to as 
nurse technicians), who due to the staff shortages must rotate between the departments 
as any other more qualified personnel [18, 20]. To provide comparison, the 
qualifications of nurse technicians are equivalent to that of the European care assistants, 
who for instance are not responsible for implementing medical treatments. One of the 
nurse technicians interviewed was, for instance, required to assist in surgeries without 
much previous experience and another worked the pharmacy in the absence of a real 
pharmacist. Whereas the nurses in general felt that their education was adequate, 
rotation from one department to another posed an obvious challenge, where skills were 
not learned prior to the transfer. In particular the need for a number of specialized 
midwifes and pharmacists to support the work of the general nurses arose in the 
interviews.38  
 
Additionally to the demonstrated demand for multiple expertise skills, nurses in 
particular  stated  that  due  to  the  staff  shortages  and  a  number  of  patients,  they  do  not  
have time to carry out all their tasks during the shifts – much as expected. As a result, 
guardians (relatives of the patients) have stepped in to look after the more general tasks 
of feeding, bathing and turning of the patients.39  Because  of  such  necessity  of  the  
guardians, nurses commonly stated that they felt as if they had failed to carry out the 
responsibilities assigned to them. Such feeling was further stressed, where guardians felt 
insecure of their role. One of the nurses captured this described feeling of failure in 
discussion of a night shift with only two of them working a ward of some hundred 
patients: 
                                               
38 At the moment Malawi does not train specialized midwifes, as only a year-long course is embedded in 
the general studies. 
39 For a relative to accompany the patient in a hospital might also be embedded within the culture. 
However, it is now seen essential for each patient to have his or hers own guardian, who may ensure that 
treatment is delivered.   
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‘You are doomed to fail…that is evidence based, because you actually see that you 
have failed. I cannot do, because time is not there for me to do it. Because we fail, 
we just delegate to the guardians, but we are not supposed to do it – that patient is 
very weak, very sick and the guardian is afraid of touching that person, and you 
insist telling the guardian that touch your patients, help that patient with the bath, 
yet the guardian is scared’ [20].  
 
This failure to provide care for each patient individually visibly resulted in frustration 
and the feeling of helplessness amongst the nurses. What is more, and regardless of the 
vital role of the guardians in helping with patient care, many nurses had indeed grown 
tired of repeatedly arguing with and advising the guardians, and felt as if the relatives 
pointlessly added to the stress experienced by the staff.  
 
Similarly to the help provided by the guardians, also students and medical interns 
supplement the staff shortages during their practical trainings. There seems to be a risk 
however, that the work experience proves appalling already at this early stage owing to 
the evident staff shortages. This is to say that other alternatives to the expected work in 
the public hospitals may seem more attractive already for those yet to enter the working 
life. According to observations of a medical volunteer, much of the hard work is indeed 
carried out by the students. She exemplified the situation by discussing her time in one 
of the central hospitals, where only two medical interns answered for the whole medical 
department, working 12 hour shifts in turns [2]. A newly graduate general practitioner, 
who had recently finished his internship period, verified that for short periods of time 
the situation may indeed get as severe as described by the volunteer [4]. In general, it 
was agreed among the newly graduates that work experiences especially within the 
central hospitals were discouraging. For nurse students there was an additional strain to 
that of staff shortages, as many stated that consultation with senior staff (especially in 
the central hospitals) was unsatisfactory.  
 
Alongside staff shortages, medical resource shortages presented a principal reason why 
practical trainings had proved discouraging: one of the final year nursing students 
notified that although the education received was sufficient, it did not prepare her for 
the work in practice and for everyday situations, where medical resources are missing 
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and alternative tools and methods must be sought [12]. Because of lacking resources, 
the skill of improvisation was indeed emphasized in all of the interviews. A common 
example  given  of  improvisation  was  that  of  catheterization,  that  in  general  cannot  be  
carried out by the book as the equipment (sterile kit) is most often not available. Hence 
alternative – and at times rather innovative – methods are required. These (regular) 
occasions of ad hoc treatments proved challenging and even frightening for students 
especially, seeing that even with improvised treatment patient safety must be 
guaranteed and the risk of induced infections minimized [12]. Such discouraging 
experiences, lack of practical skills relevant for the stressed conditions as well as lack 
of consultation during practical trainings provide grounds for a decision to move abroad 
or  to  reassign  even  before  actually  entering  the  working  life:  one  of  the  three  nurses  
interviewed upon their graduation stated that he did not wish to continue working as a 
nurse and indeed seriously considered alternative tasks within the health sector [8].40  
 
Not only guardians, students and medical interns, but also international medical 
volunteers bring relief to the current staff shortages. Although international volunteers 
ease the pressure and often introduce specialized skills, it was commonly stated by the 
local respondents, how knowledge ‘from the outside’ made them realize the 
incompetence of medical care in Malawi: 
 
‘It is always difficult to think about that this drug would have helped the patient, 
but it is not available, so what do we do?’ [16]. 
 
Certainly any knowledge, skills and ideas were welcomed along with the extra hands to 
cover for the shortages, yet to learn from treatments, equipment and medications 
available in developed countries noticeably exacerbated the feeling of frustration and 
uselessness of the inadequate medical resources as well as contributed to the personal 
feeling of helplessness and failure to provide care.  
 
Out of the number of reasons identified as a source of frustration, perhaps the primary 
reason raised was that of tension between the nursing cadres. As discussed in chapter 2, 
the cadre of diploma enrolled nurses was introduced as a response to the human 
resource crisis with the idea to train as many nurses as quickly as possible and to ensure 
retention, given that the diploma accomplished would not match the international 
                                               
40 Palmer (2006) has further elaborated on the link between inadequate resources and low staff morale.  
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requirements for nursing qualifications. This old strategy to cover for the shortages was 
recently abandoned, and the aim of the new human resources for health strategy and 
education scheme is (as pointed out in the interviews) now to train diploma registered 
nurses instead – a newly introduced cadre between diploma enrolled and degree nurses. 
Consequently to the introduction of this new cadre, grievances amongst nurses began to 
emerge.  Such  tension  was  evident  in  the  interviews  as  particularly  diploma  enrolled  
nurses expressed their disappointment over the inadequate appreciation of their work 
input: although duties were somewhat similar in comparison to the tasks and 
responsibilities  carried  out  by  the  diploma  registered  and  degree  nurses,  salaries  were  
worse. This issue was somewhat topical at the time, seeing that clear boundaries 
between the three cadres were yet to be established in the official demarcation of work 
tasks [14].  
 
Although general tension was evident, nurses sympathized each other and wished for 
clearer demarcation of duties and more comparable salaries. All cadres agreed that due 
to the staff shortages work in practice did not differ to a great extent – the only 
difference being that of ward management, commonly the responsibility of degree 
nurses. Despite the comparable duties, disparities between cadres were recognized in 
particular in remuneration and compulsory work shifts:  
 
‘To some extent there is not so much difference in the work description, but 
management skills. Salary is different, because of qualifications. Amount of work is 
the same to some extent – only difference is that degree nurses don't usually come 
to night-duties for the whole night (17-7.30), only on call, if there is something 
serious…or night supervision’ [13].  
 
Grievances arise mainly from inadequate work description, pecking order based on 
educational qualifications (and despite comparable work in practice), differences in 
work shifts and differences in salary and allowances. Whereas a newly graduate 
diploma enrolled nurse will earn 29, 000 MKW (approx. 150e) per month, degree 
nurses receive 58, 000 MKW (approx. 300e) per month (in the public sector). Moreover, 
whereas  diploma  enrolled  nurses  are  obliged  to  work  nights  without  an  allowance,  
degree nurses seldom work the night-shifts – yet when they do, they receive an 
allowance for this. Equal allowances were wished, seeing that the night-shifts were 
described to be emotionally by far the most challenging. It was further described that 
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nurses are commonly only one or two against as many as eighty patients in one ward. 
During the rainy season, the number of patients was told to be even more and diploma 
enrolled nurses in particular felt indisputably helpless and depressed even, when 
discussing the topic. This was the case especially if patients had passed away during the 
previous night and nurses had been on duty on their own. It seems as if these hardships 
and stress emphasized the magnitude of unequal remuneration and allowances. This is 
to say that if work conditions were more equal, salary would not necessarily play such a 
significant role. Consequently, unequal salaries (whether or not sufficient), as expected, 
come to downplay work performance. This was openly stated by a diploma enrolled 
nurse: 
 
‘Sometimes when people think what they get, they become lazy – I can say so. You 
become lazy, you see that is almost time to go home and say that “you better wait – 
my friend in the night shift will help you”. You don’t have that motive to work as 
extra hard as you can – you just work, because you are supposed to work, so you 
do what you think you can do at the time. Of course you put much effort, but you 
make yourself not panic’ [18]. 
 
Below (in Table II) I have summarized the above findings. Again, although it is 
significant to point out separate factors, it is necessary to see the multiple reasons as a 
whole – that is as a representation of the circumstances under which a decision to 
migrate is likely to occur as well as on which any developmental outcomes of migration 
depend on.  As stated in the beginning, here my aim is to build upon the conditions 
described in Table I and to demonstrate the continuation of an array of interlinked 
factors that explain the reality in which Malawian health workers live.  
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Personal frustration & feeling of helplessness ? out-migration 
         
 
Table II – examples of causalities initiating from a work overload situation and 
resulting in personal frustration and feeling of helplessness.  
 
 6.1.3 Retention policy and opportunities for further education 
 
As  a  third  category  of  analysis,  I  have  chosen  to  assess  the  role  of  retention policy in 
relation to the opportunities for further education. This is as in the Malawian set up it is 
not sensible to consider one without the other, as those complying with the obligatory 
bond within the government hospitals stand a better chance to access sponsored further 
education compared to those, who choose to carry out the bond in CHAM facilities or 
choose to break the bond and work within the private sector or abroad.41 A chance for 
further education was an aspiration expressed most strongly by all of the respondents 
(with an exception of international volunteers and one local senior physician) and thus, 
                                               
41 The government allocates most places for further studies among staff working within its own facilities. 
Some places are allocated to CHAM workers, yet it was generally agreed that the places were not only 
absolutely but also relatively fewer and hence competition for student places more tense.  
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quite  differently  to  the  above  two  groupings,  also  forms  an  analytical  grouping  of  its  
own.  
 
Although it was commonly agreed that the system, where sponsored further education is 
provided in exchange for complying with the bond and serving in the public sector 
hospitals, was sensible – this privilege attached to the bond was perceived time-
consuming, since those with most work experience were preferred over those, who were 
yet to complete their bonds.42 Seeing that the bond undertaken after generic studies 
might last for five years (for example), the wait seemed unreasonable for many. 
 
‘The five years period it just feels so long. If the bond was two and a half years 
instead, so the other three years, I could upgrade to the degree’ [12].  
 
In addition to such selection criteria, chances to enter further education were thought to 
be rather slim, because applicants in general were many and the queue somewhat long 
compared to the intake capacity of educational facilities.  
 
Regardless of the wait, however, government support was considered essential, given 
that the low salaries, even in the private sector, prohibit any chances to meet the 
required school fees alone. Nurses estimated that the school fees amounted for 300, 000 
MKW each year for two to three years of education.43 This is difficult to meet alone, 
given that, for instance, diploma enrolled nurse’s annual salary is about the same 
amount. Even when salaries within the private sector somewhat double this, the school 
fees are hard to meet as many have younger siblings to support, whose school fees 
should also be paid from the single salary.  
 
Despite the long wait and inferior salaries, and quite unexpectedly, the better chance for 
sponsored further education in the public sector has indeed attracted health workers 
from CHAM and NGO hospitals as well as from other private clinics to work with the 
government facilities. One of the respondents recalled such ‘mass movement’ of people 
                                               
42 The preference concerned at least senior physicians, as opposed to senior nurses; one senior nurse had 
been turned back three times for the reason that she was ‘too old’ to invest in. It is furthermore crucial to 
note, that the emphasis on senior doctors over newly graduates has imposed challenges to the patient care, 
since especially within the districts senior doctors are not commonly met as newly graduates are left alone 
to run entire hospitals. It is indeed not uncommon to find a DHO in his or hers twenties answering for the 
health care of the whole district. 
43 Annual fees in Kamuzu College for Nursing, Lilongwe.  
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from private to the public sector once sponsorships were first introduced in the early 
2000s [3]. At the time, the choice therefore manifested as one between poor salaries yet 
a chance for free education and that of better salary yet worse chances for privately 
funded further education (due to inferior quotas reserved for those outside the 
government facilities). Four options for both nurses and doctors could be captured based 
on the replies: 
 
1) Government bond and work within government hospitals: inferior salary, yet 
improved chances to apply for free further education. Further education however 
cannot be guaranteed for all and does not include post-graduate studies for 
nursing. In turn post-graduate studies for medicine are sponsored.44 
 
2) Government bond and work in CHAM facilities: slightly better allowances and a 
total salary than in the public sector, yet worse chances to apply for free further 
education, as only few places are allocated to CHAM workers. 
 
3) Work within the private sector and dishonor the bonding agreement: better 
salary and a slight chance to pay for education one-self, if intake levels allow.  
 
4) Work abroad and dishonor the bonding agreement: better salary and a better 
chance to pay for education one-self  either a) in Malawi,  if  intake levels allow, 
or b) abroad.  
 
In addition to these four options, many wished to find a private sponsorship to speed up 
the process and to improve the chances to upgrade educational qualifications.  
 
Although, further education is desired equally by all cadres of nurses and medical 
doctors, and to access the local education system free of charge proposes a challenge for 
everyone, diploma enrolled nurses seemed to face the most hardships. At worst, for a 
diploma enrolled nurse it could take some 15 years to upgrade to a degree, depending 
on how the bonding periods are determined as the bonds seem to vary between 2-5 
                                               
44  To my understanding medical graduates are not tied to a bond as nurses are. However, medical 
graduates work two years as interns and after that two years of work within districts is required before 
one can apply for post-graduate studies. Here too, those with more experience are preferred.  
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years.45 To illustrate, the generic studies of a diploma enrolled nurse last for three years 
after which a bond of approximately three years must be complied. The next step is to 
upgrade to a diploma registered nurse that takes additional two years. A new bond of 
some three years is to be expected. Finally another two years of schooling is required in 
order to attain a degree. Again, a bond will follow, if education was government 
sponsored.  
 
Provided that the status and salary of diploma enrolled nurses is by far the worst, they 
naturally felt strongly about attaining a degree. However, as discussed with one of the 
respondents, whose wish was to attain a degree in order to be able to support his family 
once he got married, to wait for ten years seemed unreasonable as he would have turned 
forty by the time he had finished his education.46 Because of the low status and salary – 
contributing to a sense of powerlessness to bring about change to the depressing 
circumstances – changing occupation altogether seemed as the most viable option for 
this respondent [7]. Looking at the options at hand, it is no wonder that many feel 
trapped. The slowness of the system to enable personal development and to build 
meaningful lives was perceived as the main challenge and the key problem to the 
surfacing frustration.   
 
Interestingly, I conducted my field research at a time when negotiations over sponsored 
further education tied to the bond were under way as the six-year-emergency human 
resources for health programme implemented principally with the DFID (as discussed in 
chapter  2)  was  about  to  come  to  an  end  in  December  2010.  Whereas  at  the  time  
employment was as a rule preferred in the government hospitals, given the better 
prospects for further studies – it was commonly feared, that were the sponsored 
education scheme to end (and regardless of the compulsory bond introduced after 
generic studies) there would be a reversed flow of health workers from public hospitals 
to private ones in search of better remuneration and a consequent chance for further 
education. Such anticipated ‘mass exodus’ corresponds  with  options  3  and  4  listed  
above, and indicates renewed crisis and yet another boost for out-migration [stated for 
example in interviews 3, 7 & 19]. Even upon rumors of possible cuts in government 
                                               
45 The duration of the bond between cadres and within cadres varies accordingly to the time of graduation 
and the protocol at the time – those who graduated in early 2000s have longer bonds compared to those 
who have graduated only recently.  
46 Here it is crucial to bear in mind that those in their twenties in Malawi are considered to be middle-
aged and those in their forties indeed make up for the older part of the demographics. 
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funding, many weighed their future options as it seemed that sponsored further 
education  was  slipping  out  of  reach.  Thus  also  patience  to  comply  with  the  bond  had  
evidently diminished: 
 
‘As of now I better go where I can have more salary – anywhere, where I can find. 
Like in Malawi mostly it is NGOs that pay well. So I could save some of my salary’ 
[18]. 
 
Many had held high expectations of attaining a further degree and now felt as if they 
had been deceived after years of public service. Thus not only did public sector health 
workers wish to find employment elsewhere in order to fund future studies on their own, 
but also perceived eventual return to the public sector as even foolish: 
 
‘I would have spent my money for school and then to go back to the government 
for a low salary – no. I better go where I could find more salary’ [18]. 
 
Reduced funding and support for the health sector evidently, at last, compromised the 
otherwise exceptional motivation and solidarity,  expressed  by  many,  to  work  in  the  
government hospitals regardless of poor working conditions, low salaries and the 
slowness of the system even.47 At the time of the negotiations and lingering uncertainty 
over the future funding schemes, many in fact felt as if forced to move on and to weigh 
alternative options against their will – as namely the abovementioned options to seek 
employment in the private sector (option 3) or abroad (option 4) were to be considered. 
Such findings indicate that ‘mass exodus’ and out-migration are not necessarily 
voluntarily preferred, but on the contrary may be strongly influenced by limited 
alternatives at home and in the public sector.48  
 
A local newly graduate medical doctor noted how as a result of uncertain funding, 
already as students poor prospects for future education and salaries are now anticipated 
and thus alternative work opportunities are carefully weighed [4]. According to the 
                                               
47 The high motivation among health personnel to work within the government hospitals – in exchange 
for further education and salaries – was exceptional and in fact unpredicted in the light of the previous 
studies on the root causes of migration (see for example Connell et al. 2007). 
48 In January 2011, I was informed that sponsored further education for nurses was no longer made 
available as only generic studies were funded. To my understanding, however, scholarships for post-
graduate medical doctors are still available. In June 2011 it was further announced that DFID had 
withdrawn its funding for the health sector (IRIN News 6.6.2011, online source).  
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worst case scenario, newly graduate doctors may seek employment in the private sector 
or abroad right after their internship period is completed, and thus may never even add 
to the numbers of public sector health workers. Such a choice is understandable seeing 
that otherwise two years of work experience in the district hospitals is required before 
even standing a chance to apply for post-graduate studies at COM. Correspondingly, 
young nurses may wish to bypass the slow system as well as emerging funding 
problems by seeking employment elsewhere, either right after their studies (regardless 
of the bond) or right after completing the required bonding period.49 Such scenarios 
would indicate, that ‘mass exodus’ is not alone a challenge amongst those already in the 
working life, but also a matter to be considered in relation to those, who are yet to enter 
the sector.   
 
As mentioned, however, rather than a principal option, migration was perceived as a last 
resort and as a forced alternative even. Both nurses and doctors stated that were the 
intake levels satisfactory, the process more prompt and funding secured, both 
employment and studies would be first and foremost preferred locally. This is to stress 
that at least before the recently realized cuts in funding, health workers did not wish to 
move abroad and predominantly local alternatives (such as listed options 1 and 2,) were 
considered. Even where migration seemed as the only way out, it was commonly 
stressed that migration would merely provide means to accumulate enough to return for 
further studies. These findings are significant in the light of the previously presented 
views that prospects of migration and international employment would increase 
incentives for education in the sending-countries, as discussed in chapter 4. Instead of 
contributing to education and human capital formation in the sending country (Stark 
2004), similarly to Faini’s arguments (2003) my findings suggest that even if migration 
would create incentives for education, inadequate schooling facilities and low intake 
levels in Malawi prohibit such positive outcomes. Likewise, low intake levels may 
discourage return migration even – seeing that many planned return in relation to further 
education carried out in local institutions.  
 
In addition to low intake levels, also incomprehensive course selections for post-
graduate studies were cited as a discouragement to attain local education, although 
otherwise preferred. This is to say that inadequate schooling capacity may both result in 
out-migration (not only in search of employment but also education), as well as hinder 
                                               
49 Such finding is significant when planning programs that tackle out-migration. 
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return migration, again largely dependant on these educational prospects at home. 
Because of inadequate course selections, international education of post-graduate 
medical doctors is indeed encouraged and sponsored even in order to complement the 
education provided in the Malawi College of Medicine. Nonetheless, and as will be 
discussed in the following section 6.2, few of these international students have returned: 
 
‘We got a lot of people coming work their first maybe two three years, and then 
they get their scholarship to study and then they don't come back’ [10]. 
 
The findings presented here can be summarized in the thought that if (somehow) 
sponsored education for all levels was continued locally within reasonable time, 
migration (for work or for studies) was less likely to occur in the first place. Below in 
Table III I have listed the above-mentioned factors (as identified in the interviews) 
concerning  the  slowness  of  the  overall  system  attributable  to  retention  policy,  low  
intake levels and preference of senior staff over newly graduates as well as to recently 
reduced funding schemes and poor course selections.   
Reasons for the slow system and  
the general feeling of being trapped in it: 
Alternatives to  
escape the system: 
 
? several applicants 
? low intake levels  
? preference of senior staff (doctors) & 
absence of consultants in the districts 
? bond & low salaries in the public sector 
? withdrawn funding & unfulfilled 
expectations of sponsored education  
? high school-fees compared to 
remuneration 
? limited course selection for  
post-graduate studies 
 
 
? employment in the private 
sector rather than in the 
public sector or CHAM 
? privately funded local 
education 
? change of occupation 
? out-migration; work abroad, 
education in Malawi 
? out-migration; both work 
and education abroad 
 
Table III – A summary of the key findings, where the left column shows the factors 
contributing to the slow system to access further education and reasons for the resulting 
frustration and stress, while the right column presents the alternative ways to escape 
the system.   
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In all, regarding the general preference of and wish for local education and the fact that 
emigration indeed takes place out of necessity and lack of opportunities, out-migration 
of health workers can somewhat be looked upon as forced (unwilling) migration. To 
argue this is by no means to undermine refugee movements that traditionally represent 
the ideas of forced migration, but to point out that the general experiences among 
Malawian health workers indeed derive from the government (and donor) failure to 
provide alternatives and viable options – a failure resembling the very reasons, why 
forced migration in its traditional sense occurs. 50  A recently established Surgeon 
Fellowship Programme at Kamuzu Central Hospital in Lilongwe, initiated by UN 
volunteers in the surgical department in 2008, exemplifies well an approach to promote 
a much needed local alternative. The programme intends to contribute to the number of 
specialized  doctors  in  Malawi  as  a  supplementary  programme  to  the  small  number  of  
post-graduate courses provided in the Malawi College of Medicine (UNV News link 
Malawi 2010).51 What is significant is that the programme provides a local upgrading 
possibility for newly graduate doctors, who now can bypass the compulsory working 
period in the districts without seeking alternatives abroad. One of the young graduates 
indeed stated that the programme had already become popular among his friends as 
many had applied [4].   
 
 
 
Above I have illustrated the local circumstances under which decisions over migration 
take place and which are likely to influence any developmental outcomes of migration, 
as noted by both optimist and pessimist schools of thought (and as discussed in chapter 
4). In order to include all of the key findings and to describe the circumstances 
comprehensively, I have demonstrated the local reality through three analytical 
groupings of work overload, personal frustration and educational opportunities. My 
purpose has been to point out the multiplicity of and interrelations between factors that 
together form the overall circumstances, as well as to argue that rather than one reason 
                                               
50  For example Neumayer (2005) has discussed the reasons stated in asylum application in Europe. 
Forced migration among other types of migration is initially, however, defined by Ravenstein and Lee (in 
Lee 1966). Succeeding literature on migratory movements is vast and cannot be covered within the limits 
of this study.  
51 The current vacancy rate for medical specialists is 85 percent (UNV News link Malawi 2010) and the 
Malawi College of Medicine offers currently only five post-graduate courses locally (online source: 
Malawi College of Medicine). For other medical fields, according to the local workers, international 
education may be sponsored. 
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alone, out-migration results from the situation on the whole. Thus also, in order to 
tackle the problem of out-migration once and for all, a whole array of interlinked factors 
should be acknowledged. 
 
The circumstances discussed (and summarized in Tables I, II and III) play a significant 
role not alone in the consequent sections of 6.2 and 6.3, but also in my final 
interpretation presented in chapter 7. What is crucial to note for now is that the 
described circumstances strongly indicate that rather than being complementary to the 
local conditions, out-migration provides an alternative to  the  stressed  situation.  As  
Adepoju et al. (2010) have argued, developmental outcomes of migration are likely to 
depend on such difference.  
 
 
6.2  To leave, to stay or to stay away?  
 
Above I have discussed the circumstances under which decisions over migration are 
made as a sum of incentives that are likely to influence one’s decision to move abroad. 
However, given that a majority of Malawian health workers52 in fact remain working in 
Malawi (as did the interviewees) and it is indeed these highly skilled professionals in 
developing countries, who are the very focus group of the EU Blue Card, during the 
research analysis I saw it equally important to understand, why under the same 
circumstances, where some have decided to move abroad, many indeed have not. By 
discovering the incentives to stay, my intention here is to assess whether or not the EU 
Blue Card is likely to diminish or support these reasons. It will be shown that even the 
slightest changes to the described circumstances may potentially influence the 
individual decisions made over whether or not to move or to stay. 
 
On top of investigating the incentives for some to remain, I will provide some insight to 
those reasons, why extensive return migration has not occurred – that is, why Malawian 
health professionals as a rule have decided to stay away. Again, my intention in relation 
to return migration is to point-out the importance of the prevailing circumstances within 
the migrant-sending countries from which not only decisions to leave and stay, but also 
decision to return (in part) depend on. This is to say that the prevailing circumstances 
                                               
52 At least when doctors and nurses are not considered separately. 
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are likely to determine whether or not migratory flows are temporary or permanent – a 
distinction on which developmental outcomes of migration largely depend, as will be 
discussed in chapter 7. To provide basis for such final analysis, my purpose here is to 
illustrate some of the reasons that determine the likelihood of one to stay or to stay 
away – either temporarily or permanently – and assess whether or not the EU Blue Card 
acts as a catalyst to these reasons.  
 6.2.1 Diminished reasons to stay  
 
As said, during the research analysis I understood that equally to the decisions to leave, 
also decisions to stay can be explained by the same prevailing circumstances described 
above. Therefore, and based on the above findings, I have deducted four likely 
explanations that clarify, why out-migration has not occurred despite evident incentives 
for it, and why majority of health workers has indeed decided (either as a conscious 
choice or a passive one as will be shown) to stay in Malawi. In fact it should not be seen 
exceptional for one to stay where his or her home is, and hence it is necessary to bear in 
mind that the following analysis is solely for the purposes to weigh the reasons to stay, 
regardless of the discouraging circumstances discussed above, against those options 
offered and opened up by the EU Blue Card. The four explanations are discussed below.  
 
First,  a  decision  to  stay  may  simply  appear  as  such,  although  in  reality  no  actual  
decision is made. Most of the local respondents were in fact clearly ‘stalling’ and 
wishing for a defining change that would either result in a calculated decision to stay or 
to  leave.  This  is  to  say,  that  many  hoped  that  the  circumstances  (as  described  above)  
would change for better, so that they could preferably stay. However, if change was not 
to occur, all respondents working in government facilities were evidently ready to leave 
and  thus  fell  under  this  first  category  of  stalling.  Leaving  within  this  context  was  
referred to either as out-migration or as to abandon the occupation or the public sector. 
Especially those respondents, who had graduated in early 2000s and were neither senior 
staff nor young graduates, were clearly stalling – some had been for ten years, and it 
was only a matter of time when ‘leaving’ was to become reality. Most were evidently 
not happy with the current conditions, yet repeatedly submitted to these circumstances; 
either financial resources were insufficient for one to risk a transition such as out-
migration, or individual tolerance was repeatedly encouraged by a hope for a change in 
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the conditions. Seeing that the discussed cuts in educational funding have been 
implemented, it is unlikely that there is much of such hope left, and thus those who have 
been stalling so far, are now most likely to seek for alternatives.  
 
Second explanation to stay indeed illustrates a situation where one’s wait for better is 
rewarded. Compared to the first category, this represents clearly a more calculated 
decision to stay. As discussed in section 6.1, all of the local respondents wished to 
receive further education, preferably in Malawi. However, if education could not be 
provided locally, the next option was seen in migration. Hence, for example, a chance 
for further education in one of the local institutions could contribute to a decision to stay 
and not to seek alternatives abroad. Likewise, if adequate medical supplies were 
provided, workload would be eased – and consequently work conditions improved. This 
is to say that even a slight change in the circumstances and underlying reasons that drive 
out-migration may encourage one’s tolerance towards those discouraging conditions 
that have not changed and may persuade one to continue working in Malawi. For 
instance, a new hospital facility in one of the research locations provided significant 
improvement to the conditions of the staff, even though the number of patients 
increased as the new facility encouraged more people to seek medical care [3].  
 
Third, it must be recognized that the circumstances under scrutiny involve additional 
factors to the ones revealed in the previous section. Senior staff, especially, identified 
family as a reason for them to stay, yet also younger respondents expressed similar 
aspirations to marry and live in Malawi.  Therefore,  family and children can be viewed 
as an example of a positive incentive amongst the described negative ones:  
 
‘If I go there [abroad], who am I going to leave my children here to take care of 
them? It means there I am going to eat, to do everything – I feel better – but my 
children here, they will suffer. That is why people are not going’ [9].  
 
While previously it has been suggested that families encourage children to move abroad 
in  the  hope  of  financial  remittances  (see  for  example  de  Haas  2010),  the  local  views  
presented by the health workers did not support such livelihood strategies. Rather than 
the economic security enabled by money transfers, health workers perceived it 
important to stay within a short distance to their families in order to provide personal 
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assistance and care when needed. Similarly to these feelings towards family, all 
respondents felt strongly about their responsibility to serve fellow Malawians: 
 
‘Sometimes what touches me most is the people who are here. There are so many 
patients here. Even in my home district it is the same – there is no-one to take care 
of them [family] – and that is something that holds me to stay, even though there is 
money elsewhere – these people need the care. So, if I leave this country for 
greener pastures I can support my family, but I would be depriving the care to my 
fellow Malawians here – and even my own relatives and friends could not come 
and see me, when they need help in health care. I hear stories from my home 
district that the lines [in the hospital] are so long’ [3].  
 
Such solidarity towards fellow Malawians was touching and exceptional; despite the 
recognized incentives for out-migration, all respondents felt strongly about their role 
within the society.53 However, it is probable that the feeling of solidarity diminishes in 
the course of time, as negative elements strengthen. High motivation to serve the 
country is undermined particularly by the lack of opportunities for personal progress, 
choices and opportunities, as discussed above. Therefore, it is likely that even solidarity 
has its limits under the circumstances, where rewards and compensation received in 
return are slim.  
 
Last, and perhaps most importantly regarding the options opened up by the EU Blue 
Card, a decision to stay may simply be for the reason that opportunities for travel and 
living abroad are scarce. It was indeed commonly stated within the interviews that 
‘given the chance’ and ‘if the opportunity is there’ –  one  would  move  abroad.  As  
commonly known, migration is a costly business and requires some planning and 
preparation (see for example Massey et al. 1998), and hence chances and opportunities 
by large depend on the personal contacts and networks as well as the legal avenues 
available for migration. This fourth category can be perceived to go hand in hand with 
the first category of ‘stalling’ and waiting for a change in the circumstances – as here it 
is ‘stalling’ and waiting for a chance to escape the circumstances.   
 
                                               
53 First I thought I was shown such solidarity only since most health workers wished to show as ‘angels’ 
and  ‘saviors’,  yet  despite  this  imposed  and  indeed  very  true  role  in  a  crisis  situation,  I  was  genuinely  
surprised in several occasions of the solidarity shown at work and the strong feelings many had over 
helping the others. 
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In all, based on the research findings, the reasons to stay in Malawi were few amongst 
the number of incentives that make up for the prevailing circumstances and contribute 
to the decision to migrate or seek alternative work. Family, children and future marriage 
together with solidarity towards fellow Malawians and an opportunity for free education, 
are indeed the only recognizable reasons evident from the research analysis. While the 
majority of local respondents fell under the first and fourth categories, all wished for the 
second to materialize – that is that naturally all wished for improved local circumstances.  
 
In the light of the above findings, also the EU Blue Card can be assessed. It seems that 
instead  of  supporting  the  few  reasons  for  people  to  remain  in  Malawi,  the  directive  
indeed compromises these incentives. For example, by allowing for immediate family 
reunification the EU Blue Card presents the alternative of migration in an attractive 
light, where family can come with and thus no longer presents an incentive to stay (or to 
return).54 In addition to this third category of reasons to stay, the EU Blue Card is also 
likely to alter the circumstances in regard to the last category, where especially the lack 
of international contacts and networks to ease migratory movement was referred to. 
With a direct contact to the employer, such role of personal networks may become 
increasingly insignificant. This is especially since the sole purpose of the EU Blue Card 
is to simplify application procedures and facilitate access to the EU labour markets (as 
discussed in chapter 3). Without comprehensive and effective ethical recruitment 
safeguards, the legal channels created and employment opportunities provided are 
surely grasped and would perhaps encourage many more to migrate compared to the 
current levels – especially if discouraging circumstances at home are not prioritized and 
addressed, a theme which I will return to in chapter 7.  
 6.2.2 Multiple reasons to stay away 
 
Above I have illustrated how both decisions to leave and to stay derive from the very 
prevailing circumstances. Here my intention in turn is to assess my findings on the local 
conditions from yet another standpoint, as I will investigate the local circumstances as 
an explanation for the current reality where so far extensive return migration has failed 
                                               
54 Note that the EU Blue Card allows the entry of ‘immediate family’ only, which for instance does not 
include parents of the applicant. In Africa the concept of family is however extended, and hence for one 
to ‘stay close to a family’ may include other relatives as well than just those who are considered 
‘immediate’. Further, note that my intention here is not to argue against the protocol of or the right to 
family reunification. 
84 
 
to occur and many have indeed decided to stay away. 55  Through an improved 
understanding of the influence that local conditions may have on the likelihood of return, 
also developmental outcomes and consequences of migration can be explained. Thus 
this section too provides basis for my final analysis and conclusions, presented in 
chapter 7.  
 
Altogether the respondents knew of only few returnees, working mainly in the private 
sector  or  within  the  central  hospitals.  All,  however,  knew  of  Malawian  nurses  and  
physicians abroad and it was commonly believed that there was no intention among 
these known emigrants to return, except for the holidays and eventually for retirement. 
Hence, according to the local viewpoints and experiences, those health professionals, 
who already reside abroad, are residing abroad permanently and seem to have no 
intention to return to work in Malawi. Likewise, the growing stock of overseas-trained 
nurses and physicians in the developed countries confirm such views on permanent 
migration over temporary flows (Bach 2003). This is an interesting finding considering 
that as a rule the respondents had agreed that if the alternative of migration materialized, 
such option would be harnessed only for temporary purposes, as discussed above in 
section 6.1. This is to say that upon the initial plans of migration, return is planned as 
well. Consequently the question becomes, how come majority of emigrants end up 
staying permanently, if upon emigration temporality is preferred? Again, four 
explanations could be distinguished from the research findings, and again are 
principally based on the above discussed circumstances under which decisions over 
migration are made.  
 
First, the only returnee, whom I ran into during my seven weeks of stay in Malawi and 
after vigorous attempts to reach any, stated that despite the recent achievements and 
improved conditions within the health sector, as compared to those that many left 
behind some ten years ago, his numerous colleagues residing abroad had failed to return 
to Malawi. Such reluctance to return was viewed in part to result from a somewhat 
similar preference system that was recognized also as an initial motivation for out-
migration, seeing that those who have remained in Malawi and complied with the bond, 
                                               
55 In addition to the local situation, it must be however noted, that equally to conditions at home, also 
experiences from abroad influence decisions over return migration. Nevertheless, to study such influence 
is not my priority purpose, as I have chosen to focus on the interlinkages between migratory flows, 
outcomes and local conditions.  
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seem to hold superior career and education opportunities [10].56 What is more, those 
who have stayed may have simply established better networks for career progress, in 
comparison to those, who have not resided and worked in Malawi. To revise the system 
of preference is, however, not uncomplicated nor even desirable; if scarce opportunities 
for promotion and education were not appointed for those, who have stayed and waited 
for such a chance, but were given to the returnees instead, the initial reasons to stay as 
identified above would become undermined.  
 
Given that vacancies (especially for specialized doctors) remain numerous and the need 
to cover for the staff shortages continues to be urgent, poor career prospects and low 
intake levels do not alone explain the reasons, why extensive return migration has not 
occurred. The  claims  over  preference  of  those  who  have  stayed  over  those  who  have  
worked abroad, in fact seem somewhat hasty, as it was acknowledged that the few 
known returnees in fact work in high positions; as consultants in the College of 
Medicine, central hospitals, research projects and private clinics. Thus career prospects 
and educational opportunities are not necessarily as selective towards returnees as might 
be suggested.  
 
This brings us to the second finding of local salaries, which in part explains the failure 
of extensive return migration. The one returnee reached for an interview acknowledged 
how work in the public sector does not seem attractive for many primarily because the 
salary is not comparable to that received abroad. Therefore, the few returnees such as 
himself have sought employment in the private sector or have established their own 
private clinics. Nonetheless, and as a third explanation for one to stay away, 
entrepreneurship in a private clinic is widely discouraged, given the overflow of patients 
from  the  public  sectors.  That  is  to  say  that  the  excessive  workload  of  the  district  
hospitals spills over and equally affects the private clinics. Seeing that private clinics are 
often located where public services are lacking, many indeed prefer to attend these 
clinics despite the hospital fees. This is especially where traveling to and staying in a 
district hospital would anyway become more expensive than a private fee.  
 
‘Basically we are taking the workload of the government…if the government had a 
functioning hospital in the district; I would not have so many patients’ [10]. 
 
                                               
56 Also Muula (2005) has reached similar findings.  
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Work overload, inadequate access to medical resources, multiple tasks and budgeting 
constraints represent only few of the reasons identified as demanding even in the private 
clinics. On top of these challenges, taxation imposed on the private sector might seem 
unreasonable, seeing that private clinics commonly take over for the responsibilities that 
the public sector fails  to carry out.  Such a complementary role is,  for example,  on the 
agenda of many NGO based clinics.  
 
Fourth and most notably, the few chances to actually implement internationally 
acquired skills in Malawi discourage return migration. In all of the interviews, with both 
local staff and international volunteers, it was highlighted that specialized skills and 
experience acquired abroad can seldom be implemented in Malawi as such, given that 
most of the medical resources to carry out treatments provided in the developed 
countries, are simply missing. Therefore, those who return become easily frustrated 
with the situation, where they cannot put their newly acquired skills in practice and 
carry out meaningful work accordingly. Thus there is a chance that those few who 
return, emigrate soon again in search of more rewarding tasks. Such had already been 
the case on few occasions [5 & 10].  
 
Even though the principle focus here has been to explain the failure of return migration 
as viewed through a lens of local circumstances, it is also necessary to mention the lack 
of incentives abroad that would encourage health workers to return. The notion of ‘less 
work, better pay’ captured in a number of interviews is in fact not surprising at all yet 
worth mentioning, seeing that then notion explains well, why the initial plans of 
temporary  migration  may  easily  turn  to  a  permanent  stay.  This  notion  does  not  apply  
alone to those migrating for work, but also to those, who have left Malawi for post-
graduate studies (some with a government scholarship). 
 
‘Graduate training is based on working. If you are going to specialize as a surgeon, 
you do not learn in the book, but you practice, and you are already working in that 
university hospital – and you are paid something. When you compare that with 
what you are likely to get when you get home, you might want to stay off. 
Sometimes you just want to get more experience for a little bit longer’ [10]. 
 
Thus, even where the initial intention behind migration was to acquire a post-graduate 
degree, international studies may easily, though gradually, turn into fulltime 
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employment. Likewise, and as recognized above, if the initial purpose to move abroad 
was to work in order to meet the tuition fees at home, without accessible educational 
opportunities in Malawi, further education may as an alternative be sought 
internationally. What is more, seeing that emigrants are likely to have built up their 
lives in the new host country in just a few years, return migration may no longer present 
a relevant or even a desired option, although initially planned upon [17]: 
 
‘A lot of times, when you go to specialize, you have got kids in schools, and you 
spend five years for instance and you don't want to disturb their school as a lot of 
people would want their children to finish school first before they return’ [10]. 
 
The present failure to ensure return migration of international post-graduate students is 
not novel as the problem appeared the same already during the 1980s and early 1990s 
before the establishment of the Malawi College of Medicine, when undergraduate 
training had to be carried out internationally. Although at the time under-graduate 
doctors were obliged to return to Malawi to carry out internships upon their graduation 
(similarly to present-day bonding agreements) return was seldom permanent as most 
decided to re-emigrate and find employment abroad. The only returnee reached for an 
interview illustrated how only two out of ten undergraduate students of his overseas 
class in the early 1990s remained in Malawi, while the other eight sought international 
employment soon after graduation.  None remained in the public sector as the two (him 
included) continue to work in private clinics. Whereas the stock of general practitioners 
in Malawi has been slowly increasing since generic studies were introduced locally, the 
problem of out-migration and brain drain (as well as the drain of investments put in 
education) evidently persists among the post-graduate students. This is despite the fact 
that international post-graduate studies have for long presented the primary means for 
Malawi to attain much needed skills through brain circulation. Accordingly it must be 
noted that the recent ideas put forward in the EU are not new as they are already 
employed in Malawi. Seeing that the attempts to harness brain circulation in student 
migration have so far failed, it is however doubtful that the EU approach to promote 
skills transfers through labour migration would prove any more successful as long as the 
shared reasons to stay away remain in place. 
 
Above I have presented some key reasons that may discourage return migration, despite 
the initial intention of temporary stay. The opportunities opened up by the EU Blue 
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Card may in fact provide a channel for these reasons to translate into decisive factors in 
a decision to stay away. This might be the case, for example, for a post-graduate student, 
who may easily extend her stay abroad by applying for a work permit after graduation, 
if for instance rewarding work opportunities at home were not found. To attain an EU 
Blue Card permit is possible as in addition to those, who apply from a third-country, 
also third-country nationals already residing within the EU (such as international 
students) are eligible. In such a case student migration may also appear as a way around 
the safeguard protocol of ethical recruitment, seeing that those third-country nationals 
already residing abroad are likely to be excluded from the screening of applicants, 
similarly to the UK experience discussed in chapter 2. The opportunity to apply for 
extensions presents a further risk from the Malawian point of view, as previous studies 
have concluded that the longer the duration of migration, the less likely return becomes 
(Haour-Knipe & Davies 2008) – a point that I will also return to in chapter 7.  
 
 
My purpose above has been to point out that not only do the prevailing circumstances 
explain the reasons for one to leave (as discussed in 6.1), but also explicate reasons for 
one  to  stay  as  well  as  to  stay  away.   Furthermore,  I  have  wished  to  demonstrate  that  
through an improved understanding of the local needs and desires that derive from the 
prevailing conditions, also the nature of migratory flows can be identified – as for 
example distinctions between student and labour migration as well as temporary and 
permanent flows can be made. As evident, such distinctions are however not clear-cut 
and may become easily blurred in the course of time, as for instance temporary student 
migration may turn into permanent employment abroad. The EU Blue Card might play 
a considerable role in defining the type of migratory flows – thus also the question of 
whether migratory flows are temporary or permanent appears crucial in assessing the 
likelihood of circular migration in chapter 7, where also the developmental outcomes of 
such flows will be addressed.  
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6.3  The assumed relevance of brain circulation 
 
Whereas above I have provided basis for the final assessment of the likelihood of 
circular migration, in the following I wish to challenge the general assumption that such 
circular migration and resulting brain circulation, even when realized, would 
automatically be relevant, desirable and beneficial for development.57 Such assumptions 
are  not  alone  made  by  the  EU,  but  also  seem  to  be  somewhat  common  among  the  
academia, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Again, accordingly to my approach, local 
viewpoints over the topic are emphasized.  
 
Below in Table IV, I have again listed some key findings from the field in accordance to 
those factors discussed during the interviews. The findings are divided to those that can 
be viewed to support the relevance of brain circulation and to those that point out the 
current irrelevance of it. It is necessary to note, that specific medical research would be 
required for a more comprehensive understanding of the relevance, need and 
implementation of medical skills in Malawi for the attainment of development 
objectives; although below findings are based on the local professional views and 
discussions with international volunteers, following analysis and interpretation of the 
relevance of brain circulation and skills introduction for the health sector development, 
could be carried out only up to my own very limited understanding of medicine as a 
social  scientist.  Therefore,  my  objective  here  is  to  barely  point  out  some  of  the  most  
obvious benefits and challenges that are likely to occur with regards to the prevailing 
circumstances.58  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
57 Circular labour migration can be viewed to have two dimensions: in addition to circular migration of 
manpower (or the numbers of workers), also circular migration of skills (i.e. brain circulation) is to be 
recognized. 
58 The local respondents with no first-hand international experience based their views of the relevance of 
skills acquired from abroad on their work experience with international volunteers and exchange students 
as well as on their visions of health care elsewhere. The two local respondents with work and student 
experience from a developed country based their views largely on international comparison, similarly to 
the foreign volunteers.  
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Dispute 
 
Relevance of brain circulation  
 
Irrelevance of brain circulation  
Nature 
Of disease 
Knowledge of  
non-communicable diseases 
acquired from Europe. 
 Prevalence and regional  
specificity of tropical/ 
communicable diseases. 
 
 
Medical 
resources 
 
Up-to-date knowledge of new 
medicine, equipment, technology 
and treatment.  
Scarcity of resources, and so 
clinical examination is seen  
as the most valuable skill.  
Health care 
standards 
European standards of patient 
rights, co-ordination, 
teamwork & consultation. 
Malawian reality of work  
overload, low motivation,  
& staff frustration. 
 
Table IV – some of the opposing views presented within the interviews on relevance and 
irrelevance of medical skills acquired abroad in Malawi considering the current 
circumstances.  
 
 
Above three major divergences in opinion are listed based on the research findings.  
First, while international experience could surely facilitate medical specialization in 
non-communicable diseases such as cancer (characteristic to developed countries), and 
thus would without a doubt bring valuable knowledge and experience to Malawi, it 
remains questionable how principal and urgent knowledge of non-communicable 
diseases can be in a country, where majority of diseases are infectious and distinctive to 
those in developed world. Also international volunteers [2, 5] pointed out this 
differential character of disease in Europe and the limited use of respective knowledge 
and skills in practice in their work in Malawi.59 Apart from the differential nature of 
disease between the continents, however, both agreed on the need of specialized 
medical professionals particularly in the areas of surgery, obstetrics and gynaecology. 
These fields were in fact as a rule, identified as most urgent in need of specialist 
medical doctors.  
                                               
59 This is not to argue that knowledge of non-communicable diseases, such as cancer, heart disease and 
diabetes,  were  not  needed  in  Malawi  (as  they  surely  are)  but  to  point  out  that  the  majority  of  cases  in  
Malawi are very indifferent to the conditions in Europe for example, and in fact international volunteers 
may find themselves in situations, where instead of teaching the locals – they learn from the locals, who 
are more familiar with tropical disease (however naturally all benefit from all as knowledge is exchanged).  
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Altogether the findings concerning the differential character of disease in the global 
South are important in the view of the fact that the three health related MDGs concern  
1) HIV/AIDS and other diseases such as malaria 2) child health and 3) maternal health. 
The common causes for under-five mortality consist of malnutrition, diarrhea, 
pneumonia and measles (as stated in relation to this fourth goal of the MDGs) – hence 
knowledge of communicable diseases specific to the region seems more crucial for the 
accomplishment of the first two health related goals. It is indeed unlikely that Malawian 
medical professionals would learn of these tropical and communicable diseases while 
working in Europe. Unlike the first two, the accomplishment of the third health related 
MDG could potentially be served by circular migration, seeing that maternal health is 
continuously compromised in Malawi due to the absence of obstetrics, gynecologists 
and specialized midwifes. However, maternal health is not alone compromised because 
of the skills shortages, but in fact principally because of the staff shortages and the fact 
that some births are not attended by any kind of a professional health worker [3, 4, 7]. 
Therefore  both  skills  and  staff  shortages  in  part  explain  the  high  rates  of  maternal  
mortality. 
 
A local doctor states that in fact under the current circumstances it is wishful thinking to 
have adequate numbers of specialists working in the districts [4]. He states that ideally 
there would be a specialist for each department, as this would drastically reduce the 
referrals made to the central hospitals and make diagnosis and patient care more 
efficient,  but  as  of  now  it  seemed  more  realistic  to  plan  to  have  at  least  one  general  
practitioner in each ward to support the work of clinical officers and to share the burden 
with him. 60  Thus evidently staff shortages continue to be more urgent than skills 
shortages.  Such  principality  of  staff  over  skills  is  stated  also  on  the  agenda  of  the  
Essential Health Policy, discussed in chapter 2, where it is recognized that not all 
services can be provided, and only the basic ones (similar to the three MDGs) should be 
of focus (Palmer 2006). The principality of adequate levels of staff noted on the EHP 
agenda does not, however, necessarily rule out the need for skills, as carefully tailored 
skills applicable and needed in Malawi could potentially ease the current staff shortages. 
                                               
60 At the time of the interview there were only two local doctors in this district hospital of which the other 
was the DHO, busy with administrative tasks. Thus patient care was left nearly entirely for this 
respondent, who ran from one ward to another. 
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Gerein et al (2006) have argued for the need to recognize an adequate ‘skill-mix’ that 
would serve the two objectives of more staff and more skills.  
 
Although staff shortages appear more critical, the need for such adequate skills-mix 
cannot be denied: one of the senior volunteers exemplified that before establishing his 
specialist clinic (for a certain non-communicable condition), the patients were most 
often left without care, if not referred to South Africa, since they could not be diagnosed 
or treated in the respective district – or even in Malawi: 
 
‘Before these patients would just die, or have complications without any preventive 
measures’ [5].  
 
Clearly, a medical professional within this particular specialized field of medicine was 
needed. However, because of the failure of the hospital administration to appoint 
anyone to learn of these skills due to staff shortages, it was feared that the clinic would 
be closed after the volunteer left. Even if someone was to be trained and appointed to 
continue  the  efforts  of  the  clinic,  under  the  current  circumstances  the  hospital  would  
most likely fail to provide the necessary and specific medicine needed for the conditions 
treated in the clinic, as it had failed to date (the volunteer had to provide medications 
privately through the support of the organization).61   
 
This brings us to the second dilemma concerning the relevance of skills acquired from 
abroad to Malawi: it was repeatedly pointed out that even if relevant specialized 
medical skills were attained abroad, implementation of these skills without adequate 
medicine, equipment and technology would pose a challenge within the Malawian set-
up. One of the newly graduate local medical doctors made a point that in fact skills and 
knowledge to be acquired abroad are already introduced locally, since the teaching staff 
at the College of Medicine and consultants in the central hospitals often are 
international employees or possess international experience [4]. He felt that he had been 
taught extensively (in theory) of possible treatments and existing technology, yet the 
implementation of the learned knowledge in practice proved a challenge, because of the 
scarcity of medical resources. A European medical volunteer verified these comments 
                                               
61 It must be noted that the hospital administration might not have budgeted for these specific medications, 
knowing that the organizations behind the volunteers may step in. Most likely however, only basic things, 
if even these, can be provided within the limits of the hospital budgets.  
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as she thought highly of local education in the Malawi College of Medicine and 
commented  on  the  excellent  practical  skills  of  the  local  medical  doctors  working  in  a  
demanding set-up without much equipment [2]. Without undermining the need for 
specialized  skills  acquired  abroad,  local  physicians  emphasized  the  significance  of  the  
skill of simple clinical examination – that is examination and diagnosis without medical 
equipment and technology. Even basic equipment like stethoscopes can be of poor 
quality or missing, especially in the rural health centers and thus the basic skills are of 
most relevance. More advanced equipment and technology (like ECG and CAT scan) to 
facilitate diagnosis can often be found only in private and central hospitals, yet even 
here maintaining the skill of clinical examination is encouraged and valued. Some even 
saw that there was a risk, that if one was to work abroad, she would easily get 
accustomed to have adequate resources at hand, and thus improvisation and clinical 
examination would propose a challenge once returned to Malawi [4, 13, 17].  
 
Conversely to such pessimistic views, work abroad could indeed facilitate local up-to-
date knowledge of new equipments, technology, medications and treatments. In fact at 
times resources might surprisingly be available even in Malawi – yet without up-to-date 
training,  no-one  may  even  be  aware  of  this.  Such  a  case  was  exemplified  by  an  
international volunteer, who demonstrated how some medications sent by European 
donors  were  left  untouched  simply  because  local  doctors  and  clinical  officers,  nor  the  
nurses working the pharmacy, knew enough of these drugs [1]. While keeping up with 
new medication poses a challenge for anyone and anywhere, the problem was 
exacerbated in Malawi, seeing that the nurses working in the pharmacy did not even 
have pharmaceutical qualifications to question these ‘mystery donations’. The failure to 
use available resources was, however, not alone for the reason of skills shortages, but 
also for the reason that the donors repeatedly failed to provide orientation and 
consultation concerning the donated medications. What is more, donors had even failed 
to send sufficient amounts of medicine, as for instance antibiotics and contraceptive 
packages were already partly used, and insufficient amounts were left for treatments. 
Thus any efficient use of these donations was undermined already from the very start, 
regardless of the local skills shortages.  
 
As a matter of fact, challenges beyond skills, staff and medical shortages are 
commonplace. For example, in one of the hospitals the only refrigerator reserved for the 
medications of the pharmacy had broken down. The options left were either to let the 
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medications freeze up in the broken refrigerator or to take them out to keep in a room of 
well  above  thirty  degrees.  As  a  result  valuable  vaccinations  were  lost.  Likewise,  fuel  
crises  in  Malawi  are  ordinary  –  and  thus  also  it  is  almost  as  ordinary  that  ambulance  
services cannot be provided. Such matters, independent from the health sector, can 
hardly be addressed by brain circulation. 
 
Last, as summarized in Table IV, often superior health care standards propose an 
additional ‘skill’ that could be acquired abroad and as a result such norms could be 
attempted  also  in  countries  such  as  Malawi.  For  example  one  of  the  nurses  with  
international exchange-experience was very impressed with the general nurse-patient 
relations in Europe and the involvement of the patients in the planning of the care: 
 
‘So if you are sick they just don't come to give you the drug, but they involve you in 
planning first – so you just don't give the drug without discussing it and reasoning 
it [with the patient]’ [17]. 
 
He however continues to explain the reality in Malawi: 
 
‘The goal there is to finish the work for the patients rather than talking to them, 
because it is kind of waste of time’ [17].  
 
Evidently  the  prevailing  circumstances  in  Malawi,  such  as  work  overload,  lack  of  
medical resources and frustration together with low motivation (caused by unequal 
work tasks and low salaries for example), continue to discourage any efforts to improve 
the local health care standards and the provided patient care. Staff shortages and 
consequent hurry are in fact referred to as the main obstacles for importing superior 
standards and patients rights, though these are evidently wished by all. As discussed 
above in section 6.1 in relation to the substitute role of guardians, nurses wished to have 
more time with each patient to provide adequate care and show respect, yet 
acknowledged the impossibility of such objectives because of the constant stress; 
 
‘I may wish to be a nice nurse yeah, I go to work halve past 7, I am nice, I am nice, 
I am nice – then after lunch I am tired. I may not use the same voice I was using in 
the morning. You know stress starts to come in and then I start shouting. It is not 
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out of my will. Because lets imagine, I am looking after maybe 65 patients in the 
ward of 198 patients – especially in the rainy season when there is a lot of malaria 
– so afternoon you are tired and stressed, at 5 pm you are exhausted’ [7]. 
 
Through improved co-ordination, team work and consultation networks, workload could 
be shared better and completed more efficiently. Brain circulation could act as a channel 
for such ideas of new more efficient ways of work, seeing that some international 
volunteers had already attempted to introduce new work methods in the local hospitals. 
Such input had been well-received especially by the nurses, who without the support of 
the volunteers felt discouraged to show initiative on their own. Not only did nurses feel 
discouraged to introduce new work procedures because of the stressed circumstances, 
but also because few remained in one work place long enough to initiate such changes. 
A senior nurse noted that namely because of the retention policy, newly graduates feel 
trapped and often hold a low motivation. As a result many stay only for the time 
required, after which lives may be built elsewhere.62  
 
‘Sometimes you can have people, who have no motivation and who just stay there 
waiting for their period to end’ [9].  
 
 
Above I have discussed three themes in which arguments in favor and against can be 
made over the relevance of skills transfers in Malawi. At first I have shown that the 
more general character of disease between the global South and North is very different, 
and hence the work experience in Europe would not necessarily match the most 
common needs present in Malawi. Such needs also constitute the very health related 
Millennium Development Goals, that also stand for the EU development objectives. 
Second, I have pointed out that even when critical skills were obtained while studying 
or working abroad, the implementation of these skills in practice proposes a challenge 
due to the lack of medical resources. For example, even basic things such as gloves and 
                                               
62 Upon signing the bond in exchange for sponsored generic studies (which most could not afford alone), 
few truly realize the attached commitments brought about in the future; commitment to low salary and 
poor working conditions for a period of three to five years with inadequate opportunities for accumulating 
wealth and supporting other family members come as a surprise. Unfulfilled expectations of further 
education exacerbate the situation.  
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aprons may be missing, meaning that even if skills in midwifery or obstetrics were 
attained, assistance in birth might be compromised due to the high risk of infection. Last 
I have discussed that even though the local aim is to provide quality care, the stressed 
circumstances turn any improvements to the current health care standards into a distant 
dream.  
 
In the light of the above findings, the need for specialized medical and nursing skills, 
and for improved health care standards, cannot be denied, yet the urgency and weight of 
such skills transfers measured against the prevailing medical resource and staff 
shortages can be questioned. In other words my intention here is not to claim that brain 
circulation and skills transfers were not beneficial for development, but to point out that 
these  argued  contributions  of  the  EU  Blue  Card  to  the  attainment  of  development  
objectives are not self-evident or necessarily even very relevant under the current 
circumstances. In fact it seems that before the more basic conditions are improved, 
optimistic claims of skills transfers resulting in development are but simplistic 
assumptions. Such influence of the local circumstances has also been recognized by 
Portes (2009 p.15) who states that ‘the extent to which the return flow of professionals 
pays off depends largely on the existing infrastructure’. Therefore it seems that the very 
reasons that encourage out-migration and undermine return also impede successful brain 
circulation. 
 
In all, in this chapter I have illustrated and underlined the importance of local 
circumstances that are likely to determine the developmental outcomes that migration 
may have. Based on my findings it seems obvious that circular migration and brain 
circulation  promoted  by  the  EU  Blue  Card  will  not  provide  a  solution  for  the  current  
challenges  in  Malawi,  as  any  positive  outcomes  seem  to  be  impeded  by  the  stressed  
circumstances. Positive outcomes under critical circumstances similar to that of Malawi 
are not claimed by the European Union or the academia, yet the failure of the Blue Card 
to differentiate between vulnerable and healthier countries and sectors provide grounds 
for me to question in what ways migration could be conducive to development 
regardless of the evident challenges. In the following analysis I will investigate such 
ways as I will evaluate how the EU Blue Card could address the problem of brain drain 
and achieve Policy Coherence for Development even in the extremity of Malawi. 
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7. Policy Coherence for Development – or not? 
 
In recent policy discourse the positive nexus between migration and development has 
been highly emphasized. The European Union has engaged in this discourse together 
with other international organizations, such as the World Bank, OECD, IOM, ILO and 
the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) as discussed in Lavenex & 
Kunz (2008). The positive nexus between migration and development is also well 
captured in the very idea of the Policy Coherence for Development – to harness policy 
sectors with direct impact on developing countries to take account of  and support the 
objectives of development co-operation, seeing that aid alone is not enough to 
accomplish the MDGs by 2015 (European Consensus on Development 2005, Carbone 
2008).  In fact, it seems as if the very idea of PCD has translated into a new 
development paradigm, similar to the idea behind the notion of “nexus” – a connected 
group of policy sectors, where one cannot be distinguished from the other. 
 
In the view of the findings from the Malawian health sector presented in the previous 
chapter, this newly stressed positive nexus between migration and development, 
embedded in the latest development paradigm of the PCD, seems surprisingly optimistic. 
Without denying the importance of the PCD principle as a comprehensive approach to 
development, I wish to challenge this optimistic paradigm and the recent migration-
development  mantra,  of  which  the  EU  Blue  Card  stands  for  a  concrete  example.  In  a  
similar manner than Lavenex & Kunz (2008) have concluded, I too will show that the 
PCD principle in fact risks translating the purpose from migration supporting 
development to vice versa – to development supporting the purposes of migration and 
other more dominant policy frames. That is to say that there is a danger that the way in 
which such an optimistic paradigm materializes in the political field, might in fact act 
contrary to the initial PCD principle; instead of supporting and ‘patching up’ 
development policy and aid, the common EU migration policy framework on hand and 
the current optimistic ideas of the nexus risk reducing the emphasis given on 
development objectives as such.  
  
In  this  chapter  I  will  answer  my definitive  research  questions:  Will  the  EU Blue  Card  
initiative be able to support the pro-development circular migration instead of further 
contributing to the brain drain dilemma of developing countries, and is it hence possible 
for the EU Blue Card to support the common development objectives, while responding 
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primarily to the internal EU security and employment interests? I will do this by 
approaching the Blue Card directive and the Policy Coherence for Development 
principle from the perspective of my case study on Malawi.  
 
I will discuss my findings in relation to the twofold role of the EU Blue Card within two 
distinct  dimensions  of  policy  coherence.  First  in  section  7.1,  based  on  my  analysis  in  
chapter 6, I will discuss the development side of the equation by evaluating the 
probability of circular migration to result in the developmental outcomes of triple-win 
or in brain drain and migrant syndromes in accordance with the theoretical framework 
presented in chapter 4. I will consider the revealed developmental outcomes of the Blue 
Card as a question of internal coherence within a single policy sector, meaning, whether 
the Blue Card as a strategy succeeds in attaining the set development objectives and 
thus produce intended and desired outcomes of the migration policy. Here I will argue 
that circular migration as a strategy is likely to fail to deliver intended outcomes due to 
the assumptions that the strategy rests upon.  
 
Second  in  section  7.2  I  will  explore  the  reasons  behind  the  chosen  strategy  and  show  
how any potential benefits that migration policy could have on development (i.e. 
internal coherence) are undermined by other more dominant policy frames forming the 
fundamentals of the EU Blue Card. This I will do by addressing the concept of 
horizontal coherence according to which the objectives of all three policy sectors of 
security, employment and development should be attuned to each other. I will argue that 
in its attempt to serve multiple policy fields and fulfil its twofold role, the EU Blue Card 
fails to ensure the realization of the PCD principle.  
 
  
7.1 Means to an end? EU Blue Card as a case of internal coherence 
While the persisting global South-North migratory flows leave little doubt for the 
realization of the first employment-oriented objective of the Blue Card – for the 
Community to receive the labour it desires – my case study on Malawian health sector 
demonstrates that human capital shortages in the South are severe and that the second 
intention of the EU Blue Card to take account of development cooperation and support  
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development objectives accordingly to the PCD principle is not as self-explanatory as 
the first objective is.  
 
In order to take account of and support development, according to the idea of internal 
coherence, migration policy should produce real-world outcomes that are consistent 
with the set objectives. Hence from an internal coherence perspective, realizing the PCD 
principle embedded in the EU Blue Card depends on whether the actual outcome 
corresponds with the intensions or not. Additionally, the chosen strategies and 
mechanisms should be attuned to the objectives (Forster and Stokke 1999b p.20). In the 
EU Blue Card the intended developmental objective is to contribute to the achievement 
of the MDGs, and the selected strategy is to tackle brain drain principally by means of 
circular migration. In practice the question of internal coherence in the context of the 
EU Blue  Card  comes  down to  whether  or  not  the  persisting  patterns  of  migration  and  
the problem of brain drain from South to North can be successfully addressed through 
the instrument of circular migration. 
 7.1.1  The two types of circular flows  
 
The impact assessment study of the EU Blue Card identified two types or models of 
circular migration, as discussed in chapter 3: a) circular migration of persons residing in 
a third-country and b) circular migration of third-country nationals settled in the EU 
(European Commission 2007a). As  evident  the  defining  factor  of  the  direction  of  the  
circularity is based on where the migrant resides permanently. Therefore the two 
circular models can be illustrated as follows:  
 
? Type A) Country of origin – EU member state – Country of origin  
 
? Type B) EU member state – Country of origin – EU member state 
 
First, given that the primary purpose of the EU Blue Card is to attract more highly 
skilled immigrants from third-countries for temporary employment within the EU, the 
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first type of circular migration is assumed to occur. Within this scenario, a developing 
country such as Malawi would temporarily ‘loan’ its personnel to the EU labour 
markets. Second, although the EU Blue Card first and foremost intends to attract 
workers from outside the EU, also those already residing within the Community are 
eligible  for  the  EU  Blue  Card.  Seeing  that  so  far  majority  of  Malawian  health  
professionals residing abroad have failed to return, the EU Blue Card could indeed offer 
a channel for these migrants to travel to their countries of origin, without compromising 
their administrative statuses and rights to reside in the EU.  
 
In  the  context  of  Malawi,  these  two  alternative  models  of  circular  migration  suggest  
very different developmental outcomes. In order to assess the viability of these two 
patterns from Malawian point of view, my intent here is to study the odds of these 
patterns to result either in a triple-win or in migrant and brain drain syndromes. In other 
words, the purpose here is to consider the internal coherence of EU Blue Card by taking 
on the question, whether or not circular migration – as the primary means of the Blue 
Card  to  address  the  problem  of  brain  drain  –  will  result  in  pro-development  outcome  
and  a  positive  nexus.  This  question  is  also  essential  in  deciding,  whether  the  EU Blue  
Card will realize the PCD principle or not.  
 
Based on my findings, under the prevailing circumstances in Malawi to address staff 
shortages is of primary importance in order to accomplish the MDGs, rather than that of 
focusing on the skills shortages, although severe. Without sufficient human resources at 
home even a temporary loan, accordingly to type A migration pattern, could further 
challenge the already stressed conditions. Even if new skills were acquired abroad, 
based on the findings, it is not self-evident that skills could be applied upon return. If 
skills proved applicable, it would be possible that skills transfers compensated for the 
lost work input – in the best case scenario even to the extent of a triple-win. However, if 
skills acquired abroad were not relevant or could not be implemented, the 
developmental impact would be solely negative. This is because temporarily lost work 
input results in temporary brain drain and lost investments in conformity with the idea 
of the brain drain syndrome. Moreover, temporarily lost work input is likely to 
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deteriorate conditions for those left behind as workload increases. This in turn risks 
resulting in a migrant syndrome, as more health workers may take upon the option of 
migration due to the change in the circumstances.  
 
Additionally to contributing to the existing staff shortages, there would appear to be 
another controversy in the very idea that type A circular migration would lead to 
development. The EU has justified type A migratory flows on the grounds that brain 
circulation and skills transfers were beneficial for development. Nonetheless, seeing that 
many developing country nationals already reside abroad and possess these much 
appraised skills, instead of luring more staff to Europe, it should only be a question of 
how to bring these internationally acquired skills back.63 Still  for Malawi,  to bring the 
skills back is only secondary concern to the question of how to bring the much needed 
extra hands back home, as under the current circumstances, skills should be considered 
only a bonus to the more important issue of staff volumes.  
 
Alternatively to type A circular migration, if the health professionals already residing 
within the EU would return to their countries of origin even temporarily – according to 
type B circular migration – developmental outcomes could prove completely different. 
As discussed, the stock of Malawian medical professionals abroad has been commonly 
referred to exceed the number of medical doctors remaining in Malawi. The return of 
these professionals even for a short period of time could carry significant contributions 
to local development as the effect would be largely similar to that of the work carried 
out by international volunteers at the moment: to cover for both the staff and skills 
shortages. Although the applicability of skills acquired abroad is not self-evident, 
considering that these workers were anyway ‘long-lost’ to Malawi, the benefits of their 
work input cannot be denied.  
 
                                               
63 It is worthwhile to note that the EU rhetoric over the significance of skills transfers for development 
also holds an assumption that there would be added value in skills acquired in Europe, or that such skills 
would somehow be “superior” to those skills that can be acquired, for example, in developing countries. 
Any value added in international employment, however, is likely to depend on the specific tasks and job 
demarcations assigned to the immigrant, as equally it might be the case that no new skills are learned 
during the international employment – and thus also social returns and skills to take back home are less. 
Such notion is crucial while calculating the gains and costs of migration. In relation to such rhetoric, it is 
furthermore interesting to note that it is indeed the EU itself (in the first place) that needs third-country 
skilled personnel to cover for its own staff and skills shortages.  
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Therefore, whereas the type A circular migration as the primary intention behind the EU 
Blue Card does not necessarily serve the needs and interests of the migrant-sending 
countries and is likely to worsen the conditions at least in the short-run before return 
migration occurred in Malawi, the type B circular migration illustrates the benefits that 
may follow when long-lost migrants are allowed to return without risking their status in 
the EU. Balance between type A and type B circular migration is extremely important in 
defining the developmental outcome of the EU Blue Card. 
 7.1.2  The two assumptions of circular flows  
 
The likelihood of these two types of circular migration to occur can however be called 
to question. This  is  because  both  of  the  definitions  of  circular  migration  rest  upon  an  
assumption that migrants would consistently want to return to their countries of origin, 
either permanently (A) or temporarily (B). This however, is not always the case. Now, 
let me illustrate this point in more detail. Although my findings support the view that 
prior the actual migration many would prefer to remain in Malawi – or at least 
eventually return to Malawi, if the option of migration was took on – the findings 
equally show that after already residing abroad, when circumstances and viewpoints 
have adjusted, the incentives to return to build meaningful lives in Malawi are few. In 
fact a majority of those Malawians, who have migrated already, still remain abroad. 
This is to say that what starts as temporary movement (A) translates easily to permanent 
migration – and adds to the stock of ‘long lost’ professionals. Also previous studies on 
migration trends indicate such change from temporary migration to permanent stay 
abroad, since return to the county of origin is perceived to compromise the achieved 
status and re-entry to the developed world (see for example Bach 2003, Portes 2009).  
 
The first assumption thus is that type A circularity would occur. In fact, the EU Blue 
Card fails to take account of the influence of the circumstances both in migrant-sending 
and receiving countries under which decisions of migration take place. It is assumed 
that improved migrant rights that allow for re-admission would guarantee the 
temporality of stay and employment within the Community.  This ‘insurance for status’ 
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does not however guarantee that migrants would wish to return permanently to work in 
their countries of origins, once adjusted to the new circumstances. In fact migrants may 
wish to hold on to their lives in the new host country, where their personal ‘centre of 
gravity’ is newly located and lives can be built. The attached migrant right to apply for 
visa extensions and new employment within the EU after the initial period expires 
provides migrants with an opportunity to stay permanently even with temporary status. 
This poses a challenge for the EU to guarantee and ensure the temporality of the ‘loan’. 
For example a sum of four temporary visas of three years each, account for a total of 
twelve years. Twelve years worth of labour hardly translates to temporary employment 
anymore from the migrant-sending country point of view.64   
 
The second assumption of circular migration relates to type B, as it is presumed that 
migrants settled down in Europe would automatically wish to contribute to development 
of their home country health sectors by practicing their profession there – only because 
the possibility exists. The legal channel provided by the EU Blue Card alone may not be 
enough, as there might be other obstacles and disincentives that hinder return – namely 
the discouraging circumstances in developing countries, described in chapter 6. As 
evident, in Malawi the absorbing capacity and integration mechanisms of new workers 
and skills from abroad are weak, regardless of the fact that the need is great. Although 
benefits of potential type B circular migration cannot be denied as concluded above, the 
EU Blue Card exaggerates its benefits by overlooking the developing country realities 
and inabilities to harness migration for the interests of development even when it 
occurred.  
 
As shown, there is much uncertainty that permanent (A) – or even temporary (B) – 
return would occur even when encouraged and intended. In fact, a more realistic picture 
of  circular  migration  would  be  a  sum  of  the  two  models;  the  first  pattern  of  circular  
migration originating from the migrant-sending countries easily translates to continuous 
                                               
64 It is necessary to stress that my purpose here is not to encourage the xenophobic discourse in Europe 
but to point out the inconsistencies embedded in the current ideas put forward by the EU in relation to 
migration and development. Furthermore, my purpose is not to challenge the individual right to reside in 
the EU, but to discuss the societal consequences of permanent migration for migrant-sending countries.  
104 
 
visa extensions and thus eventually to permanent migration, as opposed to permanent 
return after temporary employment in the EU. This signifies a failure of the triple-win 
and an occurrence of brain drain and migrant syndromes. The EU Blue Card risks 
adding to the already existing stock of migrants permanently residing abroad, and thus 
fails to reverse the existing and persisting migratory trends of South-North flows.  
 
According  to  above  discussions,  the  deficiencies  of  circular  migration  as  a  tool  to  
deliver PCD and desired development objectives are evident. While fulfilling the PCD 
principle would require for the actual outcomes to correspond with the intended 
development  dimension  of  the  EU  Blue  Card,  it  seems  clear  that  type  A  circular  
migration fails to meet such ends. This failure suggests internal incoherence as 
strategies do not ensure the intended outcomes. Conversely, type B migration stands a 
chance to materialize the developmental dimension of the twofold role of the EU Blue 
Card, seeing that as a strategy it addresses return migration and North-South flows more 
vigorously, instead of adding to the volume of global migration. Thus in all the Blue 
Card risks increasing brain drain (A) simultaneously to offering a way out of it (B). 
Nonetheless,  with  Malawian  circumstances  in  mind,  even  the  benefits  of  return  
migration are doubtful. 
 
 
7.2  Means to whose end? Twofold role and horizontal coherence   
 
Hundreds of Malawian health professionals already study or work in the UK but for a 
reason or another have not returned to work in their original home country. At the same 
time, hundreds of Malawians in Malawi are waiting for an opening such as an EU Blue 
Card  to  offer  them  a  way  out  of  the  strained  conditions  and  poverty.  Taking  into  
consideration such circumstances, from a Malawian point of view it seems that in order 
for circular migration to support development concerns, the primary focus group of the 
EU Blue Card should first and foremost consist of those migrants already residing 
within the European Community (B). However, the principal focus group of the EU 
Blue Card is the opposite (A) for the reason that employment and security interests 
currently dictate the common EU migration policy framework.65  
                                               
65 Of the influence of the security policy see for example Lavenex & Kunz (2008).  
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Because of such dominance and influence on migration policy, it makes little sense to 
consider the interlinkages and internal coherence between migration and development 
policies alone. The discussed failure of internal coherence can be explained by the very 
fact that the tool of circular migration is designed on the terms of domestic EU interests, 
rather than on the terms of the PCD principle. In other words, the twofold role imposed 
on the migration policy is not equal but hierarchical: employment and security policies 
form the foundation and define the framework for the EU Blue Card (as discussed in 
chapter 3), in which development objectives must be superficially squeezed in. Blinded 
by the migration-development euphoria and the possibilities of circular migration, the 
EU does not see this hierarchy as a problem. On the contrary, it is firmly believed that 
the  tool  of  circular  migration  will  ensure  a  triple-win  situation,  where  all  parties  get  a  
fair share of the cake – that of highly skilled professionals. From the EU point of view 
Blue Card as a legal channel of labour migration provides a ‘one tool for all’ solution to 
the persisting problems in all sectors as 1) illegal migration may be reduced and 
migration management improved for the interest of Community security policy; 2) 
third-country highly skilled workers can be attracted to the EU to cover for the 
emerging staff and skills shortages for the interest of the Community employment 
policy; and 3) developing countries can too be engaged in the global labour markets of 
which developmental benefits can then be drawn for the interest of development policy. 
Thus  the  EU  Blue  Card  is  an  attempt  to  combine  the  three  policy  sectors  of  security,  
employment and development for the interest of all. To realize the objectives of all three 
is  in  line  with  the  idea  of  horizontal coherence, as policy objectives are not 
contradictory but attuned to each other (Forster & Stokke 1999b).  
 
Although this combination of the three objectives in just one directive seems 
surprisingly balanced in theory, my findings presented in the previous section witness 
that the practice is likely to prove different. Circular migration as a tool to achieve PCD 
and ensure the development dimension of the twofold role could succeed in bringing 
migration policy closer to development objectives, if the primary focus was on 
mobilizing those migrants already ‘long lost’. However, because other parties 
additionally to development sector are interested in harnessing the avenues that 
migration policy could open, it is necessary to ‘share’ and attempt horizontal coherence.  
Thus the focus is shifted according to the needs of more dominant policy frames. 
Without this interference, internal coherence and positive nexus between migration and 
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development would be possible, although not trouble-free given the assumptions that 
return  would  occur  and  that  skills  transfers  were  of  relevance  as  evident  from  my  
findings. In other words, horizontal coherence, when imposed rather than natural, 
undermines the possibility of internal coherence.  
 
Because of the evident hierarchy and a biased focus to increase the volume of migrants 
rather than underlining the importance of voluntary return, much more is needed to 
accomplish the development dimension of the EU Blue Card. Above I have argued that 
circular migration as a PCD tool is deficient and rests on bare assumptions that return 
would occur and that this return could be utilized in full. Current migration-
development euphoria seems to ignore this possibility that, although materialized, 
circular migration is not self-evidently beneficial and thus does not necessarily translate 
to a triple-win as imagined by the EU along the lines of horizontal coherence. Because 
of this uncertainty, from a Malawian viewpoint positive nexus and genuine horizontal 
coherence could best be encouraged and harnessed by improving the situation at home 
and subsequently by addressing those circumstances that influence the individual 
decisions  to  leave,  stay  and  to  stay  away.  The  current  tools  of  ethical  recruitment  and  
circular migration do not address these circumstances. Thus a way forward would be to 
promote the return of both type A and type B migrants by seizing for example such 
underlying factors that were seen important by the Malawian health professionals, 
regardless of how trivial these may seem (see tables I, II and III in chapter 6). In other 
words, the tools to achieve PCD should be targeted towards minimizing the risks of 
brain drain and migrant syndromes, instead of chasing after an assumption of a triple-
win. Ironically, to achieve a positive nexus and Policy Coherence for Development it is 
indeed development that should be pursued.  
 
It is necessary to note that my wish is not to argue against the tools of circular migration 
and ethical recruitment, as these are clearly good intensions and visions, and certainly a 
right way forward in the EU policy formulation. However, according to my findings 
these tools are not enough to address the problem of brain drain and thus should be 
considered only as secondary to the more vital PCD tool of promoting reasons to work 
in developing countries.66 In the absence of such tools that would tackle the developing 
                                               
66  Similarly Castles (2004) has argued for a genuine emphasis on underlying developing country 
conditions to address the root causes of migration, while discussing the common policy failure to control 
migration.  
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country conditions, the EU Blue Card enforces all migrant-sending countries to enter in 
unfair competition over the highly skilled professionals, regardless of their own 
retention objectives. The question thus becomes, who can offer the most attractive 
working environment – a game that developing countries are likely to lose. Because of 
the hierarchical twofold role, however, meddling with developing country conditions is 
not high on the EU migration policy agenda, although such PCD tool would most likely 
complement and reinforce the current tools of circular migration and ethical recruitment. 
 
In addition to the failure to introduce a third development-oriented PCD tool that would 
introduce balance between the labour markets in migrant-sending and receiving 
countries, the sole concentration on current tools and the underlying trust that circular 
migration  and  ethical  recruitment  alone  will  prove  enough to  ensure  that  development  
concerns  are  sufficiently  taken  account  of  contain  a  risk  that  the  purpose  of  the  PCD  
principle translates from migration supporting development to development supporting 
migration. This is to argue that the blind trust on the positive nexus may result in a 
situation where development resources are channelled towards migration management 
in the sending countries. In itself this could be a good thing given the need for return 
migration, but if aid is used for management instead of development, those 
circumstances that hinder return migration in the first place are left with less attention. 
Along this line of argument Adepoju et al. (2010) state that the EU call for improved 
migration management along with the liberal labour migration policies risks to tie aid to 
the interests of the EU and not the developing countries. Channelling resources to 
migration management represents a wrong strategy for PCD as it is driven by domestic 
EU interests. This biased emphasis undermines focus on a development-oriented tool, 
vital for the realization of the PCD principle. Thus the way in which the PCD principle 
materializes in the political field and the danger that it turns against its own intentions 
depends on the more dominant policy sectors that fall under the same migration policy 
framework.   
 
The bias on the domestic dimension of the twofold role compromises the potential of a 
positive nexus and thus diminishes the development dimension of the Blue Card to bare 
rhetoric. In fact Lavenex & Kunz (2008 p.452-53) have noted that despite recent 
migration-development euphoria ‘the main focus of recent initiatives is still on the 
aspect of immigration control and proposals for measures pertinent for development 
remain not only very vague, but also non-committal and discretionary’. This is to say 
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that despite good intentions, a real shift remains missing as the framework and tools are 
based on the EU demand rather than on developing country realities. Because of this, an 
initiative that was intended to support the achievement of the MDGs might end up 
hindering the process instead. 
 
 
Above I have argued that in its attempt to serve multiple policy sectors, any positive 
impact that migration policy could have on development on its own is undermined. This 
is to say that in its attempt to achieve horizontal coherence, internal coherence becomes 
unattainable. This failure would suggest the “mission impossible” (Carbone 2008): 67 
that the EU Blue Card cannot achieve both internal and horizontal coherence 
simultaneously and that realizing the PCD principle would mean undermining the 
employment  side  of  the  Blue  Card’s  twofold  role.  However,  the  dominance  of  the  
employment allows only for bare optimistic logic and wishful thinking that migration 
could readily be conducive to development. This optimistic rhetoric and the idea of a 
positive nexus disguise the fact that migration policy remains EU demand-driven and as 
such has little to offer for development. In all, it seems that, although the EU Blue Card 
formally takes account of development objectives by means of circular migration and 
ethical recruitment – and thus follows the given PCD protocols in rhetoric – it falls short 
of actually delivering and realizing the principle.   
 
 
Final Conclusions 
 
The idea that other policy sectors could have a positive impact on development is at the 
very heart of the current development paradigm of the European Union. According to 
the Policy Coherence for Development principle all EU policies which are likely to 
have a direct impact on developing countries should take account of and support the 
commonly agreed development objectives and complement the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals. I set out to study this paradigm in the context of 
migration policy, given the topical and inspiring discourse that international migration 
flows could be harnessed to serve the interests of all – an optimistic standpoint also 
                                               
67 As Carbone (2008) has described the task of Policy Coherence of Development. 
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evident  in  the  recent  EU  Blue  Card  initiative  that  aims  to  encourage  migration  of  the  
highly skilled professionals. The EU has perceived circular migration as a way forward 
to  realize  the  positive  nexus  and  to  fulfill  the  PCD principle.  My purpose  has  been  to  
evaluate the sustainability of such argument and study whether the migration-
development nexus maintains its positive marker when observed from a developing 
country perspective. In order to learn whether or not the current migration policy 
framework of the Union can succeed in realizing the PCD principle, I set my research 
questions as follows: 
 
? Will the Blue Card initiative be able to support the pro-development circular 
migration instead of further contributing to the brain drain dilemma of 
developing countries? 
 
? Is it thus possible for the EU Blue Card to support the common development 
objectives, while responding primarily to the internal EU security and 
employment interests?  
 
In practice these two questions came down to whether circular migration could provide 
a viable and relevant solution to the problem of brain drain. If so, it could be concluded 
that  the  EU Blue  Card  would  contribute  to  development  and  would  realize  the  Policy  
Coherence for Development principle.  
 
I chose to approach the research questions from a Malawian perspective seeing that 
Malawi has experienced excessive brain drain of its health professionals during the past 
decade, and as a vulnerable country would have the most to gain (and to lose) from any 
changes in European migration policy. Regardless of any barriers, highly skilled 
professionals are likely to continue migrating and thus vulnerable countries should not 
be ruled out of any research concerning the possibility to create a positive nexus 
between migration policy and development. This is true even in an acute context such as 
health sector crisis and thus I saw it important to place the directive in such a 
perspective – all the more because, although intended, the EU Blue Card is not sending-
country sensitive. Because of the aforementioned reasons, I considered it significant to 
carry  out  a  field  research  and  to  question  whether  circular  migration  was  perceived  to  
provide a solution to the persisting problems and circumstances, and whether it was 
even desirable. Given the extreme circumstances in Malawi one must be careful in 
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making any generalizations based on the findings reached here as circular migration 
may prove beneficial elsewhere. However, given the research context and objectives the 
findings presented above are relevant and valid. What is more, through this approach I 
was able to introduce a local viewpoint still missing to the European discourse.   
 
As I viewed the EU Blue Card and the current migration-development euphoria through 
the lens that the interviews provided me with, the local circumstances pointed me to 
question the very mainstream idea that return and circular migration (together with brain 
circulation and skills transfers) would self-evidently be conducive to development – a 
presumption held in both optimist and pessimist schools of thought. Thus one of the 
contributions of my field study was to reveal the short-comings of current debate and 
nexus-thinking that overlook the fact that, even if materialized, circular migration does 
not necessarily equal triple-win. This is significant seeing that although circular 
migration would serve the interests and development objectives in certain countries, the 
outcomes may be quite different elsewhere. As the Malawian experience has shown, the 
outcomes are likely to depend not only on the sector and the country, but also on the 
prevailing circumstances under which decisions over migration are made (a point made 
also by optimists and pessimists, yet surprisingly ignored in relation to the idea that 
return would be beneficial).  
 
I started out by introducing the history between Malawi and the UK and how emigration 
of health professionals contributed to the vast human resource crisis still evident in 
Malawi. The purpose of chapter 2 was to show that the EU Blue Card is not first of its 
kind, and that there are lessons to be learned from previous experiences. In turn in 
chapter 3 I looked at the ways in which the EU Blue Card has been made allegedly 
development-friendly to avoid such consequences. I not only introduced the twofold 
role of the directive, but also addressed the tools that are to ensure positive outcomes for 
all. In addition, I viewed some of the key criticisms that have been presented against the 
EU  agenda.  In  all,  given  the  persisting  South-North  migratory  flows,  as  well  as  other  
policy sectors involved, it became obvious that the EU Blue Card is well-intended and 
perhaps represents the only rational way out.  
 
The present-day debate concerning such examples as Malawi and the EU Blue Card fit 
well in the past academic discussion that I overviewed in chapter 4. Here I also 
presented my theoretical framework and introduced some of the key concepts that I saw 
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essential for my study. Consequently in chapter 5 I explained the reasons why I 
considered it necessary to approach the research problems and current debate from a 
developing country perspective. I introduced the methodology that I saw fit for such an 
approach as well as discussed the problems that I faced while executing the field work 
and research analysis.  
 
After explaining the research arena, context and framework to my readers, I was finally 
able to proceed to the actual fruits of my study as I presented my research findings in 
chapter 6. Here I saw it crucial to illustrate the Malawian circumstances and experiences 
through a local voice, and attempted to see any interlinkages between the needs and 
interests  that  arose  from  the  interviews  and  what  the  EU  Blue  Card  has  to  offer  for  
highly skilled third-country nationals. From these more individual needs and desires, I 
moved on to address the bigger picture, as finally in chapter 7 I was able to look at the 
heavy EU apparatus and the possibilities it has envisioned from a developing country 
perspective, and could present my own interpretation that arose from the field work. 
Here I was also able to place my findings within the previous discussion and theoretical 
framework as well as to understand the reasons why Policy Coherence for Development 
is so difficult to achieve.  
 
To conclude, as evident in the light of the Malawian circumstances global migration 
management is desirable. Seeing that migration is likely to persist with or without a 
welcome note to the EU, it is in everybody’s interest to review migration protocols and 
to control the global migration flows. Considering this, from an EU point of view it 
makes sense to legalize these movements and to harness the benefits of migration both 
in migrant-receiving and sending countries. Without the legal avenues that the EU Blue 
Card opens up for circular migration – there would be little to harness from. 
Unfortunately however, as I have argued circular migration as an engine for 
development  is  not  as  simple  and  as  unproblematic  as  at  first  may  seem.  Thus  the  
developing country conditions from which migration begins should be of highest 
priority.  From  the  Malawian  point  of  view,  the  EU  Blue  Card  should  not  be  
implemented before incentives to stay in Malawi, and incentives for those already 
outside Malawi to return, were created. Other than that, countries like Malawi may have 
little interest in promoting free international mobility of highly skilled professionals. 
Thus instead of encouraging further migration, the rational approach is to promote 
voluntary return and retention. As of now, the two approaches to migration adopted 
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within the EU and in Malawi are contradictory and undermine one another, despite the 
fact that they share the same objective as that of development. With the current tools the 
EU Blue  Card  fails  to  overcome this  contradiction,  which  could  be  addressed,  if  right  
mechanisms were in place. This failure to create a positive nexus presents a challenge 
for  further  studies,  as  it  is  necessary  to  explore  the  ways  in  which  also  the  most  
vulnerable countries could become involved. Within this study I have been able to point 
a new direction for this.  
 
In  all,  according  to  my  initial  research  objective  to  assess  the  EU  Blue  Card  and  its  
ability to deliver PCD from a developing country perspective, I have succeeded in 
pointing out that what may seem as coherent from an EU standpoint is not necessarily 
so from a local stance – and the way in which the principle materializes in reality may 
even act contrary to its initial purpose. Although the EU Blue Card does follow the 
guidelines  of  the  PCD  and  takes  account  of  development  objectives,  it  fails  to  realize  
and deliver the actual principle.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I Focus group of the field research 
 
A total of twenty (20) persons were interviewed, three of whom twice. (Note that not all 
information is listed in order to protect the identity of the respondents): 
 
A) International composition: 
? Of the 20 respondents 4 were other than Malawian. 
 
B) Occupations: 
? The 20 respondents consisted of 13 nurses; 1 clinical officer; 5 medical doctors, 
and 1 professionally trained pharmacist.  
 
C) Occupational qualifications: 
? Of the 13 nurses; 4 were degree nurses; 3 were diploma registered nurses 
(however still students), and 6 were diploma enrolled nurses (technicians).  
? Of the 5 medical doctors; 2 were local; 1 was from another African country, and 
2 were international volunteers. 
 
D) Age & Gender: 
? Of the 20 respondents 5 could be considered as senior staff. 
? Of the 20 respondents 10 were female and 10 were male.  
 
E) Bonding agreement: 
? Of the  16  local  respondents  9  were  working  under  the  bond at  the  time of  the  
field study (autumn 2010).  
 
F) Post-graduate studies 
? Of the 16 local respondents 2 had already accessed some post-graduate training 
and 11 were waiting to. (In addition 3 local respondents were undergraduate 
students about to graduate and are excluded here as they had not yet been 
eligible to access further training or had time to ‘wait’ for this).  
  
G) Returnees: 
? Of the 16 local respondents One (1) could be considered as a returnee (as of 
having lived and studied/worked abroad for a considerable amount of time). 
Three (3) others had had exchange student experience from abroad. These three 
were not considered as returnees, seeing that their experience abroad was 
strongly tied to an organization or institution, and lasted less than a year.   
 
H) Hospitals: 
? In all respondents represented 4 different hospitals in 3 different towns in central 
Malawi; 2 of the hospitals were public sector district hospitals; 1 was a CHAM 
hospital, and 1 was a private hospital.  
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Appendix II  Analytical categories 
 
A total of 25 categories were identified during the analysis of the field interviews and 
transcribed material. Note that categories are interlinked as under these categories 
somewhat similar issues and sub-categories emerged. Consequently, of these 25 
categories, the three presented groupings of 1) work overload, 2) frustration and 3) 
further education, emerged clearly as common-denominators.  
 
1. Locals’ work experience with international volunteers  
2. International volunteer experiences in Malawi 
3. Difficulty to apply specific skills in Malawi 
4. Medical resource shortages and challenged diagnosis/treatment 
5. Government induced policies on return migration 
6. Comparison of CHAM, public and private hospitals (salaries and opportunities) 
7. Current preferences of work place 
8. Knowledge of Malawian returnees and work experience with returnees 
9. Staff shortages and consequent limitations to work  
10. Clear, spontaneous expressions of frustration & helplessness 
11. Knowledge of emigrants or expected emigrants, and their preferred destinations 
12. Education opportunities  
13. Remarks on education policy  
14. Ways to migrate (as of bypassing the bond) 
15. Reasons to stay (where stated plainly as such)  
16. Wishes to move abroad for work 
17. Retention policy and staff placements to the districts 
18. Student experience of practical trainings  
19. Past education and how it has prepared for actual work tasks and conditions 
20. Salary, allowances & locum 
21. Coordination and management at work place 
22. Recent developments and improvements in the hospitals/health sector 
23. Remarks on needs and suggestions 
24. Occupational cadres and job demarcations 
25. Disqualified replies due to researcher’s error  
 
